University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

4-8-2016

Stoicism in Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza:
Examining Neostoicism’s Influence in the
Seventeenth Century
Daniel Collette
University of South Florida, dpaulcollette@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Collette, Daniel, "Stoicism in Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza: Examining Neostoicism’s Influence in the Seventeenth Century" (2016).
Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6210

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Stoicism in Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza:
Examining Neostoicism’s Influence in the Seventeenth Century
by
Daniel Collette

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Roger Ariew, Ph.D.
Daniel Garber, Ph.D.
Colin Heydt, Ph.D.
Douglas Jesseph, Ph.D.
Thomas Williams, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
March 25, 2016

Keywords: Early Modern Philosophy, History of Ethics, Stoicism, Neostoicism,
Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza
Copyright © 2016, Daniel Collette

DEDICATION
For Alistair and Wesley, my raison d'être.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Most chapters were presented in earlier form as colloquium; Mary Domski, Julia Jorati,
Matt Kisner, and Julie Walsh offered especially helpful comments. My committee is
composed of the finest people: Daniel Garber, Colin Heydt, Douglas Jesseph, and
Thomas Williams. I am grateful to have learned with them; any errors in this manuscript
are my own. I owe very special gratitude to my committee chair, Roger Ariew, for his
unceasing generosity of time and a lasting mark of modeling excellence. He has shown
what it means to be successful while still maintaining one’s integrity and ‘soul’. I am
abundantly grateful for Doina-Cristina Rusu, the only non-committee member to read this
work as it formed. She has provided many insightful comments making my arguments
markedly better, and I have finished sooner because of her encouragement. I am a better
philosopher, and a better person, because of her friendship. Additionally, many dear
friends deserve credit for their encouragement and collaboration: Vlad Alexandrescu,
Anthony Desantis, Anthony Fernandez, Benny Goldberg, Dahlia Guzman, Hugh
LaFollette, Charles MacKenzie, Lucio Mare, Lucien Monson, Erika Oshiro, Nancy
Stanlick, Jeff Steele, Christine Wieseler, Milton Wilcox, and Andrew Winters. Others I
omit out of oversight, not ingratitude. To Joseph Anderson and Aaron Spink, many ideas
and drafts (which sort of draft I will leave to the reader) have been exchanged at
Coppertop and many places traveled: the bonds of friendship are the highest reward from
candidacy. Finally, thank you to Jennifer Collette. More than anyone she has felt the
weight of this process; I could not have done this as soon, or as well, without her.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Chapter One: Descartes’ First Morality: A Pyrrhonian Morale Par Provision .............................15
I. An Early Indifference Towards Morality .......................................................................18
I.a. Ethics in the Meditations on First Philosophy? ...............................................20
I.b. One Remaining Detail .....................................................................................28
II. An Alternative Reading of the Morale Par Provision ..................................................29
III. The Objection From a Letter to Elisabeth, 4 August 1645 ..........................................35
Chapter Two: Passions Embodied: Descartes’ Letters to Elisabeth Revisited ..............................38
I. The Passions of the Soul as Physiology .........................................................................40
I.a. The Passions of the Soul as Natural Philosophy..............................................42
I.b. The Order of Philosophy and a Physics of Man ..............................................47
I.c. The Cartesian (Re)construction of the Passions of the Soul ............................50
II. Cartesian Morality .........................................................................................................53
II.a. Descartes and the Greek Ethicists ..................................................................54
II.b. Descartes’ (Late) Ethics .................................................................................58
II.c. A Historical Precedent for Descartes’ Approach ...........................................63
III. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................66
Chapter Three: Pascal On the Good Life: If Happiness Fails, Try Stoicism .................................68
I. Pascal’s Use of “Order” in the Pensées ..........................................................................69
II. Pascal’s Philosophical Anatomy ...................................................................................74
II.a. Pascal and Augustine ......................................................................................74
II.b. Pascal and Descartes ......................................................................................81
II.c. Pascal and Montaigne .....................................................................................94
II.d. Pascal and Epictetus .....................................................................................100
III. Pascal on Morality and the Good Life .......................................................................102
Chapter Four: Spinoza’s Anti-Stoicism, or, Spinoza Among the Neostoics ...............................115
I. Some Interpretations of Spinoza and the Stoic Morality ..............................................118
II. Spinoza’s Anti-Stoicism..............................................................................................124
III. Spinoza Among the Neostoics ...................................................................................138
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................143

i

References ....................................................................................................................................149
Appendix: Medieval References to Stoicism ...............................................................................160

ii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AC

Descartes, René. Meditations, Objections, and Replies. Edited and Translated
by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Co., 2006.

AG

Leibniz, G.W. Philosophical Essays. Edited and Translated by Roger Ariew
and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1989.

AT

Descartes, René. Œuvres de Descartes. Edited by Charles Adam and Paul
Tannery. Paris, 1910.

EW

Hobbes, Thomas. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes Vol. VI. London:
Bohn, 1839-45.

CD

Augustine. City of God. Edited by Henry Bettenson. New York, NY:
Penguin Classics, 2003.

CSM

Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volumes I-II.
Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugland
Murdoch. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007-2009.

CSMK

Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume III, The
Correspondence. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff,
Dugland Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.

ST

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. I-II. Translated by the English
Dominican Province, 2008. http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2.htm.

References to Pascal’s work are from Jean Mesnard’s Œuvres complétes, currently in four
volumes (1964-1992). Since Volumes V-VIII are still forthcoming, I make the following
exceptions. References for the Pensées are to the Sellier (S) edition (1999), though I also provide
the older Lafuma (L) citations. References to the Entretien avec M. de Sacy are from Mesnard
and Mengotti’s 1994 edition; this newer manuscript was discovered and published after already
appearing in the Œuvres complétes. In some cases, a text is not available in any of the above
collections. Under these conditions, I reference Le Guern’s Œuvres complétes (1965). All
translations of the Pensées are from Roger Ariew’s edition (Blaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. and trans.
Roger Ariew [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2005]).
All translations of Spinoza’s work are from Samuel Shirley’s Complete Works (Benedict
Spinoza, Complete Works, ed. Samuel Shirley [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002]).
iii

ABSTRACT
My dissertation focuses on the moral philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza in the
context of the revival of Stoicism within the seventeenth century. There are many
misinterpretations about early modern ethical theories due to a lack of proper awareness of
Stoicism in the early modern period. My project rectifies this by highlighting understated Stoic
themes in these early modern texts that offer new clarity to their morality. Although these three
philosophers hold very different metaphysical commitments, each embraces a different aspect of
Stoicism, letting it influence but not define his work. By addressing the Stoic themes on the
morality of these three authors, I also hope to help better capture the intellectual climate of the
time by bringing Stoic themes into the foreground.
Stoicism is a Hellenistic philosophy that considered the passions a sickness of the
intellect and the source of all human suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was
obtained through replacing irrational passions with rational beliefs. Stoicism had a revival in the
Renaissance ushering in a wave of Neostoic authors who play an important role in shaping the
intellectual landscape of the following centuries. My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who
wrote a “provisional morality” early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of
ethics until near his death. In my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars
misread Descartes’ first ethics as part of his final ethics, this earliest “provisional morality”
mimics Neostoic Skeptics such as Montaigne and is provisional because his method of doubt is
also provisional. In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral
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theory attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions:
Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. In many ways Descartes embraces Stoic morality,
but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather they are a
physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s irrational
desires. I further defend my thesis externally by showing that this is the reading supported by
Descartes’ contemporaries including critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine
Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis.
My third chapter discusses Pascal, who embraces Stoicism differently. Pascal offers
Stoicism as the first tier of a binary ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of
man, it is an alternative moral code for those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness.
Finally, in my fourth chapter, I discuss two common misinterpretations of Spinoza’s ethics: one
of them neglects the Stoic influence on his thought while the other embraces it too strongly,
portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Although there are ways that he is more Stoic than
Descartes and Pascal, such as in his panpsychism and monism, this does not extend to his
morality. Rather than accepting either of the two readings, I highlight anti-Stoic themes that are
also present. I conclude that if the discussion is contained to his morality, Spinoza is no more
Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters.
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INTRODUCTION
The influence of Stoicism on early modernity is pervasive: for many authors during this
time, it was a source of their philosophical thought; for others, it was a point of criticism against
their contemporaries who dared to embrace the Hellenistic school. Unlike the early modern
Epicureans, who unabashedly embraced Epicurus’ philosophy, the early modern Stoics—or,
Neostoics—were more subtle in their use of Stoicism, typically synthesizing it with their other
philosophical and theological commitments to create something uniquely their own while also
unquestionably Stoic.1 This appropriation is most typically found in their moral philosophies,
though not exclusively. In present-day scholarship, the role of Stoicism in the 17th century
intellectual landscape is understated, and more often ignored. Without a proper awareness of
Stoicism’s influence, misinterpretations of early modern ethics have abounded. It is my goal in
this dissertation to rectify this problem by examining the Stoic influences on the morality of
three philosophers—René Descartes (1596-1650), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), and Benedict
Spinoza (1632-1677). This will result in gaining further clarity into their ethical theories and, as
a result, place them into the context of this Neostoic revival, a research project that has been
neglected before now.
With the amount of commentary that already exists on Descartes and Spinoza, and the
oversight of Pascal’s philosophical contributions, there is question as to what room there is for
this project. The literature on their work is vast, and even long neglected areas of investigation,
such Cartesian morality, have received a good deal of recent interest. Likewise, Pascal is known
1

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) was an Epicurean. Although he synthesized Epicureanism into his Christian theology,
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for his contributions to mathematics (binomial coefficients, a counting machine, the cyloid,
infinity), the natural sciences (experiments on the void), and theology, but Anglophone
philosophers tend to dismiss his philosophical contributions. At best, Pascal is presented as a
skeptic, or a mystic whose only relevance is an argument for religious belief commonly referred
to as “the Wager.”2 It is not even immediately obvious what is common between them that can
be identified as “Stoic” to deserve extensive treatment together, not to mention that they have
very different metaphysical commitments: Descartes is a rationalist who rarely lacks confidence
in his ability to understand the world, Pascal often draws attention to human epistemic limits to
question our access to metaphysical knowledge, and Spinoza is a panpsychic monist and
determinist.
I believe such a project is not only plausible, but also necessary precisely given the
current intellectual climate. In the volumes of literature written on Descartes and Spinoza there is
a multiplicity of errors, especially pertaining to their respective moral philosophies. The same is
true of Pascal—I believe one reason for the lack of philosophical interest in Pascalian literature
is that few scholars have taken the time to understand the fragments making up the Pensées or to
read his minor treatises; as a result, his work is misunderstood.3 One key to solving these issues,
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His argument is that if someone believes religion is likely true, and wishes to believe but is not sure if s/he should,
when weighing the odds of risk versus benefit of belief and disbelief, it is more rational to believe than not to
believe. The argument is part of a larger fragment, “The Discourse on the Machine,” and should not be taken outside
of Pascal’s many arguments to determine the true religion, though the Wager is commonly presented outside of
these contexts. (Pensées S680/L418).
3
The Pensées of Pascal are a collection of fragments that were found among Pascal’s belongings. He seemed to be
composing a philosophical treatise that functioned as something like a defense of the Christian religion. The papers
were collected and published posthumously in 1670 (the Port Royal edition) with very little sensitivity to the
argument that Pascal may have intended to forward. As a result, the treatise has become something like a puzzle (or
a critical editor’s nightmare). Undergoing several editions, editors have tried to undo the damage of the first edition.
Of these, the most recent is the lauded work by Phillip Sellier whose edition has become the new standard, replacing
the Lafuma edition, while Jean Mesnard’s critical edition is forthcoming as Volume VI of his Œuvres completés.
Pascal also has many minor treatises that are typically overlooked by a philosophical audience, if not
altogether disparaged. For instance, Desmond Clarke warns that, “There is a complementary reason for urging
caution about reading Pascal as a philosopher. He wrote much but published little, none of which was philosophy in
the sense in which that term is used today […]. Apart from his brief essays on the vacuum and the Provincial

2

I argue, is to rediscover the Stoic roots in each of them, roots that these authors appeal to
themselves and were once appreciated by their contemporaries. In doing so, there is a great deal
to be learned still about these ethical theories that I begin to uncover in the following chapters.
To carve out a broader historical and philosophical background, Stoic philosophy
emerged during the Hellenistic Period (c. 323-31 BCE), an era known for political and social
unrest. Out of this turmoil, new philosophical schools emerged, most notably the Stoics and
Epicureans. Like Plato, these philosophers attribute their legacy to the Socratic tradition,
appealing to the Cynics and Cyrenaics respectively.4 The Stoics began as a sect who gathered at
the stoa poikilê to hear the teachings of Zeno of Citium (333-261 BCE). The school expanded
rapidly to become one of the most dominant ancient moral philosophies, peaking in popularity
during the Roman period. Stoicism was an attractive philosophy for this age, securing the good
life inwardly during a time of external upheaval and unrest. It also had a broad appeal, given that
the Stoic teachings were tremendously egalitarian for their time. To see this, the Stoic canon
speaks for itself. The last two great Stoics were Epictetus (c. 50-130 CE) and Marcus Aurelius
(121-180 CE): the first, a freed slave with very little social prestige, and the second, a Roman
Letters, all his writings were edited and amended posthumously by collaborators who were still involved in the
theological controversies that had dominated Pascal's later life. For example, he seems to have contributed to an
early version of the Port-Royal Logic that was subsequently published in 1662; and the Entretien avec M. de Sacy
was composed many years after his death, based on the recollections of an editor.” (Clarke [2015]). This is
overwhelmingly false, and the disparaging tone obvious. The manuscript for De l’Esprit géométrique, a study on
Cartesian method that is used in Arnauld and Nicole’s Port Royal Logic, is available even though it was published
posthumously. It is hard to understand how this work is unphilosophical, unless we are also to accuse Descartes and
Arnauld of the same for their geometric methods. If its posthumous publication excludes this work as unreliable,
then we would also have to call many other posthumous works into question including Spinoza’s Ethics. Also, in the
introduction to a newly discovered manuscript of Entretien avec M. de Sacy, Jean Mesnard provides a compelling
case that although the dialogue itself is the construction of a later editor, the content is almost certainly taken from
fragments written by Pascal himself. (See the introduction to Pascal [1994]). My point is that Pascal has plenty to
say as a philosopher if enough pause is given to allow him to speak.
4
The Cynics, founded by Diogenes of Sinope (404-323 BCE), taught that the human end was to return to natural
desires, throwing off external constraints imposed by society. Zeno of Citium was a Student of Diogenes who
embraced some of his teachings such as returning to nature, though he disagreed to what that meant. The Cyrenaics,
founded by Aristippus (435-355 BCE) were a school of hedonists. Unlike Epicurus whose negative hedonism taught
that the best way to obtain pleasure, the Highest Good, was to live a simple life, the Cyrenaics believed that the only
pleasures that can be guaranteed are those immediately at hand, where denying a pleasure in hope of a greater
pleasure lacks this certainty. See Arrington (1998), Brunschwig and Sedley (2003), Gill (2013).
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emperor, the most important person within the largest empire to that point in history.5 Because
the Stoics believed that any person is capable of achieving tranquility regardless of his or her
external fortunes, its teachings remain a bit general if not vague, a quality that makes it easily
molded into any role or circumstance in life.
In part because of this broad appeal, recognizing what Stoicism actually entails is not as
immediately obvious as it may seem. In the teachings from various strains of Stoicism, there are
of course similarities. They teach that the universe is divine and contains the divine will. They
describe everything in the universe as nature, and in something like pantheism, everything in the
universe is God and thus belongs to God.6 They also believe everything occurs due to prior
causes according to nature, and is thus fated or determined. Since nature is God, to say that
everything occurs according to natural principles is the same as saying that whatever happens
occurs according to the divine will. Subsequently, all that happens is not only necessary, but it is
also good, as determined by divine providence.
The Stoics taught that the passions are a sickness of the intellect and the source of human
suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was obtained through replacing irrational
passions with rational beliefs. Passions are not to be conflated with emotions, as the aim is to
replace passions with rationally caused emotion, with the difference being whether the feeling is
caused internally from reason (rational emotion) or from external causes (passions). Arising from
the passions, a person becomes unnecessarily attached to other people and material objects,
falsely believing these external goods to be their own. Because of this, when misfortune strikes, a
person who believes an evil befalls him or her is mistaken: the real cause of suffering and
5

From Epictetus, the Discourses and his short but famed Enchiridion (“Handbook”), a collection of short aphorisms
as a guide for living the Stoic life, are available. The best-known work by Marcus Aurelius is his Meditations.
6
It is a small step to move from a nature that is God, which is described in terms of physics and understood through
reason, to atheism. There is question, though, as to whether the classical Stoics would have been psychologically
capable of atheism similar to how it is understood today.
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anxiety are false beliefs, such as the delusional judgment that counterfactuals were possible or
that a different fortune would have been better. This is a mistake, since reason tells us that all
fortune, whether good or bad, is necessary and unfolds exactly as it must according to the divine
will. Reason, on the other hand, should remind us that everything contained in the universe is its
part and thus belongs to it; as a result, nothing external belongs to anyone in particular, but is on
loan from the universe to use and enjoy for some time. Therefore, if someone loses a limb, for
instance, one must remember it was in God’s good providence to do so, and that soon enough the
whole body will be returned to God anyhow.7 Likewise, if someone loses wealth, a spouse, or a
child, the Stoic sage will remember that these things were not his or her own but they belonged
to God; these goods are to be enjoyed during this time, and when taken, the wise person knows
the goods were given back to the universe. The result should be gratitude for the time with them,
and equal contentment that the good has now been returned—it could not have happened any
other way, and it was according to divine providence, which is always good.8
However, there are also several varieties of Stoic thought that take exception to particular
‘Stoic’ doctrines.9 Among the Stoics there were those who believed some external goods are
preferable to others, rejected monist psychology (that only one substance exists and our thoughts
are merely modes of that substance), forwarded a Platonist Stoicism, required external goods for
the good life, and ignored physics.10 The best way to understand these traditions, then, is not a
rigid set of dogma to which philosophers must adhere, but something closer to a family
resemblance among various doctrines. In his articulation of family resemblances, Wittgenstein
7

Seneca, De Providentia, II.1-6.
Seneca, Epistle XCIX (On Consolation to the Bereaved, 2-3). Epictetus, Encheiridion 3, 14, 26. See Seneca (1917,
1920) and Epictetus (1983).
9
This is similar to Cartesianism, for instance, where there were Cartesians who at one point or another denied
almost every claim that is arguably central to Cartesian doctrine: there were Cartesian Empiricists such as Jacques
Rohault who focus on experimentation and ignore metaphysics, Cartesians who rejected substance dualism such as
Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and so forth. See Schmaltz (2002), Dobre and Nyden (2013), Ariew (2014).
10
Aristo, Posidonius, Panaetius, and Seneca/Epictetus, respectively, held these opinions. (Sellars [2006], 5-13)
8
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describes them through giving an example of the category of ‘games’—it is difficult, if not
impossible, to set forth a rigid set of necessary and sufficient conditions to define what a game is,
as there always seems to be some exception. He writes,
What is common to them all? Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they
would not be called ‘games’” but look and see whether there is anything common to all.
For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities,
affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! ... And we
can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way, can see how
similarities crop up and disappear. And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the
large and in the small.11
Though the conditions to demarcate a game—or a Stoic—may not be precise and articulate,
there are important affinities and shared similarities that, when looked at as a whole, are
distinctive. For Stoics these distinctive similarities are that the passions are a disease caused by
false beliefs, and while passions are the source of human suffering, they have a cure, which is
virtue or rational beliefs.
The Stoics were prolific, although for the early Stoics (from Zeno until around 200 CE)
most of the manuscripts are lost and we know them through the transmission of their accounts
through ancient historians.12 For middle and late Stoics, however, there is more primary literature
available.13 A common mode of their expression was letter writing; the Stoic epistles tend to
focus on applying their doctrines to a variety of topics, such as the problem of evil, political
governance, and dealing with tragedy.14 In its final forms in the ancient world, the school took on
a nearly religious tone with teachings shifting from entire philosophical systems that included
their logic, metaphysics and physics, towards exclusive of all but moral philosophy. The
11

Wittgenstein (2009), 36e. Philosophical Investigations §66. Also, §66-§77.
Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Galen, etc.
13
The middle Stoics began around 200 CE and the late Stoics the first two centuries CE. I borrow the dates and
categories of “early,” “middle,” and “late” Stoics as outlined by Sellars (2006), though he is right to note that these
distinctions are contentious. (Sellars [2006], 8).
14
Seneca, De Providentia.; Seneca, De Clemenia. See Seneca (1927).
12
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followers of Epictetus, for example, behaved more like religious disciples applying his dogmatic
doctrine than philosophers seeking to better understand the world. It is perhaps for this reason
that the movement stagnated.15
As the Hellenistic and the Roman periods came to an end and the medieval period
followed, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle reigned, exemplified by Augustine’s Platonism
and Aquinas’ Aristotelianism. Although no new Stoic literature was being written during this
stage of history, the philosophy was persistent: originally latent in the epistles of St. Paul, it rose
as both a foil and a minor authority for the Christian Scholastics.16 In the Renaissance, Stoicism
began to grow from its place as a subordinate philosophy. The Renaissance Humanists showed a
renewed interest in classical Greek and Latin texts, often translating them into the common
vernacular. Among these Humanists were Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) and Guillaume du Vair
(1556-1621). Lipsius made new editions of Seneca’s texts and authored his own treatise, De
Constantia (1584), in which he baptized Stoic philosophy into Christian thought. Du Vair
followed this path, translating Epictetus’ Enchiridion (1586) into French and synthesizing the
Stoic and Christian philosophies in his own work, which included the Philosophie morale de
Stoïques (1585). This movement, now referred to as Neostoicism, saw itself as filling the role of
interpreting classical Stoicism; but like Plotinus’ Platonism, they took liberties—at times,
tremendous liberties—as they reintroduced Stoicism to the world. No longer merely a
handmaiden to other philosophies, Stoicism was reborn. Other Neostoics emerged, including the
ecclesiastic Pierre Charron (1541-1603) who took eclecticism further, synthesizing Pyrrhonist

15

Sellars (2006), 26-30. For more on Stoicism, see Inwood (2003), Sedley (2003), Sellers (2006), Gill (2013).
See Enberg-Pedersen (2004) for Stoicism and St. Paul and the Appendix for a list of some medieval references to
Stoicism and the Stoics.
16
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and Stoic philosophies, adapting them both to support his theological convictions.17 His treatise
De la Sagesse (1601) sold tremendously well, a copy of which would later fall into the hands of
a young Descartes in 1619. Johannes Molitor, a Jesuit priest who knew the youth, worried that
Descartes put too much confidence in the capabilities of human reason and gifted the book to
him, hoping Charron’s skepticism would help cure him of this hubris.18 Michel de Montaigne
(1533-1592) also has Stoic themes throughout his work, though his allegiances are less clear. His
magnum opus, the Essays (1580), is a collection of semi-biographical tales and short musings
with common themes of turning inward to find truth, and his considerations of various
philosophies and topics. While Montaigne’s Stoicism is less obvious (or certain) than the other
Neostoics, Charron read him as a Stoic, and this is the reading of him that is popularized in some
circles.19 This Neostoic landscape is diverse, more so than classical Stoicism, and those in the
tradition readily reject and admit aspects of Stoic thought as needed to create a coherent
philosophy in the light of their other intellectual commitments.
During this time, there is a strong reaction against Scholastic philosophy and its reliance
on the authority of Aristotle that continues to escalate into the 17th century. While early
modernity is known as the dawn for a new age of modern philosophies, the seeds of these
philosophies are laid much earlier.20 Because of the work of Humanists in the previous century,
philosophers in the early modern period had access to a variety of ancient literature for the first

17

Pyrrhonism was a school of skeptics who followed the teachings of Pyrrho (360-270 BCE). Against the Academic
skeptics, a group from Plato’s New Academy who believed the only thing they knew is that they know nothing
(Plato’s Apology 21a-e), the Pyrrhonian skeptics believed nothing could be known, even that belief itself, and so the
wise man is one who seeks a life of balance and indifference towards beliefs.
18
Clarke (2006), 64; 334-335.
19
Although the most popular of the Essays, An Apology for Raymond Sebond ends up influencing both Descartes
and Pascal, the influence is most obviously skepticism, not Stoic; this does not mean that there are not other Essays
where Montaigne comes across more Stoic, nor that his remedy for living the good life when ignorant of the good is
altogether foreign from the Stoic sage. (See In Defence of Seneca and Plutarch (Essays II.32) and On Books (Essays
II.10) as examples of more explicitly Stoic works.)
20
See Ariew (2011).
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time in centuries. Without having to return to the authorities of Scholasticism that they were
trying so hard to leave behind, Skepticism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism allowed for alternatives
from which the early moderns could draw in forming their new philosophies. In the case of
Stoicism, the Neostoics even already did the work of ‘baptizing’ the pagan philosophy for
Western Christian consumption.
In the past several years there have been significant gains in rethinking how to understand
the history of philosophy, especially in early modern circles. Tremendous work by Roger Ariew,
Daniel Garber, Edwin Curley, among others, has questioned previous methods of examining
historical texts in isolation, and has uncovered a great deal of external evidence that helps to
shape how authors such as Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz should be read. Even
so, although Stoicism is a persistent, though admittedly sometimes subtle, background for early
modern thought, this influence was neglected until very recently and the literature that has
emerged on the topic is sparse. Most of this commentary focuses on how Stoicism affected
particular canonical figures and it typically lacks the appropriate contextual sensitivities. It is
important, for instance, to be aware of the other Neostoics and medieval treatments of Stoicism
before making general claims about how Stoicism affected a particular 17th century author. As a
result, the current literature largely misunderstands the role of early modern Stoicism, and
subsequently only confuses—not clarifies—our understanding of early modern thought. It is
towards these ends that I turn.
My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who wrote a “provisional morality” (morale par
provision) early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of ethics until near his
death. Historically, the morale par provision was considered a temporary morality, one
constructed to provide moral guidance until an ethical theory could be provided after he
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constructed a metaphysics and physics. In striving to recognize how various articulations of his
moral philosophy relate with one another, recent literature identifies the morale par provision as
a first step in Descartes’ greater moral project: broad Stoic maxims that are filled in with more
specific detail later through his Passions of the Soul and related correspondence. Specifically, in
my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars misread Descartes’ first ethics
this way, the “provisional morality” of Part 3 from the Discourse on Method should be taken
provisionally. However, rather than repeating older arguments to do so, I show that it is part of
Descartes’ broader method of doubt. In Part 1 and 2, he enters into a skeptical mode which
copies Montaigne and Pierre Charron in style and content; he does not emerge from this
skeptical mode until Part 4 when he introduces the cogito. Part 3, then, is a natural extension of
Part 2: rather than offering something intended to be taken too seriously, Descartes is recalling
the advice of a Stoic sage offered by Montaigne and Charron for how to lead the good life when
apodictic knowledge is unattainable. In short, the morale par provision is provisional because his
method of doubt is also. Part 3 is another part of his method of doubt that he does not emerge
from until Part 4.
In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral theory
attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions into
his own morality. I begin by first arguing that the Passions of the Soul is best understood as a
physics of man, a work in physiology, not a treatise on ethics. This interpretation is not only
better supported by Descartes’ published treatises and private correspondence, but it is also the
reading that early Cartesians take when reconstructing Cartesian morality. I then argue that, if the
Passions of the Soul is foremost a physics of man, then there is significant interpretive benefit in
how to understand his other late ethical writings. I show that in many ways Descartes embraces
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Stoic morality, but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather
they are a physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s
irrational desires. This is the foundation in which he believes his moral philosophy reconciles
Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian accounts of the good, virtue, and the passions. I further defend
this thesis by showing that this is the reading supported by Descartes’ contemporaries including
critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis.
The topic of my third chapter is Blaise Pascal, a figure often overlooked by Anglophone
philosophers. He is important in this context as he illustrates the complexity that sometimes went
into adapting Stoicism in eclectic philosophical systems. Pascal has a number of influences that
he carefully synthesizes into one complete philosophical program, most notably Augustine,
Descartes, Montaigne, and Epictetus; by understanding how he draws upon these resources, it is
possible to reconstruct his morality from the confusing Pensées fragments and other minor
works. Pascal’s credit to Epictetus is explicit and his way of incorporating Stoicism into his
system is novel and nuanced. I will show that Pascal offers Stoicism as the first tier of a binary
ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of man, it is an alternative moral code for
those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness. True happiness is found in knowing and
loving God, which allows a person to order his or her desires according to their proper end;
however, in a postlapsarian state, loving God is impossible without effective grace. That is, as a
precondition for knowing or living God, he must choose to dispense grace upon that individual.
Since there is no guarantee of this happening, Pascal wants his interlocutor to pursue God and
the good nonetheless, and not abandon them to the worst state, concupiscence. His answer then,
is Neostoic—reduce passions and submit oneself to the good will of God. Best case, this will
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better prepare one to receive divine grace; worst case, it is an alternative morality which allows
the reprobate to have a less miserable life than s/he would if enslaved to the passions.
My fourth chapter is on Spinoza’s morality, and it takes a different tone. Rather than
arguing for a particular reading as I did with Descartes and Pascal, I push back against two
common misinterpretations of Spinoza vis-à-vis Stoicism: one of them neglects these influence
while the other embraces it too strongly, portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Rather than
accepting either of the two readings, I argue that, if the discussion is contained to his morality,
Spinoza is no more Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters. Although there
are ways that Spinoza is more Stoic than Descartes and Pascal, evident in their physics and
metaphysics, these affinities do not extend so well to his morality. When it comes to his moral
philosophy, there are several ways that Spinoza is anti-Stoic that should be taken into
consideration. My goal is neither to understate the Stoic influences on Spinoza, nor to reduce
him into an unqualified opponent of Stoicism. Rather, I argue that Spinoza is a Neostoic, fitting
comfortably into an established tradition known for eclectic tendencies, selectively accepting and
rejecting doctrines as they see fit within their broader philosophical project.
As a methodological note, I try to be textual and contextual, balancing internal and
external evidence as much as possible to defend the thesis in each chapter. For external evidence,
when speaking of one author influencing another, I limit myself to those cases where it is
generally accepted that one author read the other in question; for example, I allow Charron’s Of
Wisdom but not Plato in examining the morale par provision. In other cases, I limit myself to
those things that an author has said about either himself or his own work elsewhere, such as what
Descartes said in the introductions to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy (1647)21
or the Passions of the Soul (1649). The same is true of their correspondence, and with some less
21

This date is for the French edition. The first edition in Latin without this Introduction was published in 1644.
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weight, what was said by their contemporaries. My primary texts that I appeal to for Descartes
are the Treatise on Man (1664), Discourse on Method (1637), the Meditations on Philosophy
(1641/1642), and the Principles of Philosophy (1644/7). I also draw a great deal from the
correspondence with Princess Elisabeth (dated May 21, 1643 through October 9, 1649), Queen
Christina (dated November 20, 1647 through February 26, 1649) and Pierre Chanut (dated June
15, 1646 through March 31, 1649), the French ambassador to Christina’s court. In Pascal, my
primary texts are the Pensées as well as Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et Montaigne
(1655?) and De l’Esprit géométrique (1658?).22 For Spinoza, I limit my discussion to his Ethics
(1677). I omit the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (c. 1661), the Short Treatise on
God, Man, and His Well-Being (1662) and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) since the
secondary literature I engage in during this current study limits itself to the Ethics. More could
be said, I am sure, if these texts were also considered, but this will be left for future studies.23
My research on this topic, though hard earned, is still in its infancy; I do not pretend to
exhaustively treat these topics. There is plenty more that could be said about Cartesian,
Pascalian, and Spinozistic morality and its relation to Stoicism. However, what I do set out to
accomplish is, first, to give a perspective from which to rethink which traditions influence the
ideas of these great thinkers, and as a result, how we as an intellectual community can better
understand their thought. By rethinking their moral philosophy through this lens, I will also
provide a better understanding of how Stoicism shapes the early modern landscape, making room
for future research in these areas. For this second accomplishment, it is fitting that my final
22

The first edition of the Pensées was in 1670, though as I note in fn3, this Port Royal edition was not without
significant errors in its organization, the Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et Montaigne and De l’Esprit
géométrique (written c. 1658) The exact dates for the Entrentien are not clear since it seems to be composed by an
editor out of fragments. All three of these were published posthumously, but there is good reason to accept their
reliability. See Mesnard’s discussion of the texts’ history in Œuvres III, 368 and Entrentien avec M. de Sacy (1994),
“Introduction.”
23
Justus Lipsius has a political program that would be interesting to read beside Spinoza’s Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus.
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chapter is on Spinoza, and not only in how each of the authors relate with one other individually.
It is true that the chapters follow one another according to their historical chronology and
philosophical development, and in this sense it is already an effective organization. But by
ending with Spinoza among the Neostoics, it helps to sketch out the overarching theme that I
work towards demonstrating—there is widespread influence of Stoicism in early modernity, and
this is demonstrated by its appropriation even among philosophers who radically disagree with
one another in so many ways.
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CHAPTER ONE:
DESCARTES’ FIRST MORALITY: A PYRRHONIAN MORALE PAR PROVISION

When it comes to unraveling Descartes’ moral philosophy in present-day literature,
commentators commonly see their task as understanding how various articulations of his
morality relate with one another.24 There are at least three places where Descartes discusses
moral philosophy. The first is early in his public life – in part three of the Discourse on Method
Descartes provides his morale par provision (“provisionally morality”), a list of rules to assist in
living well. The remaining two are much later: his final treatise, the Passions of the Soul, and
correspondence from the same period with Pierre Chaunt, Queen Christina, and most
significantly, Princess Elisabeth.25 The literature that strives to draw connections between these
works is often insightful and not lacking in interesting textual evidence. However, I believe this
process is fundamentally limited if not altogether flawed, as it operates under the assumption that
the various articulations of his morality do in fact relate with one another. I am not sure that they
do. While there may not be any inherent harm in seeing connections that Descartes himself did
not intend, in the case of the ethics, I believe it is a distraction that makes his later ethics, which
are already difficult to systemize, even more opaque.
For this reason, my goal in this chapter is to investigate whether the morale par provision
relates to his later ethics in any significant way; by significant, I mean whether or not it should
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See LeDoeuff (1989), Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro (2011), Gilby (2011).
Some authors attribute ethical themes to his Meditations on First Philosophy. I disagree, the reasons for which I
will address in the body of this chapter.
25
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be used in order to inform his later ethics. Traditionally, the morale par provision was
interpreted as a temporary morality to be disposed of once an established ethics was offered.26
The reasons for this reading may seem obvious at first glance. Just prior to offering the rules that
are his morale par provision, Descartes says he intends on building a morale par provision as
temporary housing “lest I should remain indecisive in my actions while reason obliged me to be
so in my judgments, and in order to live as happily as I could during this time...”27; it is a
temporary construction, he says, so that he may live comfortably while tearing down the old
house and constructing plans for the new. For this reason, many authors have argued that the
morality is provisional—a temporary construction to be demolished when appropriate.28 Donald
Rutherford aptly describes the morale par provision under this reading as “just that – provisional
rules that Descartes will follow while he carries out his search for certain knowledge.”29
In more recent years, however, there is a movement in Descartes scholarship to argue that
the moral philosophy established in the Discourse is “permanent and universal” in terms of his
overarching moral project.30 This trend begins with Michèle Le Dœuff, whose reading in her
influential text Recherches sur l'imaginaire philosophique has been widely embraced by the
Anglophone world.31 Le Dœuff argues that the term par provision is a legal phrase, a “juridical
term meaning ‘what a judgment awards in advance to a party’”.32 Since Descartes would be
aware of this legal sense of the term, she argues that in the Discourse on Method he is laying
down a universal moral code, general maxims which are completed when ethical particulars are
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Laporte (1945), Rodis-Lewis (1957), Schneewind (1997).
AT VI, 22; CSM I, 122.
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Rodis-Lewis (1957), 9-24. Also Schneewind (1997), 185-187, etc.
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Rutherford (2008).
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I quote Cimakasky and Polansky (2012), 353.
31
Le Dœuff (1989). Anglophone texts include Marshall (1998), Shapiro (2006), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), Shapiro
(2011), Gilby (2011), and Cimaksky and Polansky (2012).
32
LeDœuff (1989), 62.
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provided in the later ethical works.33 Other contemporary commentators do not attempt such an
externalist approach, and instead freely pick from the corpus of Descartes’ texts both published
and unpublished, public and private, to create a systematic account of Descartes’ morality based
on these various articulations.34 Both of these approaches share a common goal of reconstructing
a Cartesian ethics that does not exclude the gains made in the Discourse.
Although I appreciate the contextualist aim of Le Dœuff’s thesis and the desire for each
of these authors to draw upon all of the treasures left by Descartes in reconstructing a Cartesian
ethics, I find that I cannot embrace either of these present-day views. Of course, by forwarding
the thesis that the morale par provision is indeed temporary, I may be criticized as looking
backwards not forwards. However, I believe these readings are a distraction to understanding
Cartesian ethics, adding misleading criteria and forcing a misemphasis upon certain themes. If
that is the case and it makes his unfinished ethics, which are already difficult to systematize,
even more opaque, then it would be unwise to keep moving forward.35 When going on journey,
the responsible traveler must sometimes pause, and if it is discovered that s/he is going in the
wrong direction, then s/he must correct course; sometimes this means ‘going backwards’ when
an incorrect turn has been made in the direction opposite to that which one intends to be
traveling. Though my defense of the older reading is novel, in a sense I do move backwards, but
it is so that we might once again move forward more productively. This is my goal at present,
then; it is not to offer a more robust account of Descartes’ ethics: I leave this task for my second
chapter.
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LeDœuff, (1989) 66-69.
John Carriero’s and Lilli Alanen’s monographs best capture this position. See Carriero (2009) and Allanen (2003).
35
Of course, Descartes would advise in his third rule once a decision has been made that one should remain resolute,
like finding one’s way out of a forest! (Discourse on Method Part 3; AT VI, 24-25)
34
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I wish to defend the original thesis that Descartes should be taken seriously when he
states that the provisional morality is temporary, but I will read it in a way that pays closer
attention to influences that heavily shape the first three parts of the Discourse. To accomplish
this, the chapter will consist of three sections. In the first I call into question the relevance of the
morale par provision to his final morality by showing how unconcerned Descartes appears to be
about moral philosophy until much later in his public life; in the second, I argue for a new
reading of the morale par provision by showing that it is a natural Neostoic extension of the
skepticism outlined just prior to it; in the third and final section, I will anticipate and then
respond to the objection that Descartes proclaims the lasting importance of the morale par
provision himself, drawing a comparison between it and a new list of moral guidelines in a letter
to Princess Elisabeth.

I. An Early Indifference Towards Morality
In his writing, Descartes cover a wide breadth of topics. Even in his private
correspondence, these discussions concern metaphysics, Baconian experimentation, biology,
philosophical and scientific method, mechanics, physics, medicine, and many other topics in
speculative and natural philosophy.36 In spite of the many pages written on different topics, until
late in his public life, he almost entirely neglects the topic of morality. It is not until he begins
corresponding with Princess Elisabeth, the Princess of Bohemia, that he begins any prolonged
discussion of morality.37 If Descartes intended the morale par provision to serve a role in his
36

For discussions of medicine in the correspondence see AT I, 648 (Huygens, 4 December 1637); AT II, 500
(Mersenne, 9 January 1639); AT II, 570 (Mersenne, 20 February 1639); AT III, 120 (Mersenne, 30 July 1640); and
AT III, 271 ([Pollot?], Mid January 1641). For discussions of mechanics, see AT I, 434 (Huygens, 5 October 1637);
AT I, 648 (Huygens, 4 December 1637); AT II, 500 (Mersenne, 9 February 1639); AT II, 542 ([Debeaune?], 30
April 1639); and AT III, 212 (Mersenne, 28 October 1640).
37
May or June 1645 (AT IV, 218), 21 July 1645 (AT IV, 251), and 4 August 1645 (AT IV, 263). Misfortune struck
Elisabeth concerning her nobility and health, and Descartes responds with medicinal and moral advice. Deborah
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final ethics, it is strange that he typically neglects, and sometimes actively avoids, the topic. This
omission should call into question his concern for writing a morality during this time and thus
the role the Discourse should play in a final moral theory.
There is one explanation for his silence on morality that would allow for its continued
importance, that Descartes had interest in moral philosophy but was quiet about it. By
comparison, Descartes does not write about the Regulae in any of his other works and
nonetheless the treatise seems to be of some importance to him. It underwent at least one major
revision and, depending on how one interprets the forthcoming findings from the new Cambridge
Manuscript, there is some possibility that he continued working on the manuscript until much
later in his life. Although it is possible that he hints at the Regulae in the Discourse on Method
when he says that the method of the Discourse is not his method in its entirety, this is only
conjecture. If an argument from silence fails to undermine the importance of the Regulae, then
why would it succeed for morality? If this is the case, the objection is that there is no immediate
inference from Descartes’ silence on morality that should be drawn: that he is sometimes silent
on morality implies no more than the tautology that sometimes he is silent on morality. I believe
this explanation fails to be compelling, however, because in spite of similarities, there is an
important difference that makes this analogy fail in relevant ways. Although Descartes does not
discuss the treatise of the Regulae itself, he is clearly concerned with method at large; method is
important for him, even if he is silent about composing a specific treatise. This is not the case
with his moral philosophy. With his morality, it is not a specific treatise that he is silent about,
but the entire branch of moral philosophy itself.

Brown notes that medicine and morals are not always easily distinguishable. I believe she is correct. See Brown
(2008), 38-40. However, Descartes makes a distinction between them: medicine is for good of the body, morals are
for the good of the soul. That they influence each other does not reduce them to the same thing.
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I.a. Ethics in the Meditations on First Philosophy?
The more compelling objection, then, is that Descartes actually does discuss ethics in the
eight-year period; if so, then it is more likely that he laid down the morale par provision as a
foundation that he continues to slowly build upon while constructing an ethics over time. In one
sense, this objection is true; Descartes seems to discuss morality in the Meditations. In the third
meditation, for example, Descartes talks of evil:
Now as far as ideas are concerned, if they are considered alone and in their own right,
without being referred to something else, they cannot, properly speaking, be false. For
whether it is a she-goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is no less true that I imagine
the one than the other. Moreover, we need not fear that there is falsity in the will itself or
in the affects, for although I can choose evil things or even things that are utterly nonexistent, I cannot conclude from this that it is untrue that I do choose these things.38
Then again, in the fourth meditation, “Were I always to see clearly what is true and good, I
would never deliberate about what is to be judged or chosen. In that event, although I would be
entirely free, I could never be indifferent.”39 According to Descartes, ignorance of the good is the
cause of indifference, and the appropriate response to indifference is to withhold judgment:
“Because the will is indifferent in regard to such matters, it easily turns away from the true and
the good; and in this way I am deceived and I sin.”40 Likewise, in the fifth meditation, Descartes
discusses resoluteness. This topic mirrors the doctrine of constancy from the second maxim in
the morale par provision and later in his morality.41And then, finally, the sixth meditation
contains a discussion on pain and pleasure in terms similar to the Passions of the Soul.42
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AT VII, 37. AC, 20-21. Quotes from the Meditations as well as the Objections and Replies will use the translation
by Ariew and Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000) unless indicated otherwise. Here, Descartes
considers his criteria of truth and the nature of ideas and he only discusses immorality (that is, choosing evil) only in
so far as it helps to illuminate his criteria.
39
AT VII, 37; AC, 21.
40
AT VII, 58; AC, 33.
41
Descartes discusses the limits of knowledge for atheists compared with theists. Descartes expands on these themes
in the replies to the second set of Objections: “I do not deny that an atheist could know clearly that the three angles
of a triangle are equal to two right angles; I am simply affirming that his knowledge is not true scientific knowledge,
since no knowledge that can be rendered doubtful seems to deserve to be called scientific knowledge. And since we
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It is not unreasonable to see ethical themes in these examples – some of Descartes’
contemporaries, the authors writing against Descartes in the Objections and Replies, certainly
saw them. Mersenne, in the second set of objections, criticizes Descartes’ criteria of truth,
arguing that:
…if the will never goes astray or errs when it follows the mind’s clear and distinct
knowledge, and if the will lays itself open to danger when it allows a conception of the
understanding that is not at all clear and distinct … there would be practically nothing
that might permissibly be embraced by the will, since we know practically nothing with
the sort of clarity and distinctness you require for that kind of certainty which is immune
to all doubt.43
Descartes replies:
…what renders the will certain, if what it follows is not clearly perceived? And who has
ever denied…that the more clearly we understand something before assenting to it, the
less danger there is of our being involved in error…? But a concept is said to be obscure
or confused only because something unknown is contained in it.44
Descartes concludes that it is unimaginable to only assent to truths completely known, and so
when a person assents to a belief of this sort, s/he should hold on to it with the resolve of it being
completely evident, reiterating the second rule of the morale par provision and directing
Mersenne to revisit the Discourse on these matters rather than continue discussing them.45 As for
Descartes’ current concerns,
…I would like you to recall that in matters that can be embraced by the will I drew a very
careful distinction between the conduct of life and the contemplation of truth… the fact
that the contemplation of truth was the only topic I dealt with in my Meditations is borne
out of both by the entire project and by what I declared in no uncertain terms at the end of

are supposing him to be an atheist, this person cannot be certain that he is not being deceived in those very things
that seem most evident to him, as has been sufficiently shown.” (AT VII, 141; AC, 83)
42
AT VII, 86-88.
43
AT VII, 126. AC, 74.
44
AT VII, 147; AC, 87.
45
In the Reply to the Second Objection: “Yet from time to time one thing must be chosen from a number of things
that are completely unknown and, once chosen, it is no less to be held on to than if it had been chosen for very
evident reasons, so long as no reason can be entertained to the contrary, as I explained on page 26 of my Discourse
on Method.” (AT VII, 149; AC, 88)
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the First Meditation, where I said that I could not indulge too much in distrust, since I
was bent not on outward accomplishments but only on knowledge.46
In spite of what Mersenne may have first thought, the Meditations only discuss the
contemplation of truth, not the correctness of action.
Likewise, in the fourth set of objections Arnauld pushes for Descartes to elaborate on
errors committed in sorting true and false beliefs from errors of moral judgment.47 In a rare
moment of admitting error, Descartes yields to Arnauld’s objection, making a late addition to the
body of the Meditations. In an expanded preface, he adds:
But here one should meanwhile bear in mind that the Meditation there is no discussion
whatsoever of sin, that is, the error committed in the pursuit of good and evil, but only the
error that occurs in discriminating between what is true and false. Nor is there an
examination of those matters pertaining to the faith or to the conduct of life, but merely
speculative truths known exclusively by the means of the light of nature.48
While Descartes’ concession is pragmatic—he tells Mersenne to include the amendment so that
others will know he is reasonable and either be more willing to voice their disagreements or be
less stubborn in accepting his views49—it is also an odd way of granting Arnauld his objection.
Rather than agreeing to discuss morality based on the objection, Descartes restates with
heightened emphasis that he is not addressing matters pertaining to the conduct of life in this
work.50
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AT VII, 149. AC, 88.
AT VII, 215-216.
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AT VII, 15. AC, 8.
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See the 18 March 1641 letter from Descartes to Mersenne. (AT III, 334)
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The careful reader may note here that I omit the fifth set of objections with Gassendi and the correspondence with
Hyperaspites. I do so because the letter to Gassendi at best addresses medical, not moral, concerns and at worst is
only addressing metaphysical concerns. Similarly, the letter to Hyperaspites focuses on epistemic certainty. I already
elaborated on both: In the fifth set of objections, Gassendi suggests that Descartes should move beyond foundational
concerns to moral philosophy in the Meditations. In his response, Descartes describes the human tendency to err as a
negation of choosing correctly, not a positive quality in itself. When we judge incorrectly, the will is judging
independently apart from the intellect. Belief in a material mind, for instance, is judged as true because it was judged
true in the past, not because the intellect actively judges that it is so. He illustrates these limits by considering
someone who judges whether an apple is good for eating. In this case, the senses are insufficient for a sound
judgment; by its smell or color, someone may judge that a poisoned apple is nutritious. These sensations clearly do
not provide sufficient evidence that the apple is good to eat and it may even be that a person’s desire to consume the
47
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There are several points that should be taken away from this brief overview of the
Meditations. The first is that Descartes is consistently emphatic through this period that his
concerns are metaphysical and not moral. Whenever correspondents raise moral themes in their
objections, Descartes is quick to remind them of his current indifference on the subject: he either
draws his interlocutor back to metaphysics or dismisses the objection, directing them back to the
Discourse. He is so emphatic about this point that, in addition to repeating it often in his replies
to objections, he also amends the Preface to make his disinterest even clearer. The second is that,
even in these cases, Descartes only discusses morality when prompted by an interlocutor to say
more about it. This is hardly evidence that he actually desired to talk about ethics, found it
important, or thought it was necessary to talk about during this period.51 To summarize, the
number of times Descartes mentions morality in the Meditations and its Objections and Relies
are few, and when he does, it is always at the bidding of a correspondent in order to say he is not
presently concerned with the subject.

apple is the cause for the judgment that it is beneficial for the body. (AT VII, 376) Descartes concludes that for any
given object, “there may be many things about it that we desire but very few things of which we have knowledge.
And when we make a bad judgment, it is not that we exercise our will in a bad fashion, but that the object of our will
is bad.” (AT VII, 376; CSM II, 259) Descartes is explaining to Gassendi why it is that people hold false beliefs, and
this illustration of a poisoned apple is offered to assist him with offering this explanation. It is true that the judgment
of whether an apple is beneficial or harmful to eat moves beyond the metaphysical concerns of the Meditations, but
he only offers it as an example to address the metaphysical concerns raised by Gassendi. Even supposing that
Descartes is more invested in this example than the text warrants, at very best these concerns are medicinal and,
contrary to morality, medicine is a topic that he discusses often in his correspondence, so it is not much of a surprise
to see it here.
As for the correspondence with “Hyperaspites,” during the period in which the text of the Meditations is
coming together, Descartes has an exchange with “Hyperaspites,” a champion for Gassendi. Descartes hoped to
publish this letter and his response along with the other objections and replies, but it was received too late to be
included with the others. (Descartes’ letter to Mersenne, 17 November 1641; AT III, 447) Descartes tells
Hyperaspites that “It would indeed be desirable to have as much certainty for the conduct of our lives as is needed
for the acquisition of knowledge; but it is easily shown that in such matters so much is not to be sought or hoped
for.” (AT III, 422; CSMK, 188) In short, as in the sixth meditation, Descartes is reminding Hyperaspites not to apply
his epistemic certainty to morality; they are not the same.
51
It is similar to those times when I am teaching ethics to my first year students ethics: they will sometimes ask me
about Ayn Rand and, assuming their questions are relevant to the topic at hand, I will answer them. This is no
indication as to how much I actually care about, or wish to spend any effort considering, the writings of Ayn Rand.
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Even if, Descartes is not concerned with morality in the Meditations as I have shown, that
does not make it any less important for his future ethical project. In the Preface to the French
edition of the Principles of Philosophy he discusses the order of his philosophy, describing it as a
tree: the roots of metaphysics will flow into the trunk of physics, and from the trunk of physics
will grow the applied philosophies, each with its own end: medicine, mechanics, and morals.52 In
his tree of philosophy, medicine, mechanics, and morals are posterior to his metaphysics and
physics. It is fitting that in discussing metaphysics he includes topics with ethical implications
such as the will—it will ‘flow’ through the trunk and into the branches. We should think of the
metaphysics (like the physics) as preconditions for morality.
To offer an example, in the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas famously offers five
arguments for the existence of God. Just prior to these demonstrations, he answers the question
whether it is possible to demonstrate that God exists. Aquinas replies that, “The existence of God
and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace
presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected.”53 For Aquinas,
natural knowledge can function as a precondition for faith, but the two are not identical;
similarly, for Descartes, ethics presupposes metaphysics—a doctrine of the will may be a
precondition for blameworthiness, for instance.
The remaining problem now is why he would choose to omit morality in the Meditations
after including it in the Discourse. There are a few reasons why this may be the case. For one,
Descartes’ Meditations is undertaking a different type of project than the Discourse. He writes in
the preface to the Meditations, “The intent there [in the Discourse] was not to provide a precise
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treatment of [God and the human mind], but only to offer a sample and to learn from the
opinions of readers how these issues should be treated in the future.”54 In the Discourse,
however, he is trying to accomplish much more.55 It was a wide and ambitious project,
advancing a metaphysics, morale par provision, and physics, though he admits none of them
were treated in their entirety.56 All of this is in contrast with the narrow, metaphysical focus of
the Meditations: that is, to provide a foundation for his physics by proving the existence of God
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Also, while the Discourse and its reception are important historically and philosophically, it does not present
Descartes’ mature philosophy. He did not think the Discourse was a completed work from the start. The Discourse
was more of an afterthought to his scientific treatises for which it served as a preface. His correspondence leading up
to its publication shows his efforts focused on the scientific treatises that became the Meteorology, Optics, and
Geometry. Descartes makes no mention of the Discourse until a year before its publication when he tells Mersenne
that he decided to include a preface to the three treatises. (Letter to Mersenne; March 1636 (AT I, 338); Though he
mentions a little metaphysical treatise fairly early (Letter to Mersenne from 25 November 1630 [AT I, 177]), its
stated purpose of proving the existence of God and the soul is different than that of the Discourse on Method. This is
not to say that Descartes viewed the Discourse as an unimportant document; though he did not consider it a final or
comprehensive product, (Letter to [Vatier], 22 February 1638. (AT I, 558)) he saw it as a step in a process toward
developing a more complete metaphysics and physics. He actively pursued criticisms of the Discourse, requesting
two hundred copies to distribute (Letter to Mersenne, March 1636; AT I, 339) and he requested objections from his
correspondents. This was common in his interactions with Mersenne and Huygens as well as with their colleagues
and acquaintances. One reason why Descartes may have asked for comments could be that he fears being
misunderstood: he goes as far as to include instructions in the prefaces of his publications for how to properly read
them, and confides in those closest to him that he is concerned for his reputation. In spite of this concern, it does not
change the fact that he also explicitly makes the request in his letters to search for errors in his writing. Descartes
pleads to Mersenne: “continue to tell me all those you hear. Make them as unfavorable to me as you can; that will be
the great pleasure you can give me.” (27 February 1637. AT I, 349; CSMK, 52-53) Similarly, he writes later that
year that, “those who bring some error to my attention will always please me more than those who bring me praise.”
(Letter to [Noel], October 1637; AT I 454; CSMK, 74) This sentiment is repeated to Plempius in letter dated 20
December 1637. (AT I, 475) After Galileo’s condemnation, his concern is surely more than an inflated self-image or
a desire to live undisturbed by uncharitable criticisms lest Galileo’s fate become his own. Though it seems that his
original vision was to publish the Discourse with Objections and Replies, this idea was abandoned to write the
Meditations in this way.
I strongly believe that though Descartes rarely admits to being wrong, the requests for comments on his
work are not only rhetoric. As early as 1630, seven years before the Discourse is published, he tells Mersenne that
he had interest in publishing a work that included objections from others and his replies to those objections. He
brings this up again in a letter to Mersenne from Early June of 1637. (AT I, 377) Upon receiving these criticisms, he
embraced many of them in action, if not in word, as evidence of his sincerity: there are clear differences between the
Discourse and the Meditations on First Philosophy resulting from considering objections raised by even some of his
fiercest critics. Many objections arose in letters from Pierre Petit, for example, who Descartes specifically alludes to
in the Latin preface to the Meditations. Jean-Luc Marion argues that the whole of the Meditations’ body should be
seen as a reply to the objections to the Discourse. (Marion [1995], 7, etc.) One of these changes is the order of
philosophy in the Meditations, where the placement of a proof for the existence of God is moved to precede
mind/body dualism.
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and the immortality of the soul. Here, he has a much narrower scope, intending that his physics
will follow in a future publication.57
Another motivation for omitting discussions of morality from the Meditations may relate
to Descartes’ choice of publication language: the Discourse was published in French while the
Meditations was first printed in Latin. There are several reasons for him to do this. For one, it
was more practical; he began receiving correspondence in Latin, not French, and wanted
consistency in language throughout the Meditations.58 Aware that a Jesuit audience would be
more receptive to a Latin text than a French manuscript, another incentive was political: to win
favor with the faculty at La Fleche.59 Because of these reasons, his choice of publication
language may be overdetermined.60
Nonetheless, another explanation that Descartes gives helps explain the inclusion of the
provisional morality in the Discourse and its omission from the Meditations. This explanation is
as follows: both languages appealed to large numbers of readers, but had two very different
audiences. The French language appealed to a broader demographic because it also included
those not formally educated, such as woman, among its readership; but, geographically, it
reached a smaller, francophone region. In contrast, Latin appealed to a smaller demographic of
learned individuals, but reached much further geographically. Descartes was concerned that if he
gave his strongest arguments in French he would corrupt the “weak minds.”61 In a letter from
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1637, he admits that the arguments for God’s existence in the Discourse were not the strongest;
however, in order to strengthen them he would have to first offer a more robust skepticism, and
“…I was afraid that this introduction [of more skepticism] would look at first as if it were
designed to bring in skepticism, and would disturb weaker minds, especially as I was writing in
the vernacular.”62
Since Descartes is already concerned that his skepticism will disturb “weak minds,” it
makes sense, then, when writing in the common vernacular, French, that he takes extra care to
include the morale par provision along with his doubt. He does this precisely to subdue any
possibility of future moral misgivings that might come upon those of “weak mind” while still in
the mode of skepticism. Arnauld highlights this point in the fourth set of objections to the
Meditations: “…surely the author himself admits in his Discourse on Method that this style [of
doubt] is dangerous to people of ordinary intelligence.”63 Descartes’ reply affirms this. He
refrained from treating more sophisticated skeptical arguments the Discourse, he says, because it
was written in French; he “reserved them instead for these Meditations, which I warned early on
should be read only by those who have both intelligence and learning.”64 The doubt in the
Meditations he claims is not suited for people of all intelligence; when writing in Latin, which
also implies a more learned audience, he is more comfortable delving deeper into skepticism
since he does not fear leading “weak minds” astray in the same way as when he is writing in the
vernacular. With this concern also vanishes the need for a provisional morality.
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I.b. One Remaining Detail
Up to this point, I have argued that Descartes was silent about morality after the
Discourse in order to distance myself from readings that place too much emphasis on the role of
the morale par provision in a Cartesian ethics. To do this, I have shown that his silence
concerning the Regulae is not a relevant enough comparison to deflate my concern. I have also
shown that his only discussion of ethics, not to be confused with the metaphysical preconditions
for ethics, are when he is compelled to talk about it by others in the Objections and Replies. On
each of these occasions he reminds his objector that he is uninterested in discussing moral
philosophy, going so far as to add this disclaimer into the Preface of the Meditations.
So now I will address a remaining detail, the final reference to morality by Descartes
before his 1645 letters to Elisabeth (other than the “provisional morality”). A year after the
publication of the Discourse, Descartes writes to Pollot. In this letter, Descartes writes in
reference to the moral rules of the Discourse, that “I apply this rule mainly to actions in life
which admit of no delay, and I use it only provisionally, intending to change my opinions as
soon as I can find better.”65 He is merely reiterating what he already said in the beginning of the
third part of the Discourse:
Now, before starting to rebuild your house, it is not enough simply to pull it down, to
make provision for materials and architects (or else train yourself in architecture), and to
have carefully drawn up the plans; you must also provide yourself with some other place
where you can live comfortably while building is in progress.66
Aside from the morale par provision, in this only other explicit reference to morality before the
letters to Elisabeth, Descartes reinforces the provisional nature of the rules in the third part: they
are meant to serve as a guide for actions that cannot be postponed and will be demolished when a
complete ethics is offered.
65
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I have shown, then, that the only references to morality Descartes makes until later in his
public life are very few and reaffirm that the morale par provision is temporary (and not to be
taken in the legal sense offered by Le Dœuff) as well as that he is unconcerned with ethics at this
time. There is a real indifference towards morality before he begins discussing the topic with
Elisabeth, making the morale par provision an anomaly that warrants a different explanation. It
is this explanation that I turn to in my next section.

II. An Alternative Reading of the Morale Par Provision
Up to this point I have been making a case that the morality in the third part of the
Discourse is an anomaly, a brief moment when Descartes discusses moral philosophy with any
interest or detail prior to correspondence much later in his life. Even if this is the case, then its
anomalous inclusion in the Discourse deserves an explanation. In the last section, I offered some
possible motivations—differences in both language and philosophical emphases of the Discourse
and Meditations. However I believe there is something much deeper and interesting going on
which motivates Descartes to include the morale par provision in the third part of the Discourse.
In short, I believe that the provisional morality is a natural extension of the Neostoic skepticism
outlined just prior to it. The provisional morality occurs under a ‘veil of doubt,’ which Descartes
does not emerge from until the fourth part. In a sense, the morale par provision is not actually an
anomaly, because his interest is skeptical, not moral; he is extending his skeptical program that
he begins in the first two parts.
Two authors central to the development of the Discourse and Meditations are Montaigne
and Pierre Charron. Montaigne was one of the most influential figures to emerge from the
Renaissance. Famous for penning his tremendously popular Essays, one of particular
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philosophical influence was the essay, an Apology for Raymond Sebond. In this apology,
Montaigne defends Raymond Sebond’s La Theologie naturelle against recent attacks.67 It is
hardly an apology, though, as his argument reduces to skepticism: Raymond’s critics are
mistaken, but only as much as everyone is mistaken. The criticisms against Sebond’s natural
theology are just as absurd as their object of the attacks because pursuing natural knowledge is a
fruitless endeavor. The Apology includes classic Pyrrhonian arguments that Descartes
unapologetically embraces later in the Meditations: our senses deceive us, we cannot be sure if
we are awake or sleeping, and all expressions of our cognitive faculties lead to circular
arguments.68
Pierre Charron is lesser known than Montaigne today, but he is arguably just as important
for the development of early modern thought. Richard Popkin goes as far as to consider him
among the fathers of modern philosophy, and I do not disagree.69 Charron, a priest who
systematizes Montaigne’s fideism of the Apology, attempts to lead his author to a crisis of doubt;
this Pyrrhonian crisis will affirm that human knowledge is impossible by natural reason, and
human effort should instead be turned towards custom and self-knowledge. Charron’s wise man
is a Stoic sage, arrived at by doubt, and synthesized with his Christian faith, similar in ways to
what the Renaissance Neostoics (e.g., Justus Lipsius and Guillaume Du Vair) did before him.
Charron also interpreted Montaigne in this Neostoic tradition but whether this interpretation is
fair or not is unclear. What is clear, however, is that his reading of Montaigne helped to inform
the Stoic aspects of Charron’s own thought. Descartes read Charron as well, receiving a copy of
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On Wisdom when he was young.70 This early exposure to Charron also likely affected Descartes’
reading of Montaigne, helping him draw out Stoic-like themes latent in the Apology and more
explicit in other essays.
The influence of these two authors is paramount for framing the first parts of the
Discourse, which are nearly a précis of these two works in both thought and style. Montaigne’s
style in the Essays is distinct. Written in an elegant French, Montaigne offered semi-biographical
aggrandized stories and thoughts on various topics, with focus on turning inward towards selfdiscovery and knowledge. Descartes repeats this Montaignian style in the Discourse, which he
also calls an “essay” put forward “merely as a story or, if you prefer, as a fable”.71 It is written in
French and provides an embellished autobiographical account of his journey to understanding
that begins with self-knowledge: je pense, donc je suis.
The influence on the content of these first parts of the Discourse is also significant, most
specifically in laying out a method of doubt. In the first part, Descartes lays out a provisional
skepticism that he does not emerge from until the fourth part. One of the most central Pyrrhonian
themes present in both Montaigne and Charron is the doctrine of indifference. Skepticism in this
tradition teaches that for every proposition, its opposite can be proposed with equal rhetorical
force. Since reason cannot rationally compel a person to judge in favor of either a proposition or
its negation, s/he should embrace indifference, acknowledging that nothing can be known with
certainty, even uncertainty. Descartes echoes Montaigne’s disenchantment with Scholastic
education, raising his own distaste for the Jesuit education he received at La Flèche.72 Recalling
the Pyrrhonian equilibrium traced throughout Montaigne’s Apology, he applies it to the apparent
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futility of education itself: for every reason to affirm one intellectual pursuit, there was an
equally compelling reason reject it. Reading of classical texts and studying history are beneficial
to know more about other people and judge more soundly, but at the end it is no different than
traveling, and too much traveling makes one a stranger in his or her own country, and so forth.
Descartes mimics other skeptical tropes from their writing, such as an emphasis custom and its
role in shaping beliefs:
I thought, too, how the same man, with the same mind, if brought up from infancy among
the French or the Germans, develops otherwise than he would if he had always lived
among the Chinese or cannibals. […] Thus it is more custom and example that persuade
us, rather than any certain knowledge.73
It is not until the end of part two, when he wanders into method, does he deviate even slightly
from Montaigne and Charron. When he offers this method, prescribing resources to begin
untangling human knowledge, he has not yet emerged from the veil of doubt he has placed upon
himself. This emergence from doubt occurs in the fourth part with his Cogito, the expression of
self-knowledge. Once the reader is free from the grasp of provisional skepticism in the fourth
part, s/he is able to begin applying the rules of method given earlier to solve problems and learn
new truths based on those discovered.
The question remains of what to make of the third part. I have already discussed how the
Discourse begins by repeating the skepticism of Montaigne and Charron almost verbatim, in
content and style. For this reason, I would like to return to these two authors. An important
difference between their projects and Descartes’ is that their doubt is not provisional. Both
remain committed to uncertainty, rejecting the ability to naturally obtain knowledge. However,
their skepticism does not result in paralysis, no more than it does in Sextus Empiricus.
Skepticism should lead a person to self-knowledge and tranquility. For Charron and Montaigne
73
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(or at least Charron’s Montaigne), the goal is nonetheless wisdom, and the Wise Man is none
other than a Neostoic Sage. Most clearly outlined by Charron, there are two illnesses that plague
the good life: giving oneself to external corruptions and the passions. Popular opinion is
misleading, and distracts one from the search for truth. As for the passions, they are a sickness of
the intellect and a source of all human suffering; the cure is virtue, which was obtained through
removing irrational passions. There are four remedies that Charron lays out. The first, and basest,
is to foster insensibility, as it is better to be numb to everything than succumb to the passions.
His second is to invoke passions to suppress one another, followed by actively avoiding those
circumstances that arouse passions. The fourth and highest remedy is to confront passions with
reason. This virtue is a “firmness of the soul by means of which one foresees and confronts
things without trouble.”74 In rejecting external influences and removing the passions, the wise
man is able to conquer his self. In the search for truth, the wise man also empties his mind,
letting indifference serve religion, as that person is free to follow the God and the Church.75
Similarly, life is a performance, where “the wise man will often […] play one role before the
outside world and another in his mind.”76 Charron writes, “He must do and behave outwardly for
public respect and offend no one, in accordance with the law, custom, and rites that the country
observes and requires.”77 All of these should serve the ultimate purpose of seeking truth and they
require constancy.78 “Wisdom is a regulated handling of our soul with moderation and
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proportion,” he says, “that is a balance and a sweet harmony of our judgments, actions, manners,
and a healthy constancy of our mind.”79
In rightly understanding the morale par provision, then, there are a few things that we
already know. First, that it is a temporary housing while the new housing is drafted and
constructed; second, that it occurs under provisional doubt. This second point I believe is
particularly important in understanding it. If Descartes so closely follows Montaigne and
Charron in the first two parts, and he does not remove this skeptical veil until the fourth, I
suggest that the third part should be understood as an extension of these first two parts. When
approached in this context the similarities are striking. Consider the advice for Charron’s wise
man: follow the customs of one’s country, value constancy, conquer oneself through neglecting
the external world and overcoming passions, and to make seeking wisdom the highest of life’s
pursuits. These are, of course, exactly the three (or four) rules that Descartes prescribes in the
provisional morality. For Descartes, they are to first, “obey the laws and customs of my country,
constantly holding on to the religion in which, by God’s grace, I had been instructed from my
childhood”; second, “to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I could”; third, to “conquer
myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world”; and
fourth, to review occupations for life, and “I could not do better than […] spending my whole
life cultivating my reason and advancing, as far as I could, in the knowledge of the truth.”80
It seems, then, that the third part of the Discourse is an explicit extension of the Neostoic
skepticism in the first two parts. This reading, that the morale par provision is merely an
extension of the skeptical part of his project solves several problems. First, it explains why
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Descartes is otherwise unconcerned with morality until later in his public life. Although many
present-day commentators are correct that there are Stoic themes embedded here, that is because
these are the themes that Charron and Montaigne (at least Montaigne vis-à-vis Charron) also
emphasize. At this point the Stoicism seems somewhat happenstance; though Descartes could
have presumably picked a different ethical tradition to fit into the provisional morality, this is the
one that Montaigne and Charron followed, and while still ignorant of the good, he maintains
their project to the end, not stopping at doubt, but concluding with how the wise man should act
when ignorant of the good. Descartes’ morality is provisional because his doubt is also.
This is not to say that Descartes wrote his provisional morality while ignorant of classical
Stoicism. Stoicism was extremely popular in the seventeenth century and, as an alternative to
Aristotelianism, it would presumably be an attractive ethical tradition for a modern thinker such
as Descartes.81 However, I already showed that Descartes did not express any concern for
morality before, during, or soon after writing the Discourse; given the sum of my evidence, I
believe that is fair to say that his silence that follows the Discourse is because in this work he
was more interested in following the skeptical project to its end, with its Neostoic conclusions,
than he was in providing anything like a morality in itself.

III. The Objection From a Letter to Elisabeth, 4 August 1645
In one final point on this matter, an obvious objection to my thesis is that when Descartes
does begin discussing ethics later in his life, in describing conditions for a life of contentment he
recalls the rules of morality in the Discourse on Method to Elisabeth.82 In a letter from 1645, he
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lays out the following conditions which he says relate to the three rules of morality from the
Discourse: (1) to always employ his mind to discover what he should (or should not) do in all the
circumstances of life, (2) to have firm and constant resolution to carry out what reason
recommends without being diverted by his passions or appetites, and (3) to guide himself
according to reason, acknowledging that all goods which he fails to possess are outside his
power.83 These are parallel with three rules of morality from the Discourse: (1*) to obey the laws
and customs of his country and religion, (2*) to be firm and decisive in his actions upon adopting
them, regardless how doubtful, and (3*) to master himself instead of fortune, changing desires
instead of the order of the world.84
There is undoubted similarity between the conditions and the rules, which Descartes
makes explicit. For this reason, it is easy to equivocate them, drawing a bridge between the old
and new morality. However, he does not say how they are related, merely that they are. It is
sensible to pause to investigate how they are related and not just assume they are the same rules
without investigation. And upon examination, the two sets of rules are quite different. In (1),
Descartes tells Elisabeth that we should employ our minds, while in (1*) he writes that he ought
to follow custom. Likewise in (2), Descartes states we should use reason without being diverted
by passions, but in (2*) he recommends resoluteness regardless of how doubtful an opinion he
has resolved to follow. Finally in (3), he writes that reason should guide him, enabling the
realization that it is beyond his or her own power to possess goods that are not already in
possession; however in (3*) he suggests he should master himself, changing his desires instead of
the order of the world.
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The rules of morality and the conditions for contentment do not clearly map onto one
another. Rather, the differences perfectly correspond with my thesis: if Descartes is in the mode
of a skeptic, it is best to follow custom given one’s ignorance of the world, all opinions are
doubtful so any constancy must exist in spite of doubts, and self-mastery is a path that one can
control by changing his or her desires even when ignorant of the good. These rules of the
Discourse mirror Charron and Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian Neostoicism as discussed above, and
seem appropriate while under the provisional doubt in the first four parts of the Discourse. On
the other hand, his conditions for contentment sent to Elisabeth frame similar themes, but now
from the perspective of someone who has a foundation for rational beliefs: employing our minds
(not the non-rational process of following customs), executing reason without diversions (not
constancy in face of uncertainty), and by means of reason recognize our current state (not by
means of desire). Quite differently from the morale par provision, these conditions emphasize
right living while quite confident of reason.
In the 4 August 1645 letter, Descartes is saying something new to Elisabeth, not merely
repeating the rules from the Discourse. His later project is drastically different in nature, trying
to build a rationally certain foundation for morals that benefits from gains made in metaphysics
and physics, as opposed to operating under the skeptical mode as he does in the morale par
provision. Though both resonate with a sense of Stoicism, the morale par provision is an ad hoc
morality included by extending the provisional doubt through part four of the Discourse. It is a
guide for living well when ignorant of the good. Differently, the list of conditions given to
Elisabeth is one coming from a place of knowledge and certainty; it resonates with the emphasis
in classical Stoicism that the irrational passions must be replaced with true beliefs. I will now
turn to Descartes’ later ethics in my next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO:
PASSIONS EMBODIED: DESCARTES’ LETTERS TO ELISABETH REVISITED
In my last chapter, I focused on Descartes’ earlier morality, demonstrating that the
morale par provision was an extension of the provisional skepticism that he imitates from the
Pyrrhonian Neostoic Pierre Charron, and the Essays of Montaigne vis-à-vis Charron. I now turn
my attention to Descartes’ later morality, typically identified with the Passions of the Soul and
later correspondence, especially with Princess Elisabeth, Pierre Chanut, and Queen Christina.
Since Descartes left behind no comprehensive or systematic ethics, his later morality must be
reconstructed from these sources.85 In forming a reconstruction, there are two general tendencies
in present-day literature. The first is to treat the Passions of the Soul as an ethical treatise and the
correspondence as its handmaiden.86 The second is to classify his morality into one of several
ethical traditions: Virtue Theory, Stoicism, Deontology, Platonism, and so forth.87 There is often
a good amount of textual support given for these positions, and there is a great deal that can be
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learned from these studies.88 Still, I believe both of these tendencies are fundamentally
misguided, and when following them one misreading compounds upon another.
It is true that Descartes often appeals to ancient ethical traditions when articulating his
ethical theory in letters, so I empathize with the motivation to classify Descartes into familiar
normative categories. However, I suggest that rather than attempting to follow any particular
school, Descartes is creating his own morality; this theory, he believes, can be best explained
through appealing to familiar traditions such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism.
Furthermore, he believes these three positions no longer contradict one another when understood
through his philosophy. This chapter is composed of two sections in which I will argue for this
conception of Cartesian morality. In the first, I cast reasonable doubt on the claim that the
Passions of the Soul should be read primarily as a treatise on moral philosophy; I will argue
instead that it should be read foremost as Descartes’ physics of man. In the second I will sketch
out Descartes’ morality, a section that itself will be composed of three parts: first, I will outline
Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian themes in Descartes’ letters, showing they are presented with
equal admiration and criticism; I will then analyze Descartes’ claim that his morality
encompasses all three of these traditions. Descartes thinks they are reconcilable on the summum
bonum and on virtue, and I argue that the physiological understanding of the Passions of the
Soul, established in the first half of the chapter, provides space for this synthesis to occur.89
Then, finally, I will show that Descartes’ way of forwarding his own morality—presenting his
ethical position by appealing to other schools of thought—is not new and in fact there is a strong
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historical precedent for this approach. Descartes cites competing authorities to lend support to his
moral philosophy, and though he embraces aspects of their thought, sometimes explicitly, he
means them instructively and does not self-identify as a member of any particular ethical
tradition other than his own.

I. The Passions of the Soul as Physiology
There is no strong consensus from modern literature on how to treat the Passions of the
Soul, and it seems that scholars today are not quite sure what to make of the treatise. There are a
few ‘standard’ readings, but not much agreement as to which one is correct.
One opinion rejects outright that Descartes was writing a physics of man. Lilli Alanen,
for instance, does not devote a sustained commentary on the Passions (her primary concern is the
Cartesian theory of mind), but in her brief treatment of the text, she promptly dismisses a
physiological reading:
The fact that Descartes gives so much space in his Passions to the description of the
bodily states causing and accompanying the emotions has led the commentators to
classify his view among physiological or sensation theories. That is wrong: Cartesian
emotions, although expressed in bodily states and behavior, remain essentially cognitive.
They are not, qua bodily, mere expressions of “brute” or “blind” nature, but also complex
patterns of acquired and learned reactions, carrying meaning and functions of their own.90
She supports this claim with the following example. Suppose I see a Rottweiler
approaching and, due to a preexisting belief that Rottweilers are dangerous, I become frightened.
In this case, the arousal of fear is caused by physiological changes that promptly occur upon
seeing the dog. Although the passion of fear is caused through involuntary physiological
reactions, fear itself is not physiological; fear occurs in the mind’s passive reception of these
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physical sensations.91 Alanen is right to recognize that particular sensations associated with fear,
such as a quickened breath or beating heart, must have an intellectual component. In her
example, these sensations only occur because a person has an idea of fear and it is only because
of this idea that the pineal gland delivers the physical sensations representing fear. However, I
believe it is important to frame this discussion in broader context. Descartes has already
established his metaphysics in the Meditations; it is perfectly reasonable, then, even in a physics
of man that he would draw from the theory of mind established in the Meditations. Deborah
Brown draws attention to the physiological aspects of this process, recalling Articles 35-6:
The movement of the animal spirits caused by a perception of a wolf [or in Alanen’s
case, a Rottweiler] are very rapid and cut deep grooves in the surface of the brain,
establishing a propensity for the spirits to rush in there and cause in the soul a passion of
fear whenever the same or a similar image is formed on the brain.92
Brown acknowledges physiological aspects present in Descartes’ description. While Descartes
claims that the mind receives the representation of a passion, it is merely receiving a message, an
impression. There are metaphysical aspects, of course, that must inform a comprehensive
account of the passions. As Descartes tells Elisabeth, he has already established a theory of mind
in his metaphysics; he has metaphysics available at-hand and is now ready to discuss the body.93
It would be a bit absurd to expect Descartes to abandon the work that he established earlier,
especially since his order of philosophy demands that the physics should follow from the
metaphysics—if the Passions is a physics of man, the ‘trunk’ of physics will benefit from the
‘roots’ of the metaphysics. Alanen’s claim, then, misunderstands a physiological reading of the
Passions as one that ignores his established metaphysics; instead, as Descartes moves up the
‘tree of his philosophy,’ he derives new types of knowledge that can be used alongside those
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previously discovered. His problem at hand, the new subject of inquiry in the Passions, is one of
a natural philosopher.
Other present-day commentators do not reject that the Passions has aspects that are best
identified as a physics of man, but still tend to neglect physiological themes, preferring to treat
the text as a moral treatise. Lisa Shapiro, for instance, develops a Cartesian ethical theory
drawing from the Passions in addition to the correspondence and morale par provision. She
explains that the Passions are a “follow up on the morale par provision of Part 3 of the
Discourse on Method”94 that comes by request of Princess Elisabeth to define the passions “in
the middle of a discussion concerning the regulation of the passions, virtue, and the sovereign
good.”95 The Passions contain “a worked out moral psychology and some further insight into
Descartes’s ethics,” which she expounds into a more robust ethical theory.96

I.a. The Passions of the Soul as Natural Philosophy
Rather than accept either of these readings, I believe there is compelling internal and
external evidence that the Passions of the Soul is foremost a physics of man.97 When he first
begins writing the treatise, he tells Mesland that he is fearful to write a morality because of the
theologians.98 Later, when Descartes is readying the Passions for publication, Descartes
proclaims in an accompanying letter that, “my intention was to explain the passions only as a
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natural philosopher [en physician], and not as a rhetorician or even as a moral philosopher.”99
Though Descartes gives detailed account of the passions in this final publication, this taxonomy
is according to each passion’s physiological phenomenon, absent of prescriptive moral theory
until these themes begin to emerge in the third part.
The Passions consists of three parts. The first two are almost exclusively physiological.
Here Descartes describes how passions arise in the body and their corresponding physiological
traits: physical coldness, paleness in the face, and so forth.100 In part one, Descartes differentiates
living bodies from other bodies in that they have movement; they are machines, as if a wound up
clock.101 These movements are caused in one of three ways: by animal spirits, which move from
the brain to parts of the body through nerves; by blood, which is heated through the heart then
pushed throughout the body; and by muscular movement which are caused through several ways:
through the body itself, the mind, or external stimuli like perceptions.102 It is no surprise that he
offers the third way, self-movement through the mind, given his stated purpose to Elisabeth in
writing a treatise on the passions. He draws on metaphysics established in his previous writing,
but maintains his focus on physics: the passions of the soul, he writes, may be defined “generally
as those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and
which are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits.”103 When he
expands on the definition in Articles 28-29, his account is making empirical observations of a
natural philosopher, not a prescriptive moralist: perceptions are merely knowledge caused by
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external objects that result in movements of animal spirits. There is physical interaction between
objects, the senses, the pineal gland, and the soul that excites these movements.104
Some topics discussed in the first two parts clearly have moral implications, but that
should not be confused with a morality. For example, when Descartes gives an account of the
passionate pursuit and aversion to things, such as a person shunning something that was
previously harmful, it is given in terms of the brain’s predisposition to send animal spirits to
particular parts of the body, which has no immediate moral implications.105 Imagine there is a
person, Eustace, who hates beer because, after becoming too intoxicated once, the mere thought
of beer causes physical revulsion. When he sees, smells, or tastes beer he is repulsed. Eustace’s
immediate rejection of alcohol does not have direct moral implication—it is a physical response
due to the harm that beer had previously caused his body. Of course after the immediate reaction,
he may then think of the moral consequences of intoxication. However, that moral deliberation is
not a passion. The passion is an immediate revulsion, a physical response. This is what Descartes
describes.
Likewise, in Article 41 Descartes discusses the will, but it is absent of blameworthiness;
he is bracketing the conversation, describing its physiological aspects and building upon the
metaphysical gains he made in the Meditations. In defining strong and weak souls, for instance,
his account lacks concern for which inclinations one should take towards particular behaviors.106
His advice is not much different than that of a trainer who may through habituation instill habits
and behaviors into an animal. A dog trainer may train a dog not to eat chocolate, for example.
For a dog, an aversion to consuming chocolate is good, and this is a behavior formed through
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conditioning.107 The only difference between this example and its human application is that with
humans there is a ghost in the machine; because humans have souls, each person can be his or
her own ‘trainer,’ conditioning the will by means of one’s own intellect.
In Part Two, Descartes describes, orders, and enumerates the passions. Though the
passions (including scorn, pride, envy, love, desire, hatred, courage, and remorse) are clearly of
moral importance, similar to his treatment of other topics in the Passions, he is giving a
biological description of how the body experiences these passions: rising through heat, blood
flow, and animal spirits. The biologist who observes and records the quickened heart rate,
flushed face, and furrowed eyebrows of an angry man is by no means forming an ethics – there is
no normative or prescriptive force. So Part Two’s taxonomy of the passions consists of almost
exclusively biological descriptions: after much laughter, for instance, one feels inclined towards
sadness because the most fluid part of the blood from the spleen is expended and coarser blood
returns to the heart.108 Likewise, trembling occurs during anger because this passion releases too
many animal spirits into the brain and as a result cannot “be directed from there in an orderly
way.”109 And so forth.
In the first two parts, then, he is recounting physiological responses to external stimuli,
closer to William Harvey’s work on medicine than the Stoics or any other normative tradition. It
is only in the final article (a. 148) of Part Two that Descartes writes on anything clearly related to
morals, virtue. Concluding Part Two with virtue is fitting because, in Part Three, Descartes
begins bridging the gap between his physics and moral philosophy. It is only in this third part
where Descartes begins touching on moral themes with any substance. Nonetheless, if the
Passions itself is a moral treatise, it is deeply unsatisfying—Part Three is brief and lacking in
107
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depth. While it is true that a badly developed moral philosophy is still a moral philosophy (just a
poorly conceived one – just as a kitschy and uninspired Thomas Kinkade landscape is still a
painting), I believe Descartes has earned enough respect for us not to surrender his morality so
expediently. But if the Passions is a physics, it need not be satisfying qua morality; Descartes
clearly has more to say about ethics from his correspondence at the same time that he chooses to
omit. If his goal was not to create a morality in Part Three, but to build a ‘bridge’ between the
physics of man and ethics, making the connections between the two clear, then the fact that there
is overlap between the third part of the Passions and the correspondence on ethics is to be
expected.
In one final thought before moving to the next section, some advance the thesis that the
Passions of the Soul is foremost a treatise on medicine110 while others recognize both medical
and moral themes, drawing connections between the two. It was not uncommon, after all,
following the influence of Galen, for treatises on the passions to simultaneously operate as both
natural and moral philosophies.111 This second thesis resonates with an ambiguity in some parts
of the Passions, as well as his correspondence with Elisabeth, where Descartes describes the
negative consequences that follow from passions as bad (mal): mal could mean vicious or
morally blameworthy, but it also can refer to bodily harm, an ambiguity found in the virtue of
temperance, for instance. Gluttony (failing to exhibit temperance) is a moral failure, but also bad
for one’s health. Expressing a similar reading, Deborah Brown notes, “There is little distinction
then for Descartes between the ‘cures’ for unruly passions and the practice of moral philosophy
itself.”112 She is right that he does often discuss physical remedies for the passions, and that his
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remedy is in part psychotherapeutic:113 tranquility is found through the acquisition of knowledge
and forethought, using reason correctly, reflecting upon Divine Province, and the correct
understanding and exercise of the will.114 She concludes, however, that:
Descartes’ statement in the Preface to the Passions that he will approach the passions en
physicien does not, therefore, indicate that he intends to reduce the passions to
physiological processes or ignore their moral status, but nor does it tell us what exactly he
thinks he is doing that is so new.115
Her concern raises an important point of disagreement concerning the nature of the passions but I
am not sure that it fares better than arguments for the Passions as strictly a morality. If the
Passions of the Soul is a precondition for morality, then it would also be a precondition for
medicine. At this point, Descartes has still failed to offer a physics of man and the Passions,
especially parts one and two, lacks the prescriptive force of a moralist or a medical doctor.

I.b. The Order of Philosophy and a Physics of Man
As discussed briefly in my first chapter, the order of philosophical inquiry is central for
Descartes: without the correct order, the philosopher loses his or her certainty in judgments.
Descartes is concerned with the correct order of his philosophy, ensuring that clear and distinct
ideas precede ideas deduced from them. In the Preface to the French edition of the Principles of
Philosophy, he violently distances himself from his former disciple Regius who among other
things, “changed the order” of his philosophy.116 Thus, when he writes of order in the same
preface, we should be attentive: in his tree of philosophy, medicine, mechanics, and morals are
posterior to his metaphysics and physics. This is echoed in a letter to Chanut dated 15 June 1646:
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"I must say in confidence that what little knowledge of physics I have tried to acquire has been a
great help to me in establishing sure foundations in moral philosophy."117 Appealing to the
metaphor of a tree, Descartes believes that sound reasoning begins with metaphysics, which are
the roots or foundation upon which physics rests. The branches and fruit that stems from physics
are medicine, mechanics, and morals. As a result of this order, physics must be discovered
anterior to morality. Descartes’ publications lay this groundwork: first the metaphysics in
Meditations on First Philosophy followed by the physics in Principles of Philosophy.118
The Principles contains four parts: The Principles of Human Knowledge, The Principles
of Material Things, The Visible World, and The Earth. Though he concludes the Principles in
four parts, he envisioned six parts as necessary for a complete physics:
I would not add anything further to this fourth part of the Principles of Philosophy if, as I
originally planned, I was going on to write two further parts – a fifth part on living things,
i.e. animals and plants, and a sixth part on man.119
A comprehensive treatise on physics would have included biology or physiology—a physics of
living things and a physics of man—and it was his original intent to include a fifth and sixth part
dedicated to each respective topic.120 However, he explains that, “I am not yet completely clear
about all the matters which I would like to deal with there, and I do not know whether I shall
ever have enough free time to complete these sections.”121 Rather than postponing the
publication of his physics indefinitely while he works out a physics of animals and of man,
Descartes chooses to send the Principles to press with only four parts. In place of parts five and
six, he includes ten sections at the end of part four to offer preliminary thoughts, what he calls “a
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few observations,”122 concerning objects of the senses—a sketch of what may be contained in the
physics of living things and of man.
Descartes does not intend these observations as a replacement for a complete physics; he
means them provisionally until he obtains clarity and can write a full physics of living things and
of man. A reasonable question to ask here is whether he gives an account of these topics
elsewhere in a way we can reasonably assume that Descartes would have deemed them as an
acceptable substitute for parts five and six of the Principles. The only known manuscript that
could contend for them is the Treatise on Man, which is indeed a physics of man. However, there
are two problems with considering this in place of Principles V and VI. The first is Descartes’
failure to include it in the Principles. The Treatise on Man is an early work, written even before
the Discourse on Method.123 If Descartes had already written a physics of man that he believed
was sufficient, it would be strange for him not to use it in the Principles or for him to have
written in part four that he was not clear about what he wanted to deal with in the final two parts.
The second concern is that he failed to share the Treatise on Man with any of his confidants.
Descartes is constantly sharing his work with correspondents, asking for their advice and
comments, especially for works that were still being drafted and not yet ready to be published.
When he writes the Discourse, Meditations, and Passions, he shared his work to extract
comments from his audience.124 He also authored a treatise on animals a year after the Principles
were first published; he shares this with Elisabeth.125 If he saw potential in his Treatise on Man
as his physics of man, it is not clear why it remained secretive, especially since it would have
more closely related to the topics that he and Elisabeth corresponded than a treatise on animals.
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For these two reasons, this is very unlikely the physics of man that he hoped for, the one that
would bridge the gap between the first four parts of his physics and the practical philosophies of
medicine, mechanics, and morals.126
With this methodological and conceptual gap missing between physics and morality, so is
this important precondition for Descartes’ ethics missing given his philosophical order. He
believes physics are essential for framing morality, so there must be something about physics
that cannot be overlooked in constructing a moral philosophy. It is surprising, then, that many
commentators altogether skip the physics of man and begin reconstructing a Cartesian morality
with the Passions of the Soul, assuming that it is a treatise on ethics.

I.c. The Cartesian (Re)construction of the Passions of the Soul
While a physiological understanding of the Passions of the Soul may seem novel in
contemporary literature, the earliest Cartesians favor this reading. Among them was Antoine Le
Grand,127 a Franciscan friar sent to England where he was assigned tutoring as an ecclesiastical
duty.128 Though his first publications discussed the philosophy of Duns Scotus, he earned a
reputation for himself in authoring a text propagating Seneca’s Stoicism, Le Sage des Stoiques,
ou l'Homme sans Passions, a philosophy to which he says he swore his allegiance.129 Less than a
decade later, however, he published a tract defending the Epicurean morality, L'Épicure
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Spirituel, ou l'Empire de la Volupté sur les Vertus,130 and only two years later, perhaps by
request, he published a textbook propagating Cartesianism which received an expanded English
translation titled An Entire Body of Philosophy According to the Principles of the Famous Renate
Des Cartes in 1694. In this textbook, Le Grand extolls Descartes, ascribing to him the role of
restoring philosophy.131 Following the traditional outline of a Scholastic textbook, Le Grand
includes Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, and then in the second English edition, an Ethics. It is
simple enough for the early Cartesians to include a metaphysics and physics in their textbooks as
they could just generally follow the arguments in the Meditations on First Philosophy and
Principles of Philosophy.132 The best way to go about including a Cartesian logic and ethics,
though, was less clear: Descartes left little systematic work on these branches. In the place of
logic, Le Grand uses the Cartesian method, not unlike the account in Arnauld and Nicole’s
Cartesian Logic, the Port Royal Logic.133 For a Cartesian ethics, though, Le Grand must turn to
the Passions of the Soul and the correspondence.
Drawing from these various resources, the chapter outline of Le Grand’s second edition
of the Entire Body of Philosophy is as follows:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Logic (Method)
Natural Theology (Metaphysics)
Demonology (Metaphysics)
Natural Philosophy: General (Physics)
Special Natural Philosophy, the heavens and planets (Physics)
Four Bodies, Metals, and Meteors. (Physics)
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VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.

Living Creatures in General, specially of Plants and Animals (Physics of Living
Things)
Of Man, Considered With Relation to His Body (Physics of Man)
Of Man, Considered With Relation with the Mind (Physics of Man)
Ethics, or the Right Way of Ordering the Life of Man (Moral Philosophy)

Following Descartes, Le Grand includes a physics of living things and a physics of man before
he discusses ethics. In VIII, “On Man, Considered With Relation to His Body,” and IX, “Of
Man, Considered With Relation with the Mind,” he discusses the contents of the Passions of the
Soul—how the circulation of the blood and respiration affect the body or how the senses and
appetites affect the nerves in order to bring about particular physical effects, for example. On the
passions he includes their number and order, specifically discussing Admiration, Love and
Hatred, Affections, Joy, and Sadness, all in the two chapters concerning man.134 It is not until
Part X that Le Grand moves into what he believes is Ethics proper, which is posterior to
discussions of the passions and focuses on topics including the Highest Good, Virtue, and right
reason, as well as the usefulness of the passions in attaining these ends. The sum of the material
found in what Le Grand is willing to label as ‘ethics’ is found almost entirely in Descartes’
correspondence, with only some overlap with Book III of the Passions. Therefore, the earliest
instantiation of Cartesian ethics follows the physiological reading that I suggest.
Thus, to summarize so far, I believe Descartes’ Passions are best understood as physics
of man, a foundation for practical fruit but not the practical fruit itself. I also admit that in Part
Three he allows himself the chance to begin to bridge the gap, providing some overlap between
the physics and morals. I showed that internally this best represents the nature of the text, and
externally it best fits into Descartes’ grand philosophical vision, one that the earliest Cartesians
also saw. I will now to turn to the benefit of this reading, which is a clearer vision of Descartes’
moral philosophy. In short, if it is true that Descartes wrote the Passions as a natural philosopher
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rather than an ethicist, his assertion that he can reconcile the claims of Stoics, Epicureans, and
Aristotelians becomes more coherent.

II. Cartesian Morality
The tendency in recent commentaries is to classify Descartes’ morality into one of
several ethical traditions: Virtue Theory, Stoicism, Deontology, Platonism, and so forth.135 It is
true that Descartes often appeals to ancient ethical traditions in his letters, so I empathize with
the motivation to classify his morality into a familiar normative category. However, I believe that
rather than attempting to follow any particular school, Descartes is creating his own morality that
can be explained through Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism, three positions that no
longer contradict one another when understood through his philosophy. I will argue this position
through three sections. First, I will outline Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian themes in
Descartes’ letters, where they are presented with equal admiration and criticism. Second, I will
analyze Descartes’ claim that his morality encompasses all three of these traditions. Descartes
thinks they are reconcilable on the summum bonum and on virtue, and I argue that a
physiological understanding of the Passions of the Soul provides space for this synthesis to
occur. Then, third, I will show that what Descartes is doing—presenting his own ethical position
by appealing to other schools of thought—is not new and in fact there is overwhelming historical
precedent for his approach. Descartes cites competing authorities to lend support to his moral
philosophy, and though he embraces aspects of their thought, sometimes explicitly, he does not
self-identify as a member of any particular ethical tradition other than his own.
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II.a. Descartes and the Greek Ethicists
Descartes appeals to Stoics, Epicurus, and Peripatetics with some frequency in his late
letters. Of these, his appeals to Stoicism are the most explicit. As I showed in my first chapter,
after Descartes wrote his provisional morality in the Discourse, he showed very little care for
ethics in the years that followed. When Descartes returns to these topics later in his life, it is in
his correspondence with Elisabeth, the Princess of Bohemia who recently suffered from a series
of ill fortunes.136 In attempt to console and heal her, he recommends she read Seneca’s De Vita
Beata.137 Upon rereading Seneca’s treatise himself, Descartes takes a more critical stance
towards the text, but sees it as a good place from which to explain his own opinion. In the next
letter addressed to her, Descartes replies,
I have since given some thought to this and find it not sufficiently rigorous to deserve to
be followed. […] Seneca should have taught us all the principal truths whose knowledge
is necessary to facilitate the practice of virtue and to regulate our desires and passions,
and thus to enjoy natural happiness. That would have made his book the finest and most
useful that a pagan philosopher could have written.138
That is, in De Vita Beata, Seneca offers a picture of virtue and self-regulating passions that
Descartes admires, but the Stoic fails to instruct the reader how to obtain these lofty goals.139
Nonetheless, Descartes prescribes much from Seneca: he agrees that reason is superior to
custom, that happiness consists in contentment of the mind, and so forth.140 He also agrees that
the best cure for misfortune is reason; this remedy will not only make her more content in spite
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of misfortune, but also will aid her health.141 Descartes recommends that she face her suffering
by adjusting her disposition to consider the good that rises from misfortune, tranquility.142
These Stoic attitudes persist in other letters throughout the same period. He tells
Mersenne that virtue is exhibiting resolve towards what is reasonable, and that free will is the
highest faculty because it is not controlled by anything corporeal.143 In a letter to Huygens on the
occasion of his wife’s death, Descartes offers ‘consolation’: since the tiresome duty of caring his
wife is complete, Huygens no longer has to bother himself with hope that she will become well.
Since he has a strong soul, he should find interior satisfaction knowing that he was resolute in
caring for her.144 Though Descartes’ tone towards a grieving Huygens (whose love of his wife is
famous145) lacks expected sympathy, it echoes Epictetus, who writes in the Euchidrion:
You are foolish if you want your children and your wife to and your friends to live
forever, since you are wanting things to be up to you that are not up to you, and things to
be yours that are not yours. […] But wanting not to fail to get what you desire—this you
are capable of. A person’s master is someone who has power over what he wants or does
not want, either to obtain it or take it away. Whoever wants to be free, therefore, let him
not want or avoid anything that is up to others.146
His attitude on virtue is firmly Stoic in these instances.
While there are those explicit Stoic themes in Descartes’ morality, his attitude towards
fortune and corporeal pleasures are more Epicurean than Stoic. Epicurus claims, “When pleasure
is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is neither pain of body or of mind or of both

141

Letter to Elisabeth, May or June 1645 (AT IV, 218)
Letter to Elisabeth, June 1645 (AT IV, 236)
143
Letter to Mersenne 3 December 1640 (AT III, 248)
144
Descartes to Huygens, 20 May 1637 (AT I, 631); Descartes discusses this point more fully in a 6 October 1645
(AT IV, 304) letter to Elisabeth, stating that when we practice the virtue of charity, we can have more pleasure while
weeping and under distress than while laughing.
145
Huygens’ called his wife his Star and wrote poetry expressing his love and despair over her death (“CUPIO
DISSOLVI. OP DE DOOD VAN STERRE,” 24 January 1637).
146
Handbook §14, 15; Also, Handbook, §10: “Never say of anything, ‘I have lost it’; but instead, ‘I have give it
back.’ Did your child die? It was given back. Did your wife die? She was given back. ‘My land was taken.’ So this
too was given back. ‘But the person who took it was bad!’ How does the way the giver asked for it back concern
you? As long as he gives it, take care of it as something that is not your own, just as travelers treat an inn.” (14)
142

55

together.”147 This resonates with Descartes, who writes to Elisabeth that, “in general the soul is
pleased to feel passions arise in itself no matter what they are, provided it remains in control of
them.”148 For Descartes, the passions are needed to inform the soul of what is good and harmful
to the body and they should only be resisted when a passion runs counter to an already
established firm judgment in the soul. Although this still maintains resolute judgment as a higher
good, which is in tension with the Epicurean teaching that the good is reducible to pleasure, it is
even further from the Stoics who argue that the passions are a sickness to be entirely eradicated
by reason.149 For the Stoics, exterior goods are never good for the soul, nor does contentment
(virtue) come in degrees.150 Quite contrary to this, in the same letters where Descartes discusses
Seneca, he also tells Elisabeth that someone with more exterior goods may be happier than
someone who does not have good fortune—desire is not antithetical to happiness and virtue is
easy because it is not against pleasure.151
Still in other letters, Descartes gives Aristotelian advice that contradicts both his Stoic
and Epicurean claims. One example comes in Descartes emphasizing the role of community in
the good life. He tells Elisabeth,
though each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests are accordingly in
some way different from those of the rest of the world, we ought still to think that none of
us could subsist alone and that each one of us is really one of the many parts of the
universe, and more particularly a part of the earth, the state, the society and the family to
which we belong by our domicile, our oath of allegiance and our birth. And the interests
of the whole, of which each of us is a part, must always be preferred to those of our own
particular person - with measure, of course, and discretion, because it would be wrong to
expose ourselves to a great evil in order to procure only a slight benefit to our kinsfolk or
our country. (Indeed if someone were worth more, by himself, than all his fellow citizens,
he would have no reason to destroy himself to save his city.) But if someone saw
everything in relation to himself, he would not hesitate to injure others greatly when he
147
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thought he could draw some slight advantage; and he would have no true friendship, no
fidelity, no virtue at all.152
Though community involvement is an essential component to eudaimonic living for the
Peripatetics, it comes in a rejection of the Stoic sage, unattached and self-sufficient, and against
the Epicureans whose concept of the good makes basic social functions challenging, such as
child rearing.153
Descartes also recalls Peripatetic influence in the role habit takes in acquiring virtue. He
tells Elisabeth that in addition to knowledge, “practice also is required if one is to be always
disposed to judge well.”154 While the role of self-discipline and control could apply to any
number of ethical traditions, he specifically credits the Schoolmen—“in this sense the scholastics
are right when they say that virtues are habits.”155 It is easy to dismiss Descartes on this point, as
he is often guilty of appealing to potentially unfriendly or powerful audiences in Scholastic
language rhetorically to make his ideas more palatable; this does not seem to be entirely the case
with ethics. Though he often appeals to Aristotelian authority when defending his physics and
metaphysics,156 these appeals are often directed towards an audience where such an articulation
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would be pragmatically advantageous, such as to the Jesuits or the faculty at the Sorbonne. When
addressing moral philosophy, Descartes’ audience is always more familiar to him and lacking in
ecclesiastical authority or influence; Descartes has nothing obvious to gain from drawing on
Aristotle in writing on morality.
Descartes is not, of course, trying to advocate Aristotelian ethics either. Not only would
that be unexpected for someone who frames his work as anti-Aristotelian, but he also specifically
tells Elisabeth that he wants a moral philosophy that is attainable by anyone. This eliminates
Aristotle whose morality is exclusive, requiring that someone have all the goods, interior and
exterior, to reach happiness: someone without a high birth or good fortune is excluded. Descartes
questions the Aristotelian assumption that these things are necessary for the good life,
acknowledging that though someone with more exterior goods may be happier than someone
who does not have them. For those who lack external goods, their smaller vessel can still be
filled with contentment.157 Tranquility, then, is obtainable without external goods, though
perhaps to a lesser degree of overall satisfaction. Not only is this against Aristotle, but also it
runs contrary to central Stoic themes by suggesting that virtue comes in degrees.

II.b. Descartes’ (Late) Ethics
As I have shown so far, Descartes equally draws from and criticizes the Stoic, Epicurean,
and Aristotelian moral traditions. At times he seems to prefer one to the others, and still other
times he makes claims that contradict all three. He rejects temperance as a virtue, for instance,
saying that it is good for medicine and in this way good for the body against the passions, but it
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is not clearly good for the soul.158 These tensions get fleshed out some in his discussion of the
summum bonum in an August 1645 letter to Elisabeth. In this letter, he attempts to sketch out his
idea of the Supreme Good, framed by a discussion of three major opinions from ancient
philosophers—Aristotle, Zeno (of Citium), and Epicurus. These three traditions, of course, have
a long history of tension beyond Descartes’ work, so it seems either bold or naive when he
writes, “These three views can, I think, be accepted as true and as consistent with each other,
provided they are interpreted favorably.”159 He elaborates on this by discussing each tradition’s
account of the supreme good.
According to Aristotle, the supreme good was something that consisted in all the
perfections which humanity is capable of achieving, internal and external. Zeno believed it
resided exclusively in virtue because that alone is controlled by a person’s free will, unlike
Aristotle who requires external goods. Epicurus was committed to the idea that the end of human
actions is pleasure or contentment and it is in this that happiness consists. Analyzing these
accounts, Descartes argues that Zeno errs in making the supreme good solely intellectual,
detached from the body; in doing so, the Stoics make virtue antithetical to pleasure. 160 Likewise,
Descartes accepts that Epicurus is right against Zeno—happiness is not found in merely knowing
the good in itself divorced from pleasure—but he is concerned that the hedonist does not focus
enough on knowing the good.161 Concerning Aristotle, Descartes does not offer any substantive
criticism. Instead, he advises that most people will not do well to follow the Peripatetics because
their account does not apply to anyone who lacks any human perfection. That is, since Aristotle
teaches the supreme good consists of internal and external goods it only applies to the most
158
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accomplished of most men. Descartes agrees that the best life will have both fortune (meaning
external goods such as health and material comforts) and contentment, but rejects the notion
good fortune is a necessary condition for contentment.162
Moving beyond the criticisms (and laying Aristotle aside for a moment) Descartes argues
that both Zeno and Epicurus are correct, only in different senses. To illustrate his point, he gives
an analogy of someone hitting a bull’s-eye. A person is motivated to hit a bull’s-eye because of a
prize, but cannot win the prize if s/he does not see the bull’s-eye. Likewise, even if someone
clearly sees the bull’s-eye, s/he will not bother to shoot at it if there is no reward for doing so.
Though virtue must be known (like seeing the bull’s-eye), we pursue it (like shooting at the
bull’s-eye) because of the reward, which is happiness or contentment.163 Descartes believes that
a correct view of the supreme good embraces both of these elements of Epicureanism and
Stoicism.
However much Descartes shows his morality encompasses important aspects of each
ethical tradition, one remaining problem is that his account of the summum bonum here fails to
address external goods. This is especially problematic because the way that each tradition treats
the body is central to how each forms its opinion of the supreme good. Epicurus teaches that
avoiding physical pain to maximize pleasure is central to virtue and Aristotle claims that external
goods (including those for the body) are necessary but not sufficient for the good life; the Stoics
believe the body is at best instrumentally good, clothing for the soul where true virtue lies.164 If
Descartes believes that his system reconciles these schools of thought, he must account for this
problem given that the body is one of the most pointed disagreements between the schools. The
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answer lies in the Passions of the Soul; if the Passions are understood foremost as a physics of
man and not an ethics (as I argued in the first half of this chapter), there is interpretive benefit.
To expand on this point, according to Descartes, the passions are not inherently harmful;
in fact they are quite natural and serve the important role of providing someone’s soul with
information as to what is good and bad for the body. He writes,
Now that we are acquainted with all the passions, we have much less reason for anxiety
about them than we had before. For we see that they are all by nature nature good, and
that we have nothing to avoid but their misuse or excess, against which the remedies I
have explained might be sufficient if each person took care enough to apply them.165
The practice he refers to involves training the passions through habit.166 Even with practice,
however, “Our passions, too, cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our will,
but only directly through the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions
we wish to have and opposed to the passions which we wish to reject.”167 To give an example,
someone’s pupil size cannot be changed on command; the will alone is insufficient to enlarge
them. However, a person may change a pupil’s size indirectly by fixing his or her gaze at a more
distant object or by shining a light into them. Likewise, someone cannot simply will a passion to
cease, but can accomplish its cessation through focusing on a different passion, redirecting the
animal spirits.168
By reclassifying the passions from an intellectual sickness to a physiological event, there
is no longer an immediate tension with the Stoic account. The passions are not caused by
ignorance. Instead, they are a response to external stimuli, often beyond a person’s control.
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When passions are utilized by the will correctly, they can even be good and advantageous:169
“Indeed in general the soul is pleased to feel passions arise in itself no matter what they are,
provided it remains in control of them.”170 The passions are good, even pleasing to the soul;
passions are useful when they, guided by reason and resolute judgments, are used to redirect
those that are harmful. Merely feeling anger, for instance, is not blameworthy, though giving in
to the passion of anger and striking someone is. Since all passions by their nature are outside
anyone’s immediate control, a person must often use one passion to counteract another that is
harmful, as if taking her gaze off one object by looking at another. Thus, Descartes is able to
maintain important aspects of Stoic virtue, that it is rational, while also maintaining that there is
no need to rid oneself of passions altogether.
Another upshot here concerns goods outside the body. Descartes says that external goods
are helpful but not necessary for contentment. Since the passions are not blameworthy, it is
possible to find enjoyment in an external good so long as reason judges that it is not harmful.
This allows for something like Peripatetic eudaimonia; happiness is maximized when internal
contentment of virtue is combined with fortune and external goods.171 Nonetheless, one can find
pleasure in times of pain and misfortune if s/he is guided by reason. Even if bad fortune falls on
someone and s/he experiences physical ills or suffers from material or relational loss,
contentment is still possible. As the Stoa philosophy teaches, the best minds are those that
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consider the benefits acquired through misfortune, produced by distancing oneself from the
passion that rises from the suffering and “turning one’s attention away from the evils which this
thing had been imagined to contain. For no events are so disastrous […] that they cannot be
considered in some favorable light by a person of intelligence.”172 It is in this way that Descartes
believes that his morality is in agreement with all three of these ancient traditions. The synthesis
that he claims is reconcilable given his physiological classification of the passions in his physics
of man; since the passions are amoral, they are non-blameworthy and external goods are
beneficial, though not necessary, for the good life.

II.c. A Historical Precedent for Descartes’ Approach
So far I have shown that Descartes discusses the Stoics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics in
his letters, acknowledging their strengths and offering criticisms against each. He is constructing
his own moral philosophy in which he believes these ancient traditions are not contradictory, and
I have shown how their coexistence in a Cartesian morality is possible. Though most recent
literature is guilty of collapsing Descartes’ moral philosophy into one of several moral traditions,
this reductive approach has not always been preferred. Leibniz, for instance, writes to Molanus
criticizing Descartes for not saying anything original in his ethics.173 He claims that though
Descartes shows the moral philosophies of Epicurus and Epictetus are not mutually exclusive to
one another, this idea is plagiarized from Seneca. Leibniz’s criticism is not unwarranted. Seneca
glosses and quotes Epicurus sympathetically and with frequency. To give just one example,
Seneca praises Epicurus for saying his happiest days were when he suffered from strangury and
an ulcer. Seneca concludes that, “Why, then, should those goods which virtue bestows be
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incredible in the sight of us, who cultivate virtue, when they are found even in those who
acknowledge pleasure as their mistress?”174 To extend Leibniz’s criticism, Seneca also compares
the cultivation of virtue to an athlete’s training, sounding very Aristotelian.175 Descartes’
drawing from the three traditions does not appear terribly novel.
Although I agree with Leibniz that Descartes follows Seneca’s lead here, I believe that
the similarity is a feature, not a flaw. There is significant historical precedent of members of one
philosophical tradition citing the works of another competing school in order to articulate an
aspect of their own thought. That is, Descartes is not original in recognizing the similarities
between Epicurus and the Stoics (nor the Peripatetics), but he is not alone in this unoriginality—
it is part of how many ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophers explain their morality.
For example, Augustine and Aquinas discuss Stoicism with some frequency, and not
always with criticism. In Civitate Dei, Augustine articulates his understanding of the passions as
taught by the Stoics and concludes that,
there is little or no difference between the opinions of Stoics and of other philosophers
[the Peripatetics] on the subject of the disturbances – of passions – of the soul. Both sides
champion the mind and the reason against the tyrant of the passions. And the meaning of
the Stoic assertion that passions do not touch a wise man is probably that passions in no
way cloud with error that wisdom in virtue of which he is wise, nor can they undermine
and overthrow it.176
Aquinas expresses the same sentiment in the Summa Theologica. In the article addressing
whether every passion of the soul is morally evil, he cites Augustine, answering that, “On this
question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that
all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This
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difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little,
if we consider the intent of either school.”177
This trend continues into the Renaissance. Neostoic author Guillaume du Vair approaches
Epictetus in the same begrudgingly positive tone as Seneca:
And truly I cannot chuse but admire the words of Epicurus, but I would they had
proceeded out of another mans mouth, because I would not have so worthie a sentence
marred with the effeminatenes of the rest of his opinions: My bodie (quoth he) daunceth
for joy, and my heart within me is ravished with pleasure, to think that I being content
with bread & water, should bee able to contemne all the delicate fare of the world. And
now if Epicurus gloried so much in the contempt of all dainties, what thinke you should
the Stoicks doe?178
The tendency of appropriating multiple traditions is taken even further with the Neostoics,
making them more eclectics than unadulterated Stoics.179 They often synthesized a variety of
traditions from antiquity to form something new of their own. Justus Lipsius and Gillaume du
Vair, the first neo-Stoics, synthesize Stoicism with their Christian theology. Pierre Charron and
Michel de Montaigne follow this model, incorporating Hellenistic skepticism with their Stoicism
and Christianity.
Descartes’ tendency to appeal to various traditions is not unique. There is historical
precedent for this approach of drawing from, expanding upon, and synthesizing multiple
authorities. His tendency towards any one particular school of thought at any particular time
makes him no more self-identify with that school than it makes Aquinas a Stoic or Seneca an
Epicurean. He follows the sentiment of Seneca, who writes,
Any truth, I maintain, is my own property. And I shall continue to heap quotations from
Epicurus upon you, so that all persons who swear by the words of another, and put a
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value on the speaker and not upon the thing spoken, may understand that the best ideas
are common property.180
That Descartes is creating his own morality, then, should come as no surprise, even if he does
frequently cite other ethical traditions, which should also now be unsurprising. This is after all
what he tells Elisabeth when they first begins discussing Seneca:
When I chose Seneca’s On the Happy Life to suggest to Your Highness as an agreeable
topic of discussion, I took account only of the reputation of the author and the importance
of his topic, without thinking of his manner of treating it. I have since given some thought
to this and find it not sufficiently rigorous to deserve to be followed. But to assist Your
Highness to make a judgement on the topic, I will try to explain how I think it should
have been treated by such a philosopher, unenlightened by faith, with only natural reason
to guide him.181
III. Conclusion
Over the course of this chapter I argued that Descartes is offering his own moral
philosophy, one that often draws from or synthesizes several philosophical traditions. As evident
from the second section, Descartes often draws from the Stoics, Epicureans, and Aristotelians,
both positively to help articulate his project and critically to draw out the distinctions between
his morality and theirs. In this process, he shows that the three traditions are not contradictory on
the summum bonum due to his account of the passions: if the passions are physiological events
(as I argued in the first half of this chapter) and not an intellectual sickness, then he has grounds
on which to make some passions amoral, subsequently removing their blameworthiness. I also
demonstrated that my reading not only better reconciles various aspects of Descartes’ writing,
but it is also likely given the historical precedent: Cartesian ethics are not original in appealing to
multiple ancient tradition, but this is not a weakness of Descartes’ morality. Rather, it is a
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symptom of how moral philosophy was often explained by ancient, medieval, and Renaissance
moralists. Given the historical precedent, I maintain that Descartes’ morality is something like
the morality for which I argued: though he borrows heavily from Stoicism, he does not selfidentify as a Stoic or any other moral tradition, but cites these ancient sources to support his own
morality.
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CHAPTER THREE:
PASCAL ON THE GOOD LIFE: IF HAPPINESS FAILS, TRY STOICISM
Through the past century, Pascalian scholarship typically frames his moral philosophy in
three orders: body, mind, and charity.182 Under this reading (which I will refer to as the ‘accepted
reading’), each order is given a particular ontological status analogous to Plato’s divided line.
Along with this ontology, various ethical attributes are paralleled with each order. The order of
charity is associated with an Augustinian philosophical theology, where loving God allows one
to see the Good and obtain happiness, while the orders of mind and body are respectively
associated with the intellect and carnal pleasures.183
I reject this reading and instead will offer one that more closely represents the structure
and content of Pascal’s ethics. I believe that Pascal is offering a binary ethics, twice divided: first
according to the objects of a person’s love, following Augustine’s two cities;184 then divided
again into those who are seeking God, living an adequately content life and those who remain
blissful in their concupiscence. In arguing this, it is helpful to first investigate the composition of
his thought: Augustine, Descartes, Montaigne, and the Stoics (such as Epictetus). Through this,
each piece of his complex morality will become more pronounced. Under the accepted reading,
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the influences of Augustine are often exaggerated, and the influence from Descartes, Montaigne,
and the Stoics are either underemphasized or misapplied; by understanding these influences
correctly, his system more naturally follows.185 To accomplish this goal, I divide my chapter into
three sections: first, I examine Pascal’s use of the term ‘order’ in the Pensées to cast sufficient
doubt upon the accepted reading; in the next I will discuss the role that Augustine, Descartes,
Montaigne, and Epictetus take in shaping Pascal’s philosophical project; in the third and final
section, I will present a reading of Pascal’s moral philosophy that is framed within these
influences.

I. Pascal’s Use of “Order” in the Pensées
The phrase ‘order’ (ordre) is recurrent in the Pensées. Because of this, many present-day
scholars are tempted to use ‘order’ as a key to unlock these fragments and the justification to do
so is not entirely unwarranted. There are, however, at least four different senses in which he uses
the term that proponents of the accepted reading fail to acknowledge.
Pascal’s first use is philosophically uninteresting.186 Here, he invokes ‘order’ to describe
a sect or group, as in an order of the Free Masons or an order of monks.187 His second use
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denotes a proper role or use, as when a set of affairs is ‘in order’ or that a child biting another is
acting ‘out of order’. An example of this use is found in Pascal’s account of the will: he
compares a person’s failure to act according to his or her proper function to a foot acting as
though it were a different part of the body—in this illustration, the foot, like the human will, is
acting out of order and as a result, abandoning its proper role.188
The third way Pascal uses ‘order’ is in placing one thing before another. This is the same
sense where order is applied in mathematics: given 2x+3 = 9, the correct order of operations is to
subtract three before diving by two. Placing subtraction before division leads to error. Pascal’s
use in these cases is the same sense that Descartes often invokes concerning method.189 In the
first meditation, Descartes warns that “those who do not take the time to grasp the order and
linkage of my arguments, but will be eager to fuss over statements taken out of context (as is the
custom for many), they will derive little benefit from reading this work.”190 In a brief diatribe, he
expresses similar sentiment in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy,
chastising his former disciple Regius for changing the order of his philosophy. The Cartesians in
general share a concern with this kind of order as evidenced by the first Cartesian logic book, the
Port Royal Logic. In this text, the authors describe ‘ordering’ as “the mental action in which
different ideas, judgments, and reasonings are arranged on the same subject, such as the human
body, in the best manner best suited for knowing the subject. This is also called method.”191
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Pascal himself authored sections of the Port Royal Logic and he was familiar with this sense of
the word.192
When Pascal discusses ‘order’ it is most commonly in this third sense. He describes the
order in which his ideas should be presented, or the correct way to present them for better
philosophical clarity and rhetorical impact, such as when he sketches an outline of which
sections should come first in his treatise.193 He writes, “Order. After the letter about the necessity
of seeking God, put in the letter about removing obstacles, which is the discourse on the
machine, on preparing the machine, on searching through reason.”194 And again:
Men despise religion; they hate it and fear that it is true. To cure this, we must begin by
showing that religion is not contrary to reason, but worthy of veneration and respect.
Next we must make it attractive, to make the good wish it were true, and then we must
show that it is true.”195
This sense commonly appears in other fragments of the Pensées and his other literature including
De l'Esprit géométrique, the work on method that contributed to the Port Royal Logic.196
The fourth sense in which Pascal uses ‘order’ concerns orders of kind, an ontological
hierarchy where things are ordered according to their type: body, mind, or charity.197 Susan
James correctly assesses that in these instances Pascal “distinguishes three orders of grandeur,
greatness—the order of the flesh, the order of the mind, and the order of charity—each of which
constitutes a system of values and ends.”198 The carnal order esteems earthly things and
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recognizes the grandeur of temporal power, such as a king, while the order of the mind values
the intellectual and the order of charity (or the will) values the divine.199 These orders are also
incommensurable, in that carnal people who gain their power by exercising physical strength
have no regard for matters of the mind while intellectuals gain their power through exercising
reason and have no concern for spiritual things, which they perceive as foolish and weak.200
Likewise, those who are charitable demonstrate their strength through earthly weakness, which is
really strength since it is obtained through submitting one’s will to God.
Following Jacques Chevalier, much of the Pascalian literature take this fourth sense of
order to be a cipher which can be used by a reader to uncover Pascal’s moral philosophy
contained in the Pensées.201 One commentator writes that, “The three orders describe Pascal’s
understanding of the human dilemma. The three orders provide the framework for the [Pensées]
that he was developing… We can’t understand Blaise [Pascal] apart from this context.”202
A.W.S. Baird, who offers the most extensive Anglophone survey of Pascal’s ethics, also takes
this approach, though more nuanced in its appeals to Pascal’s mathematical interests. For
example, in Le Triangle arithmétique et les traités connexes, Pascal observes that different
geometric types are incommensurable: something of a lower order does not enter into a higher
order by increasing its magnitude. A point is infinitely removed from a line, and a line is
infinitely from a cube—increasing the length of a one (e.g., a line) will make it no closer to
becoming the other (e.g., a cube), even if increased ad infinitum.203
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My concern with the accepted reading is not that it is altogether false, but that its
conclusions go beyond what evidence warrants, making a minor point (relatively speaking)
central to understanding his entire project. There are only two fragments in the Pensées where
Pascal uses this fourth sense of ‘order’.204 In comparison, he uses the third sense of ‘order,’
placing one thing before another, with frequency. Establishing methodological order plays a
much more central role for Pascal and it is important to avoid equivocation on the two senses of
the term. My criticism is not merely semantic, as if Pascal discusses these themes in other places
without explicitly identifying them as ‘orders’. Other than these two fragments, the themes of
order qua ontological hierarchy is all but absent. The Pensées contain many fragments which are
both notably longer than the two dealing with ontological order and more central to his project:
the role of imagination, skepticism and dogmatism, diversion, divine hiddenness, and the infinite
are just a few examples.205 It is not in the least bit obvious that orders of kind are central to
Pascal’s project, let alone the secret to deciphering the fragments.
A second criticism is that although Baird’s mathematical examples do help clarify
Pascal’s order of kind, there is no evidence outside of those two fragments where he discusses
the metaphysical incommensurability of these ‘orders’ to motivate imposing this mathematical
framework upon Pascal’s morality. Though Pascal’s ethics do arguably become tripartite as
discussed later in this chapter, the accepted reading seems ad hoc and there is surprisingly
underwhelming evidence to make it the secret key for understanding the other fragments.

grandeurs d'un ordre d'infinitude supérieur,” Chevalier writes “inférieur.” This is important to note since this is the
one of the editions that Baird (1975) references concerning this text and he draws a great deal of his scholarship
from Chevalier.
204
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For imagination: Pensées S78/L44, skepticism versus dogmatism: S164/L131, diversion: S168/L137, divine
hiddenness: S182/L149, and man’s disproportion and how he is situated within the infinite: S230/L199.
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I do not pretend my criticisms here are exhaustive as that would require a much more
careful analysis too tangential for my current purposes. My intention at the moment is to raise
sufficient doubt of the accepted reading in order to make space for an alternative approach, one
that I believe is better supported by internal and external evidence. To this end, I will turn to the
composition of his thought in Augustine, Descartes, Montaigne, and Epictetus.
II. Pascal’s Philosophical Anatomy
II.a Pascal and Augustine
When commentators choose to discuss the conceptual genealogy of Pascal’s work, they are
most commonly eager to discuss Augustine’s impact, though not without voices of dissent.206 For
one, Vincent Carraud rejects Pascal’s Augustinianism, noting that, “Pascal had not been nourished
by the thought of Augustine as essentially as that by that of Montaigne and Descartes,” forwarding
the even more controversial thesis that “he never thought as an Augustinian.”207 He provides three
arguments for this claim: (1) Pascal was unfamiliar with Augustine’s writing,208 (2) When
contrasting their Cogitos, Pascal’s rejection of Augustine’s to defend Descartes is violent;209 and, (3)
Pascal rejects the two cities analogy that is central to Augustine’s De Civitate Dei.210
The first two of Carraud’s arguments are compelling. Pascal refers to De Civitate Dei only a
few times in the Pensées.211 In two of these cases, as Carraud points out, Pascal cites Montaigne,
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completely unaware that Montaigne was quoting (or, misquoting) Augustine.212 In a third reference,
Pascal again misquotes Augustine by quoting Montaigne; though this time he correctly attributes the
citation to Augustine, his treatment of it again reveals his ignorance of the text. Pascal writes “Cum
veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod fallatur.”213 However, the text should read inquirat
(meaning, “asks” or “seeks”) instead of ignoret (which translates “does not know”), a mistake Pascal
again carries from Montaigne’s 1652 edition of the Essays, which contained several errors.214
Similar errors occur in other references made to the De Civitate Dei: S230/L199 also contains an
error transcribed from Montaigne, misquoting Augustine, and in other cases Pascal appears to be
quoting the works of the theologian Jansen, not Augustine himself.215 It is unclear to what degree
Pascal is Augustinian if he is so ignorant of Augustine’s popular De Civitate Dei.
Carraud’s second argument is equally compelling. He describes Pascal’s defense of
Descartes’s Cogito over Augustine’s as violent.216 The occasion of this discussion begins in
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. In the Fourth Set of Objections to the Meditations,
Arnauld accuses Descartes of plagiarizing the Cogito from Augustine’s On Free Choice of the

known texts and still not be familiar with City of God. The notes in Roger Ariew’s translation of the Pensées
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Will.217 Less than a decade later, Pascal comes to the defense of Descartes, saying that though both
Descartes and Augustine use the same words, they are not really saying the same thing:
In actuality, I am very far from saying that Descartes is not the real author of these, even if he
only learned them by reading the great saint; for I know how much of a difference there is
between writing a word by chance without making a very long and extended reflection about
it and perceiving in this word an admirable series of consequences that proves the distinction
of material and spiritual natures, and making of it a firm and sustained principle of a whole
system of physics, as Descartes claimed to do.218
Pascal continues, deriding Augustine’s Cogito as accidental, accusing him of writing it “by chance”
and neglecting its logical consequences.219 He compares Augustine’s instantiation to a thrown out
seed that flourished in Descartes’ fertile soul and compares the difference between the two as that of
“a dead man from a man full of life and strength.”220 Pascal’s reaction is even more critical of
Augustine than Descartes was himself. Descartes wrote to Colvius on the matter, saying:
I am obligated to you for drawing my attention to the passage of St. Augustine relevant to my
I am thinking, therefore I exist. I went today to the library of this town to read it and I do
indeed find that he does use it to prove the certainty of our existence. He goes on to show that
… we exist, we know that we exist, and we love the existence and the knowledge we have…
In itself it is such a simple and natural thing to infer that one exists from the fact that one is
doubting that it could have occurred to any writer. But I am very glad to find myself in
agreement with St Augustine, if only to hush the little minds who have tried to find fault with
the principle.221
Unlike Pascal, Descartes admits that his Cogito has the same force as Augustine’s. He even
welcomes the comparison, though also recognizing that given the principle’s simplicity anyone
could have written it. In contrast, Pascal is either insufficiently familiar with Augustine’s Cogito to
appraise it fairly, or so predisposed to defend Descartes that he is willing to overlook the upshot of
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Augustine’s rendition. In either case, it would be strange to say Pascal is acting as an Augustinian
here.
Despite the success of his first two arguments, Carraud’s third is less successful. He argues
that Pascal rejects Augustine’s two-cities analogy of De Civitate Dei. Augustine believes that the
whole world is composed of two ‘cities.’ These are not geo-political or socio-economic cities, but
rather its citizens are bifurcated throughout the world according to the objects of their love. Those
who love God above all else comprise the city of God; as a result, the citizens in the celestial city
also love lesser objects in their proper relation to God. Those who love themselves or other lesser
objects greater than, or in place of, God reside in the city of man. Carraud claims that Pascal would
be concerned with the idea that:
...the body of Christ, which is absolutely unified, be thought of as a society, societas
hominum, an association, that is, an association of profane interests, in the manner of those
cities that Plato and Aristotle, “who enjoy a laugh with their friends … amused themselves”
by laying down “rules” as if “for a madhouse”.222
He argues that, for Pascal, those who love God are an organic unity whose wills are subordinate to
God’s will. Pascal believes that God’s people are like a body, united with the one mind and will of
Christ who is the head. Because of this, Carraud argues that the analogy of a celestial city is
unworthy because it implies that each member still has its own will. He references letter fourteen
Pascal’s Les Lettres provinciales to support this point.
But there are two problems with Carraud’s third argument. The first is that he misreads
Pascal in the fourteenth letter. Pascal is not criticizing the city of God analogy itself whatsoever, and
in fact endorses it:
There are two peoples and two worlds spread out over all the earth, according to St.
Augustine: the world of children of God, who form a body of which Christ is the chief and
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the king; and the enemy world of God, [in] which the devil is the chief and king. …
Recognize, therefore now, my fathers, in which of these two kingdoms you reside.223
His targets are the ecclesiastics, whose lifestyle does not represent the behavior of citizens in the
divine city. His concern is not whether Augustine is wrong, but that clergy was consumed with selflove and casuistry—he assumes the cities analogy to be correct as a background for expressing his
concern.
The second challenge to Carraud’s third argument is that contrary to his claim, Pascal’s
metaphor for the people of God—the body of Christ united in his will—is nearly identical to
Augustine’s doctrine of theosis. Augustine believed, like many theologians, that humans experience
a union with God in a literal, though immaterial, sense.224 Not to be confused with a more gnostic
notion of emanation, Augustine describes theosis using three images. The first is recapitulation: God
and humanity are contraries where the greater (God) moves towards, identifies with, and then
perfects the impoverished (humanity).225 The second is an exchange: God became human so humans
can become gods. Like Plato, one must become like the object of one’s knowledge—as one must
become sun-like to see the sun, he must become god-like to see God.226 The third is the image of
divine adoption: though all creatures are sons of God in a natural sense, the elect are sons of God
through grace.227
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The conclusion of Carraud’s third argument then does not follow. Pascal’s notion of the will
is overwhelming Augustinian.228 Pascal assumes the two-cities distinction in Les Lettres provincials
and both believe the human end is metaphysical unity with God, where one’s own will and thoughts
become the will and thoughts of God. Rather than being anti-Augustinian, Pascal’s ontology (at least
on these points) could not be more Augustinian.
It is worth mentioning, also, that at the end of his article, Carraud notes that his conclusions
are provisory and that Pascal’s relationship with Augustine may need to be revisited.229 I agree with
this sentiment; Carraud’s first two arguments make a sufficiently compelling case that we should
question the degree to which Pascal embraces Augustinianism. It is an important corrective for the
tendency to read Pascal as an unadulterated Augustinian. But Carraud’s third argument is
problematic and his conclusion that Pascal is anti-Augustinian is too severe a reaction.
Though it is true that Pascal’s criticisms of Augustine are at times sharp (e.g., on the Cogito),
that is insufficient reason to deem him anti-Augustinian outright—no more than Augustine’s
deviations from Plato would make him anti-Platonist or Pierre-Sylvain Régis’ deviations from
Descartes would make him an anti-Cartesian.230 Being Augustinian, like being Cartesian or
Platonist, is more of a family resemblance than a strict set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
which one must adhere.231
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There are several reasons to paint Pascal as an Augustinian with certain qualifications. While
Pascal appears to have read little (if any) Augustine, he was immersed in Augustinianism. He was a
Jansenist in residence at Port Royal. The Jansenists were a sect of religious enthusiasts known for
their extreme piety and asceticism.232 Their theology was interpreted through the writings of the
theologian Cornelius Jansen, whose magum opus was a commentary on Augustine titled Augustinus.
For this reason the people of Port Royal also self-identified as Augustinian.233 It would be shocking
if Pascal, a well educated resident in an Augustinian abbey, did not understand Augustine’s
philosophy and theology, even if it was obtained second-hand through reading Jansen or from others
in the abbey.234
Augustine was also pervasive in the mainstream 17th century intellectual culture, a lasting
impact from the interest of De Civitate Dei, a 16th century ‘best seller’.235 By analogy, today most
people in developed countries have not read Darwin. But nonetheless, a majority of Western
Civilization is ‘Darwinian’ in a very weak sense, in that they are familiar with a sketch of the theory
of evolution and to this degree of understanding, adhere to it. For all of these reasons, it is in this
sense that I refer to Pascal’s ‘Augustinianism’.236 He clearly rejects Augustine at points, but holds
certain themes and doctrines that are easily identified as Augustinian at points. Pascal was an
Augustinian, but not strictly and he often let his other commitments supplant his Augustinianism.
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II.b. Pascal and Descartes
Pascal’s relation with Descartes and Cartesianism is more complex than that with
Augustine. While Pascal was unfamiliar with some of Augustine’s most popular writings, he was
intimately engaged with the work of Descartes. I believe this is important for understanding
Pascal’s Cartesianism. Several recent scholars have rightfully argued for Pascal’s Cartesianism
based on his reception by contemporaries and also his self-identification as a Cartesian, as well
as shared philosophical themes.237
Concerning Pascal’s reception, I begin with his familiarity with texts, which extends
beyond Descartes’ published treatises to knowledge of unpublished manuscripts, some of which
were closely guarded by Descartes and his confidants. The best known of these documents today
was also one of the most guarded in their day—the manuscripts where Descartes discusses the
Eucharist. There is good reason for their secrecy, as the documents were controversy waiting to
happen. To offer a bit of a background, in the 16th century, the Roman Catholic Church issued a
strong reaction to the Protestant Reformation through an ecclesiastical council, the Council of
Trent. One of the most significant statements to emerge here concerned the Eucharist, a doctrine
outlined with precision and care during the Council. Any deviation from the account offered
during the Council was pronounced anathema.238
Now, Descartes’ editor, Mersenne, was an ecclesiastic who knew how delicate, if not
volatile, this doctrine was. When compiling the manuscripts for the Objections and Replies to the
Meditations on First Philosophy, Mersenne redacted part of Descartes’ reply to the Fourth Set of
Objections pertaining to the Eucharist. Mersenne’s motivation for this grew out of concern of
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offending the ‘learned doctors.’239 Clerselier, who became Descartes’ later editor, was equally
wise to protect this document from untrusted eyes.240 After Descartes’ death, the churchman
Robert Desgabets ‘tested the waters’ by publishing this account in his Considérations sur l'état
présent de la controverse touchant le T. S. Sacrement de l'autel; even though it was twenty years
removed Descartes’ death, the subsequent controversy that unfolded painfully reinforced that the
caution shown by the editors was warranted.241
Despite this secrecy surrounding the Eucharist manuscript, Pascal read it. This is
evidenced by a criticism he offers in the Pensées.242 Even though Pascal’s account is critical, it is
very unlikely that he would have seen this document at all unless Clerselier or another within
Descartes’ trusted circle viewed him as a member of the Cartesian community.243 If Descartes or
his confidants felt safe showing Pascal the Eucharist fragment, it would not be unreasonable that
Pascal saw other unpublished documents by Descartes as well; there were no others as
incriminating or so well protected. Whoever the Cartesians were in the 17th century, they seemed
to extend trust to Pascal in a degree expected for a member of their philosophical community.
Of course one person reading or commenting on the writings of another does not in itself
qualify an author as the other’s disciple. If it did, then Leibniz and Hobbes would also be
Cartesian, which is clearly false. However, the fact that Pascal’s knowledge extends beyond
published works to unpublished manuscripts, especially those kept secretive due to fear of
239
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censure, is revealing to Pascal’s role an actor in mid-17th century intellectualism. Pascal would
not be shown such documents, let alone secretive documents, merely out of a generous spirit of
inclusiveness: Descartes’ reputation precedes him as someone who is not shy about ostracizing
those he did not like or trust. He asks Mersenne, for example, to withhold unpublished views
from Hobbes in addition to ignoring his letters.244 Pascal’s reception by the Cartesians leads to a
reasonable conclusion that Pascal was accepted as one of them.
This reception is again evidenced by the inclusion of Pascal’s writings in the Port Royal
Logic. Authored by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, two of Pascal’s colleagues at Port Royal,
the Port Royal Logic was the definitive Cartesian logic in the 17th century. The book is largely a
paraphrase of Descartes’ writings on method expanded upon with their own additions, including
those to make it more recognizable as a logic textbook. Included among their additions are
excerpts from Pascal’s pamphlet on method, De l'Esprit géométrique, which was composed
around 1658—the same period when he was composing the Pensées fragments. Arnauld and
Nicole make the source of these sections clear in the introduction, telling the reader that chapter
9 of Part I is taken from “a small unpublished essay by the late Pascal which he titled On the
Geometric Mind.”245 It would be strange for them to include Pascal’s writings on method if they
did not believe him to be Cartesian.
It is sensible that Arnauld and Nicole chose this selection for inclusion in their text—
Pascal’s writing on method is where he exposes the strongest affinity to Descartes. In De l'Esprit
géométrique, Pascal draws explicitly from the Discourse on Method. In addition to copying the
rules of method nearly verbatim, he imitates Descartes’ style, repeating the same skeptical
arguments found in the first part of the Discourse. Pascal also seems to draw from the Regulae,
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setting about the same task (distinguish between things that are similar) and uniquely referring to
their methods as an art, a term typically reserved for rhetoric.246 To expand on these themes,
Descartes famously adopts Montaigne’s style and thought in the first three parts of the
Discourse, especially concerning suspension of judgment. Once he calls into question those
opinions formed through anything less than certain judgments, he establishes rules modeled in
the geometric fashion that are intended to uncover at apodictic knowledge. These rules are,
1) Never accept anything as true that was not self-evidently so, basing all basic truths on
indubitable, clear, and distinct ideas free of “hasty judgment and prejudice”;
2) Divide each problem being considered into “as many parts as possible” to evaluate
each idea as carefully as possible;
3) Always proceed “in an orderly fashion”, by embracing (1) as a foundation, then slowly
building towards more complex knowledge composed of self-evident and derived
principles; and,
4) Proceed systematically and in consistently reviewing that there is surety “of having
omitted nothing”.247
Pascal borrows both of these aspects of the Discourse in his pamphlet. Like Descartes,
Pascal follows Montaigne in suspending judgment, showing the difficulty of finding knowledge
through the senses. For every pleasure there is another person who prefers its opposite. The
pleasures of a rich person differ from those of the poor, a person in good health experiences
different pleasures than another who is ill, and even the same person's pleasures will vary
according to her health, age, and mood. Given these weaknesses, a new, different path must be
followed, a method that leads to knowledge so certain that “once ... admitted remain firm and
will never be denied” and that can demonstrate the “connection of truths with their principles.”248
To this end, Pascal prescribes the following rules:
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1) Rules for definitions: Define only clear, not ambiguous, terms and when offering a
definition, only use ideas self-evident or that clearly follow from self-evident ideas;
2) Rules for axioms: Only accept clearly evident ideas as axioms; and,
3) Rules for demonstrations: Prove all propositions that are slightly obscure, using only
axioms as determined by (2) and always conceive of an actual object when considering
a definition, with restrictions that come from (1), to avoid confusion arising from
poorly defined terms.249
These are, of course, almost exactly the same rules of method from the Discourse.
As I also noted, in the same pamphlet, Pascal seems to draw from Descartes’ Regulae. In
the Regulae, Descartes refers his reductive process of finding certainty in judgment as the “art of
method”. Analogous to a blacksmith who first must make or find tools (e.g., an anvil and tongs)
before he takes on the task producing in his craft, a person who desires sound judgment must
acquire and learn to use these tools of reason before s/he is able to produce genuine
knowledge.250 Pascal also refers to his method—which also consists of reducing then carefully
analyzing ideas—as an art in De l’Esprit géométrique. The term ‘art’ in this sort of discourse is
very common, with the tradition going back to Aristotle’s art of rhetoric. It is not even unique in
the seventeenth century–Thomas Hobbes, for instance, authored several texts as ‘arts’ including
A Whole Art of Rhetoric and The Art of Sophistry.251 Nor is a geometric method itself uniquely
Cartesian; appealing to mathematical models in search of epidemic certainty is pervasive
throughout early modernity.252 But Pascal does not argue for an art of rhetoric here, in spite of
the subtitle of the second half of the pamphlet, L'Art de persuader. Rather than presenting an
actual rhetoric, like Descartes Pascal calls the geometric method itself an art.253 If Pascal is
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borrowing from the Regulae in addition to the Discourse, it shows evidence of Cartesianism
from the text, while also offering additional external evidence of another unpublished manuscript
to which Pascal had access.254 Beyond textual similarities, perhaps the clearest internal evidence
of Pascal’s Cartesianism comes during his discussion of method and persuasion, in his defense of
Descartes’ Cogito over Augustine’s. As I showed in the previous section on Augustine, Vincent
Carraud offers a careful analysis of this discussion, describing Pascal’s defense of Descartes as
“violent.”255
Pascal’s Cartesian method extends beyond De l’Esprit géométrique. In his Préface sur le
Traité du vide, Pascal makes a clear distinction between ‘matters of reason’ and ‘matters of
tradition’. Tradition serves those things that have been written and are unchanging—history,
geography, law, language, and theology. However, this is not the case for those fields of study
that use reason or senses such as “geometry, arithmetic, music, physics, medicine, architecture,
and all of the sciences that are subject to experience and reasoning.”256 For these disciplines,
authority is useless; they require reasoning. Matters of reason are not stagnant; knowledge
pertaining to them is augmented as new ways to reason and experiment are discovered; thus,
books from the past are unhelpful. Descartes makes a very similar distinction: “...I generally
distinguish two aspects of mathematics, the historical and the scientific. By ‘history’ I
understand everything which has been discovered already and is contained in books. By
‘science’ I mean the skill to solve every problem, and thus to discover by one’s own efforts
everything capable of being discovered in that science by means of our native human
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intelligence.”257 So both in his general approach to method, distinguishing between matters of
reason and matters of tradition, and in his specific application of method, his criteria of
knowledge and the geometric method, Pascal exhibits Cartesianism.
An objection, of course, is that Pascal may have been a Cartesian at least to some degree
early in his public life, but that he distanced himself upon religious conversion, focusing then
exclusively on theology and mysticism.258 However, such an argument is strange considering the
intellectual climate at Port Royal and its sympathies to Cartesianism. The Pensées fragments
confirm this, showing continued strains of Cartesian influences.
One example of shared philosophical themes in the Pensées is dualism. Few themes are
more central to Descartes’ philosophy than his quest to prove the distinction between mind and
body.259 Rather than accepting an Aristotelian hylomorphism (or opting for other modern
options),260 Pascal accepts Descartes’ view that there is an immaterial mind and a material body,
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which are actually distinct from one another.261 Like Descartes, Pascal describes animals as
machines, automata that act out of habit not reason. Parrots, for instance, wipe their beaks even
when they are clean.262 This wiping is done intermittently as a mechanical function, not with
rational intentionality to clean what is dirty. The human body is also such a machine, “For we
must not misunderstand ourselves: we are as much automata as minds,” and this for this reason it
is important to know that, “Proofs only convince the mind; custom provides our strongest and
most firmly believed proofs. It inclines the automaton, which drags the mind unconsciously with
it.”263 As for the mind or soul, Pascal asks:
What is the self? A man goes to the window to see the passersby; if I pass by, can I say
he went there to see me? No, for he is not thinking of me in particular. But does someone
who loves another because of her beauty really love her? No, because the smallpox,
which will destroy beauty without destroying the person, will cause him to love her no
more. And if someone loves me for my judgment, for my memory, does he love me,
myself? No, because I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where, then, is this
self, if it is neither in the body nor in the soul? And how to love the body or the soul,
except for its qualities that do not constitute the self, since they are perishable? For would
we love the substance of a person’s soul in the abstract, whatever qualities might be in
it?264
Though this fragment raises its own questions, such as what Pascal means by the self if it is
separate from the soul and body, like Descartes he is distinguishing between the mind and body.
In asking where the self is, Pascal acknowledges that it is found in neither of two places, the soul
or in the body, which closely resembles Descartes’ account in the second meditation:
But then were I perchance to look out my window and observe men crossing the square, I
would ordinarily say I see the men themselves just as I say I see the wax. But what do I
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see aside from hats and clothes, which could conceal automata? Yet I judge them to be
men.265
In addition to this mind/body distinction, Pascal also embraces a Cartesian account of the
intellect and will. Descartes ascribes the role of assenting to the truth or falsity of an idea to these
faculties. Those ideas accepted by means of the intellect are active judgments in accordance with
his criteria of truth (clear and distinct ideas). Those assented through the will are passive and
formed through habit and custom. In this second case, the intellect fails to discern which beliefs
to accept, so a belief is passively accepted by conditioning; this can occur because either a
person lacked necessary focus to establish a clear and distinct idea or because the person making
the judgment is indifferent towards which belief to prefer over another. In each case, when a
person is not intentionally guiding the will with the intellect through clear and distinct
judgments, the will continues assenting to beliefs on its own through conditioning, detached
from the intellect.266
This relation between the intellect and will is central to Pascal’s philosophical project of
the Pensées. It is the structure for understanding his Wager and “Discourse on the Machine”:
since the body is a machine, when the intellect fails, habit and custom move the will to form
beliefs. He writes that, “Both parts of us must be made to believe: the mind by reasons that need
only to be seen once in a lifetime; and the automaton by custom, and by not allowing it any
inclination to the contrary.”267 Concerning rational belief formation, Pascal also accepts
Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas,268 though given his Cartesian themes in De l’Esprit
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géométrique and Préface pour un Traité du vide it is not so surprising. He often refers to these
self-evident first principles known through intuition as the ‘heart’ in the Pensées.
Although there is compelling evidence for Pascal’s reception as a Cartesian among his
contemporaries, and there are clear correlations between several of Descartes’ texts and Pascal’s,
Pascal’s self-identification qua Cartesian is less explicit. Towards this end, it is worth recalling
the Cogito selection discussed in the last section. In discussing Pascal and Augustine, I showed
that Vincent Carraud convincingly argues that Pascal’s Cartesianism supplants his
Augustinianism at times. This was illustrated by Pascal’s reaction to the Cogito: he “violently”
defends Descartes, using the point to demonstrate a Cartesian principle of drawing careful
distinctions. His reaction is severe, as expected from someone who identified with Descartes,
rushing to his defense.
Even if Pascal’s Cartesianism traces the span of his bibliography, commentators appeal to
alternative evidence to make the case for his anti-Cartesianism. Someone who does this is
Richard Popkin. He claims that, “After his religious conversion Pascal objected vehemently to
the philosophy of Descartes. He kept contrasting the God of the philosophers—namely,
Descartes’ God—with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.”269 One need not be a careful
reader of Pascal to see the genesis of this interpretation. The source of these criticisms are
typically correct as there are plenty of cases where Pascal disagrees with Descartes: to name two,
there is disagreement on the vacuum and Pascal’s Jansenism leave him pessimistic concerning
the reach of human knowledge in the postlapsarian state.270 To the benefit of those who present
an anti-Cartesian Pascal, the Pensées also contain fragments appearing to be explicit censures
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including, “Descartes. Useless and uncertain,”271 and, “Write against those who delve too deeply
into the sciences. Descartes”.272 All of these things on a first impression rightly undermine a
Cartesian Pascal.
As a partial response to these anti-Cartesian themes, Pascal’s censures are not as
condemning of Pascal’s Cartesianism as they may first appear. Even in spite of their differences
in natural philosophy, Pascal himself spent some time in the sciences, and his distinction of
matters of reason and matters of tradition help frame what he may mean in these fragments. As
seen by their shared method, Pascal agrees that the surest way towards rational certainty begins
with clear and distinct ideas, providing an epistemic foundation, which is then expanded through
reasoning and experimentation.273 Their disagreements on the Torricelli experiments, for
example, are never methodological nor do they concern the reliability of the data itself, but rather
are on how to interpret evidence.274 Even Pascal’s opinion that religious belief cannot be
obtained through the understanding alone is not anti-Cartesian (that is, sacred teachings cannot
be known through the intellect alone when unaided by divine illumination). Descartes also
believes that theological beliefs are assented to by the will. The only difference is that while
Pascal makes these points explicit, Descartes avoids the topic, deferring to ecclesiastical
authority.275
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Still, Pascal finds Descartes’ nearly exclusive focus on natural philosophy misplaced.
Religion is a matter of higher importance than science because it deals with eternity. To these
ends, though science and mathematics are correct, they are also useless. He writes in a letter to
Fermat, “For to speak to you candidly of geometry, I find it to be the highest exercise of the
mind, but at the same time I know it to be so useless, I make little difference between a man who
is only a geometrician and a skilled artisan.”276 Though Descartes’ approach to physics and
mathematics may successfully lead to knowledge of temporal and finite things, they are
comparatively useless until someone’s eternal fate is secured and known:
...that is why I will not undertake here to prove by natural reasons either the existence of
God, or the Trinity, or the immortality of the soul, or anything of that kind; not only
because I would not feel myself sufficiently capable of finding in nature arguments to
convince hardened atheists, but also because such knowledge without Jesus Christ is
useless and barren. If a man were convinced that proportions between numbers were
immaterial truths, eternal and dependent on a first truth to which they subsist, called God,
I would not consider him as having made much progress towards his salvation.277
It is pragmatically irrational to focus on the temporal while still ignorant of the eternal. Pascal
draws comparison between this and a convict awaiting capital punishment: aware of his
sentence, it would be irrational for this convict to spend his remaining hours playing cards
instead of pleading an appeal.278 This is why Pascal writes concerning physics that, “We must
say in general: ‘This happens through shape and motion,’ because it is true.”279 Yet, the more
important eternal matters, shape and motion have nothing to do with ‘the machine’, training the
will towards belief; to these ends, we must say that, “it is useless, uncertain, and laborious. And
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if it were true, we do not believe all of philosophy to be worth an hour of labor.”280 Pascal takes
Descartes to be ‘useless and uncertain,’ but not without important qualifications. His work is
only ‘useless’ in that it cannot answer existential questions about eternity and it is ‘uncertain’ in
that no empirical demonstration can bridge the epistemic gap between our finitude and the
infinity of eternity. That is, Descartes delves too deeply into natural philosophy at the expense of
questions pertaining to eternity. Pascal’s most forceful criticism of Descartes is not a criticism
towards the correctness of his philosophy, but the ends towards which they are directed: he
applies his brilliance towards the wrong, less urgent end.281
Of course, as I said earlier, this is only a partial response to the objections of Pascal’s
anti-Cartesianism. Pascal was no unadulterated disciple of Descartes, and it is clear that
sometimes he rejects themes central in Descartes: his metaphysics are often more Augustinian
than Cartesian, he favors the existence of a vacuum over the plenum, and they disagree on the
infinite, just as a few examples.282 Nonetheless, it does not detract from an abundance of
similarities in their thought, change his reception as a Cartesian by his contemporaries, or change
his self-identification as Cartesian. Of course the conditions that identify anyone as Cartesian (or
Aristotelian, Stoic, et cetera) are fuzzy; however, Pascal’s reception and identification indicate
that he met whatever nebulous qualities contribute to this family resemblance. Pascal is a
Cartesian, though not purely and not always.
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II.c. Pascal and Montaigne
While my readings of Pascal’s Augustinianism and Cartesianism deviate from much of
the traditional literature, there is broad consensus among scholars of the importance of
Montaigne’s influence on Pascal.283 Montaigne’s presence is constant in Pascal’s writing. His
name appears twenty times in the Pensées and Pascal consistently alludes to Montaigne’s Essays
in the form of allusion, gloss, and paraphrase. In the Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et
Montaigne, Pascal speaks of Montaigne, praises that:
I acknowledge…that I cannot, without joy, see in this author proud reason wounded so
invincibly by its own weapons, and this so bloody revolt of man against man, which
throws him down into bestiality away from God’s company, to which he has raised
himself by the maxims (of his feeble reason).284
In same text, Pascal credits Montaigne as one of the two most significant influences on his own
thought.285 Although there is dispute amongst scholars concerning the exact role that Montaigne
plays in Pascal’s thought, the disagreement concerns the degree to which he embraces
Montaignian skepticism, not whether he does.286
Of the many Montaignian threads in Pascal, a reoccurring theme in Montaigne’s Apology
for Raymond Sebond is that humans are no greater than other creatures; traditionally, it was
reason that set humans apart from other animate beings, but Montaigne calls this into question
both by elevating the rational abilities of other beasts while also questioning human rationality.
Towards the first, Montaigne offers pages of travel accounts, observations, and stories from
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antiquity depicting animals acting rationally, living in community, and performing other
intellectually advanced behaviors that are associated with human rationality in order to
undermine the belief that humans are different from and greater than the beasts.287 He often uses
this first point to make his second that humans are weaker than they typically believe, as
demonstrated in this travel account:
If you let loose even some of our flies, they will have both the power and the courage to
disperse the horde. In recent memory, when the Portuguese were besieging the city of
Tamly in the territory of Xiatime, the inhabitants of that place brought to the wall a great
quantity of hives, in which they were rich. And with fire they drove the bees so fiercely at
their enemies, that they were put to rout, since they could not support their attacks and
their stings.288
Montaigne suggests that humans are so weak that even a mighty army can be defeated by the
smallest of creatures, tiny insects. He reinforces human weakness by repeating typical
Pyrrhonian arguments, such as the inability of our senses to produce reliable observations, and so
forth.289
In so far as Pascal is emulating the skeptical mode, he mimics Montaigne nearly to the
point of plagiarizing. “The power of flies,” Pascal writes, “they win battles, hinder the activity of
our souls, eat our bodies.”290 Though he modifies the turn of the phrase from bees, he maintains
that even the smallest of insects can incapacitate a person. This incapacitation can occur
physically (as in Montaigne’s travel account of a defeated army or insects feasting upon a
corpse) or intellectually (as even something as small as a buzzing fly can distract someone from
focusing).291
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Another point where Pascal follows Montaigne is on the power of the imagination and its
role in forming beliefs, even when there is knowledge to the contrary. “Put the world’s greatest
philosopher on a plank hanging over a precipice,” he writes, “but wider than it needs to be.
Although his reason will convince him of his safety, his imagination will prevail. Many could
not bear the thought of it without getting pale and sweating.”292 When standing upon the plank,
reason is useless to make the philosopher believe that he is safe, even when he knows the board
is strong enough to support his weight. Montaigne gives almost the same example in the
Apology:
Put a philosopher in a cage of small bars of thin iron suspended at the top of the towers of
Notre Dame de Paris, he will see for obvious reasons that it is impossible for him to fall,
and yet…he will not be able to keep the vision of that height from frightening and
astonishing him. Set a plank between those two towers, of a size such as is needed for us
to walk on it: there is no philosophical wisdom to such firmness as to give us the courage
to walk on it as we would do if it was on the ground.293
Similar arguments from Montaigne’s Apology are repeated through the Pensées.294
Though these influences are overt, many commentators overemphasize the degree of
Montaigne’s influence and as a result categorize Pascal as a skeptic. Richard Popkin offers the
most popularized Anglophone account of this opinion. According to Popkin, Pascal hopes that
doubt will drive the reader to despair, and that despair will drive the reader to seek divine
intervention to find his prelapsarian condition: “So Pascal, in most ingenious ways, tried to make
the reader first become a sceptic, then to realize his actual state of affairs and to cry out for
help.”295 For Popkin, Pascal is a Christian Pyrrhonist, a skeptic.
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I do believe Popkin is correct in his premises – Pascal teaches that human cognition is
corrupted, and subsequently we are unable to know truth or the good through reason. That is,
Pascal pushes his reader towards skepticism to emphasize human depravity and its subsequent
despair. Conditionally for Pascal, ignorance is the human state, so the Pyrrhonian description is
correct: it is a ‘new nature’ since the old, true nature is lost.296 But while early modern
scholarship is indebted to Popkin for his groundbreaking contributions in the history of
philosophy, I reject his conclusion here. He is right that Pascal intends his reader to overcome
skepticism through divine intervention, but it is this very point that calls into question Pascal’s
true skepticism. The goal of the skeptics, particularly in the Pyrrhonian tradition, was to find
ataraxia. Sextus Empiricus writes:
Our assertion up to now is that the Sceptic’s end, where matters of opinion are concerned,
is mental tranquility; in the realm of things unavoidable, moderation of feeling is the end.
His initial purpose in philosophizing was to pronounce judgment on appearances. He
wished to find out which are true and which false, so as to attain mental tranquility. In
doing so, he met with contradicting alternatives of equal force. Since he could not decide
between them, he withheld judgment. Upon his suspension of judgment there followed,
by chance, mental tranquility in matters of opinion.297
When someone is not a skeptic, Sextus believes that person suffers because false belief such as
that s/he lacks good things and that the things following him or her are bad. When that person
acquires something s/he believes is good, s/he is filled with an unreasonable joy in acquiring it
while also anguishing in fear of losing it. The skeptic, however, “leaves undetermined the
question what things are good and bad by nature. He does not exert himself to avoid anything or
to seek after anything, and hence he is in a tranquil state.”298 Montaigne’s account is
Christianized and more eclectic, with some tones of Epicureanism and Stoicism, but ignorance
remains the means towards a better life:
296
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We need hardly more duties, rules, and laws for living in our community than the cranes
and ants in theirs. And despite this, we see that they conduct themselves in a very orderly
way without learning. If man were wise, he would fix the true price of each thing
according to its greatest utility and fitness for his life.
Whoever rates us by our actions and behavior will find a much greater number of
excellent people among the ignorant than among the learned: I say in every sort of virtue.
The old Rome seems to me to have supported men of greater worth, both for peace and
for war, than that learned Rome that ruined itself. Even if the rest were exactly equal, at
least integrity and innocence would remain on the side of the old, for it dwells
particularly well with simplicity.299
Quite contrary to this, Pascal invokes skepticism in order to lead his reader to anxiety and
despair, as Popkin notes; however, this is antithetical to the Pyrrhonian aim. Montaigne is a
skeptic, for example, in that he believes placing all claims into skeptical equilibrium will lead his
reader to ataraxia: peace is not found in knowledge of the good, but in following custom and
knowing oneself.300 Popkin’s conclusion that Pascal is a skeptic does not follow. Doubt is
something Pascal believes his reader should rise above to find the Good, a sharp contrast with
the skeptical program.301 Against the Pyrrhonians, resignation to doubt does not bring peace—
“Nothing brings tranquility but the sincere search for the truth,” Pascal concludes.302
These differences between Montaigne and Pascal are made sharper when discussing
another important deviation, the ability to have probable knowledge. Apart from revelation,
Montaigne rejects the possibility of human knowledge, repeating many of Sextus Empiricus’
arguments from his Outlines of Pyrrhonism:
The Pyrrhonians use their arguments and reason only to destroy the apparent facts of
experience, and it is remarkable how far the suppleness of our reason has followed their
plan of opposing the evidence of facts: for they confirm that we cannot move, that we
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cannot speak, that there is nothing heavy or hot, with the same kind of forceful arguments
by which we confirm more probable facts.303
But Pascal believes that, though reason fails to move a person’s volition towards belief, it can
decide that one belief has more probability of truth than another, rejecting Pyrrhonian
equilibrium. This difference is also fundamental precondition for Pascal’s Wager—one can say I
believe this is likely true, and I wish it were. In an earlier fragment of the Pensées, Pascal claims,
“For we should work for what is uncertain, according to the rule of probability that was
demonstrated.”304 He also says Augustine was right that we often work for what is uncertain—
people wage wars we have no certainty of winning and go to sea when they do not know what
they will find or encounter—but is wrong to neglect the rule of probability that proves that we
should.305
With these differences, the case for Pascal’s skepticism becomes much weaker. Popkin’s
conclusion does not follow from his premises. He is right that Pascal embraces Montaigne’s
skepticism, but it is a mistake to call him a skeptic because of this. Pascal’s skepticism is
methodological. It is true that Montaigne’s influence on Pascal is pervasive. Pascal imitates
Montaigne’s skepticism in describing the postlapsarian condition, specifically the limits of
human reason and the lowliness of mankind. However, this skepticism is methodological. As a
result, Pascal is influenced by Montaigne, but in a way similar to Descartes. He is not a skeptic.
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II.d. Pascal and Epictetus
Having discussed the three authors who are typically discussed in relation to Pascal, I
now turn to a source that I believe is no less significant but is altogether neglected in present-day
Anglophone literature, Epictetus. For those scholars who spend their entire research project in
the Pensées, this oversight is understandable. After all, Epictetus is only mentioned by name six
times in the Pensées, thirteen times if general references to the Stoics are included. But by
comparison, Augustine’s name only appears fifteen times in the text. So if scholars emphasize
the influence of Augustine so strongly, the role of Epictetus deserves at least some investigation.
This prevalence should be no surprise given that in the Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et
Montaigne, Pascal describes Epictetus as the other philosopher so influential upon his thought.306
Pascal believes that Epictetus understood the duties required of man better than any other
philosopher. Like Epictetus, Pascal argues that God is the principal object and persons should
submit to him cheerfully. Epictetus believed that this disposition and acceptance of divine will
halts complaints and murmurs: if my house is foreclosed, I did not lose it; if my child dies, I did
not lose her. Instead, I restored these things to God, to the universe, from which they came.307
Pascal agrees with Epictetus, then, that people should not worry who took these things away
from us or why—it should only matter that who lent it to us has asked for it back. Human duty
extends beyond what is taken into what we are currently given. Regardless of the role in which
someone finds himself—a king or beggar—a person should perform that role like an actor giving
his best performance. Pascal offers other Stoic themes found in Epictetus: good resolutions
should be concealed and accomplished in secret, so as not to be indulging in the vanity of
approval from other people, for example. Pascal believes the sum of our duty, and the part of his
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philosophy that Epictetus gets correct, is that the whole study of man is to perceive the will of
God and pursue it.
Like his treatment of Augustine, Descartes, and Montaigne, Pascal’s appraisal of
Epictetus is not without criticism. Pascal criticizes the Stoics for teaching that humans are able to
accomplish all of these duties through self-effort. A person’s cognitive and volitional powers are
free, the Stoic believes, and through them, it is possible to obtain tranquility or happiness on
one’s own. Pascal writes:
Stoics. They conclude that we can always do what we can sometimes do, and that, since
the desire for glory makes those whom it possess do a particular thing well, others can
also do it well. […] Epictetus concludes that, since there are constant Christians, every
man can easily be so.308
Not only does Pascal believe Epictetus’ conclusion here is false, in that our intellect and will are
corrupted and incapable of obtaining these goals, but also the pride that comes from accepting
this conclusion leads to other errors of theology and right living. Pascal uses suicide as an
example of how contradictory the Stoic exhortation towards contentment becomes, “There is a
contradiction,” Pascal criticizes, “because in the end they advise suicide. Oh! What a happy life,
of which we rid ourselves like the plague!”309 Among Pascal’s other concerns, he attacks Stoic
monism. The mind is easily conflated into a part of divine substance in Stoic cosmology, which
is different from divine participation—in the former, the transcendent divinity is collapsed into
creation, while in the latter, there is a clear distinction maintained between creator and creature.
Although secondary literature has neglected Epictetus in Pascal, he himself draws a great
deal of attention to this Stoic and the Stoic intellectual tradition. Though Pascal criticizes
Epictetus at points, he is no more critical of him than he is of Descartes, Montaigne, or even
308
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Augustine at times. The autonomy of Pascal’s thought is complex and a synthesis of multiple
traditions that do not always seem like they should go together. Pascal makes his debt to
Epictetus clear, nonetheless, and a goal in the next section is to begin to sort through what the
implications of these influences on his thought are.
I do not believe that I have exhaustively treated all that can, or should, be said about
Pascal’s complex reception of Descartes, Augustine, Montaigne, and the Stoics, as well as how
they influence his thought. A sufficient sketch has been made, however, in order to move on
towards a new vision of Pascal’s ethics that is framed within these influences.

III. Pascal on Morality and The Good Life
In the last section, I outlined the four major influences upon Pascal’s thought. Now I will
show how Pascal draws themes from these different influences to arrive at an ethical theory that
both is indebted a great deal to others while also uniquely his own. Pascal establishes a binary
ethics modeled after Augustine, which is then subdivided into accounts shaped by Epictetus,
Montaigne, and possibly Descartes.310
It is helpful to begin framing Pascal’s ethics within his Augustinianism. As discussed
earlier, Pascal outlines to two cities, the city of God and the city of man. In the Fourteenth
Provincial Letter (quoted earlier), he appeals to the Jesuits, urging them to decide whether they
are representatives of Christ or not, for their casuistry is incongruent with their claims to love
God. That letter is also a helpful summary, not only in understanding this binary structure in
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general, but how it applies to his ethical framework in particular: two groups of people, divided
according to the objects of their love.
As a philosopher of science and religion, Pascal is aware of the degree to which
perspective can shape a person’s epistemic framework.311 Like all knowledge, ethics or the art of
living-well, requires the right perspective:
It is the same with pictures seen from too far or too near. And there is only one
indivisible point, which is the right place. The others are too near, too far, too high, or too
low. Perspective determines that point in the art of painting. But in truth and in morality
who will determine it?312
But while a successful artist is one who knows the proper perspective in which to capture a
picture, which conditions satisfy the correct perspective on truth and right living are not
immediately clear.
Since Pascal believes all truth—including knowledge of the Good—can be understood
when analyzed from the correct perspective, he believes the perspective in which moral good can
be understood is found in understanding human nature.313 Though humans now lack proper
perspective, this has not always been true: in a prelapsarian state, humans loved and knew God,
and subsequently people knew their true nature. Like many moralists, Pascal believes that
thinking well is the principle of morality, virtue, and the true good. Though Pascal’s opinion of
thinking well resembles divine illumination—God is the light that allows a subject’s intellectual
gaze to perceive intellectual objects—he intends something more robust. The Good Life and
happiness consist not only in the intellect but also in the will. Before the fall, humans were
joined with God ontologically. Theosis is a necessary precondition for knowledge and thus must
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include the will: true human nature is one that loves and submits to God in such a way that it
joins the divine, not merely in a metaphorical sense, but as a foot is actually part of a physical
body that follows the will of the head:
To be a member [of Christ’s body] is to have life, existence, and motion only for the
body and through the spirit of the body. It cannot by its nature love another thing except
for itself and to subject it to itself, because each thing loves itself more than anything
else. But, in loving the body, it loves itself, because it only exists in it, through it, and for
it. He who adheres to God is one spirit.314
Therefore, thinking well (and as a result living well) has as a precondition in the act of the will—
submitting oneself to the divine will allows for divine illumination. In this act of the will, a
person finds her true nature and therefore gains the correct perspective for thinking well.315
With a correct perspective, humans know the Supreme Good, which Pascal identifies
differently.316 At times he identifies it with God, stating that God alone is the Supreme Good.317
Given this claim, it may seem odd that he also identifies it as peace, which he uses
interchangeably with happiness. Happiness and Peace are also the Supreme Good, a eudaimonia
that all people seek:
All men seek to be happy. This is without exception, whatever different means they use.
They all strive towards this end. What makes some go to war, and others avoid it, is the
same desire in both, accompanied by different perspectives.318
Even those who go to war do so for this purpose, to achieve peace on their terms.319 Note the
similarity to Augustine. In De Civitate De, Augustine claims that peace is, “the end of our
good… For peace is a good so great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we
hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly
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gratifying.”320 Pascal, then, identifies three different goods as the Supreme Good. But rather than
claiming there are multiple highest goods, he believes that God is the only true good. But in
knowing God, the elect also experience eternal peace and happiness by participating in the divine
will, so in a sense these are also the Supreme Good. Though they are conceptually distinct, none
can be understood without the others.321
Pascal believes that humans no longer have this perspective, though. Whatever peace and
happiness humans had were lost: “It is quite certain that there is no good without knowledge of
God, that we are happy to the extent we get closer to him, and that ultimate happiness is to know
him with certainty; that to the extent we get farther from him, the more wretched we are.”322
According to the traditional Christian narrative, humanity is fallen. As a result, Pascal believes
the intellect and will are both corrupted: “[mankind] has obviously gone astray and fallen from
his true place, lacking the power to find it again. He looks for it everywhere anxiously and
unsuccessfully, in impenetrable darkness.”323 Separation from God, given Pascal’s ontology of
theosis, is a literal loss—an ontological dismemberment and shift in human nature. True human
nature participates in God, and in losing divine participation the accompanying cognitive and
volitional perspectives are also lost.324
One consequence of a corrupt intellect is losing moral knowledge, resulting in moral
skepticism. This is a descriptive state for Pascal, as it merely describes the present human
condition without prescribing how it ought to be. He finds robust resources for describing this
state, the city of man, in Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond Sebond. After offering many
traditional Pyrrhonian arguments, Montaigne concludes in his work that religious and moral
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knowledge cannot be obtained, at least through natural means.325 Since he lacks knowledge,
reasoning cannot bring man to happiness or lead him to the good. These things can be gained
only through authority and custom, not reason. Morals are arbitrary and relative to one’s culture
and customs: convention instructs right living.326
Pascal agrees—having lost true human nature, and subsequently moral knowledge, a new
second nature is created through power and custom.327 This also means that tyranny becomes the
new ‘justice’:
The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary things and of the majority
in others. … Since we are unable to make might obey justice, we have made it just to
obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, we have justified might, so that justice and
might should unite and there be peace, which is the supreme good.328
Peace, the Supreme Good, occurs when power and justice exist in harmony with one another,
and since peace cannot be obtained through those in power acting justly, tyranny enforces its
own ideals, making a false peace under a new ‘justice.’ While tyranny and justice should be
antithetical, power is the only way to obtain peace without true justice.
This state has a drastic effect on the life of man. He realizes his own ignorance, and how
that impedes his desire to be happy; as a result, he will die alone and unhappy.329 If someone is
left to his own thoughts he is miserable. Finding this way of living unbearable, instead of
contemplating the source of his unhappiness, he instead seeks diversion and distraction to avoid
thinking at all. When not busying himself with games, going to the theater, hunting, and so
forth—for it is not the win or the hare people seek, but activity itself—he also distracts his mind
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by focusing it in places other than the present.330 When not consumed by distracting activity,
people deflect their thought from the present where they feel their nothingness; they instead
contemplate the future and wish for the past, but never live in the unbearable moment. Pascal
writes:
Examine your thoughts, and you will find them wholly occupied with the past or the
future. We almost never think of the present, and if we do so, it is only to shed light on
our plans for the future. The present is never our end. The past and the present are our
means; only the future is our end. So we never live, but hope to live, and, as we are
always planning to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.331
Although diversion is a solution to mitigate despair, ironically it becomes the greatest source of
our misery: by avoiding the anguish of the moment, a person no longer searches for truth. This
momentarily eases the misery, but its price is satiating that person’s dreadful march to death in
ignorance—“diversion amuses us and guides us imperceptibly to death.”332 A person’s passions
are also of terrible disservice here: they are both antithetical to the Supreme Good, training the
will to love things above God, and their nature of immediacy further distracts someone from
happiness. Pleasures that flow from passions are false pleasures, another diversion and substitute
for happiness that brings a person into further wretchedness.333
The remedy for this misery in the city of man is found in knowing and loving God. If
someone is able to enter into union with God, s/he is able to have knowledge and happiness once
again—s/he enters into the city of God. However, as a people with a dysfunctional cognition and
volition, none can know God through self-effort and mere reason. In the case of a priori proofs,
such as the ontological argument, Pascal complains that:
The metaphysical proofs of God are so remote from men’s reasoning and so complicated
that they make little impression. And when they are of service to some, it is only for the
330
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instant during which they see this demonstration. But an hour later they fear they have
been mistaken.334
Human reason is weak and an individual’s concentration is easily broken. It does not take a loud
cannon to distract someone from deep contemplation—all it takes is a small object’s creaking or
a fly’s buzzing to render someone incapable of sound reflection.335 Even when a person properly
follows such an argument, its conclusions lacks any conviction, and s/he quickly forgets the
soundness of the reasoning, and begins doubting it or is easily swayed to believe contradictory
claims.
Pascal also has little confidence in the ability of a posteriori arguments to demonstrate
truth with any conviction. When considering cosmological or teleological arguments, for
instance, he is clear that nature cannot prove God exists.336 The book of nature—observing the
sky and birds, and so forth—offers no conclusions beyond what the onlooker already believes;
what it tells the observer depends entirely on the epistemic perspective in which s/he is already
operating. Only those who already believe that God exists find these arguments compelling
proofs for God’s existence.337
Given these limits to human understanding, Pascal believes a different type of ‘proof’ is
needed. Instead of more traditional arguments, there are other kinds of proofs that function to
show religion is reasonable and that it understands man: arguments from morality (which are
focused on man’s unhappiness and desire to be happy), miracles, prophecies, and figures (that is,
ancient types in Hebrew literature such as Moses prefiguring Christ).338 Pascal believes these
‘proofs’ show that religion is not irrational and that is worthy of respect because it explains the
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human condition with better clarity than competing narratives and because its narrative has
prevailed over enmity and difficult circumstances for millennia.339 He also offers up protoexistential arguments—theology best explains the reason for existence at all, as well as existence
at a particular time and place.340
However, even if someone is able to overcome his or her intellectual limits with these
different proofs, s/he is no closer to knowing God. Knowing God requires loving him, and love
is volitional, not intellectual. The strongest proofs are still only able to move the intellect, not the
will. Even if someone is able to overcome his cognitive barriers—which is unlikely—he faces
further difficulty, since his will is also corrupt.
Pascal’s answer to this is the machine, commonly known as Pascal’s Wager. As I showed
earlier in this chapter, unlike Montaigne, Pascal believes someone who seeks God can at least
know that his religion has a higher probability of being true than not being true. This is a
fundamental necessity for the Wager—that one can say I believe this is likely true, and I wish it
were. In an earlier fragment of the Pensées, he writes, “For we should work for what is
uncertain, according to the rule of probability that was demonstrated.”341 If knowing God is
foremost volitional, then someone who finds religion attractive and believes it is likely true
should focus on the disposition of her will. In this sense, some contemporary philosophers of
religion rightly refer to Pascal’s Wager as a theology of hope.342 By immersing oneself in
religion, and participating in religious rites, exercises, and community—what Daniel Garber calls
the Pascalian Regimen—that person becomes more disposed towards embracing religious
339
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faith.343 Still, the hopeful believer has no guarantee of faith however much the Pascalian
Regimen may dispose his will towards belief. As a Jansenist, Pascal believes that faith, and
subsequently loving and knowing God, are beyond the postlapsarian human’s own ability. God is
hidden and remains hidden to those whom he has not dispensed effective grace.
This, of course, is disconcerting for Pascal’s interlocutor in the Discourse on the
Machine. It is true that happiness and knowledge of the good are found in God; it also the case
that the interlocutor does not have this at the moment. S/he is in the city of man but desires to be
in the city of God. In Pascal’s ideal case, if the interlocutor undergoes the Pascalian Regimen,
then God bestows effective grace upon him or her. But for those who do not receive this
effective grace, Pascal does not want to just abandon them to a life of concupiscence. Although
effective grace is a divine gift, practically speaking, someone who attends to religious rites,
practices, and community is more disposed to receive grace than someone who spends his free
time indulging in a vicious life of sensual pleasures and excesses: the sincere church-goer is
more likely to find God than someone who is getting drunk in a casino with a prostitute.
Nonetheless, if divine favor is a necessary condition for faith and it cannot be gained through
self-effort, what is the use trying? “‘But this is what I am afraid of’,” his interlocutor states.344
As a reassurance, Pascal offers an alternative morality: Neostoicism.345 The resident in
the city of man may never have happiness, but so long as s/he is living a life in ignorance of the
good, s/he can focus her efforts on making her life less miserable. The Pascalian Regimen not
only inclines the will to be more predisposed towards faith, but it also trains one in some general
Stoic exercises, allowing for a more content life than the alternative. As I showed earlier, Pascal
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believes that the passions are an obstacle to achieving the Good Life as they keep a person
attached to his concupiscence instead of seeking the source of potential happiness. However, by
reducing one’s passions it is also the case that, “You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful,
generous, a sincere, true friend. Certainly you will not be taken by unhealthy pleasures…”346
This is different from ataraxia, the tranquility of the skeptics. Although Pyrrhonianism has a
moral force as I discussed concerning Montaigne, Pascal’s doubt is anti-skepticism in the end,
for it seeks to distress the doubter, not console him. According to Pascal:
to doubt is then to be unhappy, but there is an indispensable duty to doubt. And thus
anyone who doubts and does not seek is at once unhappy and wrong. If, in addition, he is
cheerful and presumptuous, I can find no words to describe so extravagant a creature.347
The primary goal of the doubt is to cause discomfort and move one towards finding true peace in
the city of God.348
However, by seeking, the hopeful believer is able to find truth even in the city of man;
though s/he cannot find truth with certainty, s/he can find it with some probability. As the Stoics
taught, s/he will realize that the divine will is beyond his control. Since this is the case, s/he
cannot initiate her love of God. Instead, s/he can focus on that which is within her control—
know thyself and reduce one’s passions:
…the righteous man takes nothing for himself from the world or its applause, but only for
his passions, which he uses as a master, saying to one, Go and [to another] Come. Your
desire shall lie below you. The passions thus subdued become virtues… we must use
them as slaves, leaving them their nourishment, but prevent the soul from taking any. For
when the passions are masters, they become vices, and then they give their food to the
soul, and the soul nourishes itself upon it and is poisoned.349
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Pascal is synthesizing his Augustinianism with Stoicism. In addition to what seems to be a clear
‘two cities’ distinction in his morality, Pascal consistently draws from and admires the Stoic (and
Neostoic) literature, particularly in Montaigne and Epictetus. In ways, Pascal models
Montaigne’s solution: when ignorant of the good, the wise man knows himself, learning to
accept that which he cannot control and in turn follows customs and authority.350 The difference
is of course that Pascal believes knowing oneself and subduing one’s passions cannot lead to
tranquility, though they are a better life than a life of diversion and concupiscence. As I outlined
in the previous section of this chapter, Pascal also attributes a great intellectual debt to Epictetus
in the development of his own philosophy. I showed that Pascal’s criticism with Epictetus is not
that he was incorrect, but that he taught human duties can be fulfilled through a person’s own
volition.351 Pascal’s familiarity with Stoicism allows him to comfortably borrow from it,
synthesizing it with his own system similar to his appropriation of skepticism. The Stoic themes
in Epictetus again resonate with Pascal’s hopeful believer: like Epictetus, Pascal believes that
God is the principle object and that people should gladly submit to the divine will. Also, it is God
who dispenses all things, and therefore both fortune and misfortune should be accepted as good.
And so forth.
In concluding, I want to acknowledge that there are two cases where Pascal’s moral
philosophy as outlined in this chapter may be accounted for with a different explanation. The
first is that it is possible given Pascal’s Cartesianism that he draws this Neostoicism from
Descartes’ morale par provision in the Discourse on Method instead of directly from Epictetus
or Montaigne. This is not an implausible reading as Pascal had closely read the Discourse as I
argued in the first half of this chapter. However, given the variety of Stoic and Neostoic
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influences on Pascal, I suspect this fact is overdetermined; regardless of the answer, it does
nothing to undermine the structure of Pascal’s moral philosophy that I suggest.352 The second
case is that the classical Stoics make a two-fold distinction between someone who performs the
right action but not in accordance to nature, and who performs the same type of action but is
motivated by reason and not passion: that is, a distinction between a morally conscientious
person and someone who is genuinely virtuous.353 Though other parts of Pascal’s morality are
clearly Augustinian, such as his theosis, I would gladly concede that the binary division of his
ethics follows from the Stoics and not Augustine—after all, everything that Pascal learned about
Augustine he already found in Montaigne and Epictetus.354 In either case, it also does little to
undermine the structure of Pascal’s philosophy I offered.
At the end, Pascal’s ethics are actually tripartite, not dual. There is the city of God, where
true happiness and good are obtained. However, the city of man can be subdivided into those
who seek God and learn to control their passions—a Neostoicism to make life more bearable
while awaiting effective grace—and those who revel in misery, indulging in passions and
concupiscence. These two, or three, categories make understanding his morality through the
three orders of kind (charity, mind, and body) tempting, and it is understandable why the three
orders are imposed as a framework for understanding his morality given the similarity. However,
while evidence does not support the three orders reading, a two-cities structure with Neostoicism
as a ‘second best alternative’ seems to more naturally follow from his four major influences.
Neostoicism is not ideal, but it better predisposes one towards loving and knowing the Supreme
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Good—which is that for which one should hope—and if that fails, it is an alternative morality, an
adequate placeholder for him who God has not chosen.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
SPINOZA’S ANTI-STOICISM, OR, SPINOZA AMONG THE NEOSTOICS

Of the popularized philosophical literature from the 17th century, Spinoza’s work draws
the most obvious affinities with Stoicism. A précis of the Ethics may closely resemble the
Hellenistic philosophy with its pantheistic monism and description of the passions as an illness
of the intellect with the centrality of rational beliefs prescribed as its cure. The distinctively Stoic
quality of Spinoza’s Ethics and Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being did not go
unnoticed by his contemporaries. Leibniz, for instance, criticizes Spinoza with these accusations:
The sect of the new Stoics believes that there are incorporeal substances, that human
souls are not bodies, and that God is the soul of the world, or, if you wish, the primary
power of the world, that he is the cause of matter itself, if you wish, but that a blind
necessity determines him to act; for this reason, he will be to the world what the spring or
the weight is to a clock. […] In fact, these are Spinoza’s views, and there are many
people to whom Descartes appears to be of the same opinion.355
Though Stoicism was a central criticism of Spinoza in his time, these themes were neglected in
contemporary literature until recently.356
Since then, the tide of scholarship has returned to being more sensitive to these
correlations.357 In general, much of this literature shows a careful analysis of Spinoza’s texts and
a keen understanding of the Stoics. Nonetheless, I believe that it is not without its problems.
355
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My first concern is that, from my experience, the majority of commentators who take on
the task of examining these affinities state their position too strongly, overemphasizing Spinoza’s
Stoicism. In the introduction to my dissertation, I discussed the problem of what it means to be a
Stoic and I arrived at the conclusion that whatever family resemblance one might identify as
‘Stoic’, self-identification seems to be an important factor when recognizing an author as an
actor within a particular intellectual tradition. In this sense, Spinoza is not so comfortably
classified as a Stoic.358 He views no tradition as off limits for appropriation or criticism, drawing
from and criticizing a variety of philosophical schools, both ancient and modern, while making
no exception for Stoicism. He rarely refers to the Stoics—only once in the Ethics, and in that
instance, in order to offer a criticism.359 Furthermore, as far as Stoic doctrines go, in spite of
similarities, there are also central Stoic themes that he rejects, such as teleology.360 It is not
entirely clear that it is fair to identify Spinoza as a Stoic in this strong sense of some
commentators.
Also, with an exception of one recent monograph by Jon Miller,361 the literature on
Spinoza and the Stoics strongly, if not exclusively, focuses on his morality. Spinoza is presented
as a Stoic ethicist—not metaphysician or physicist. In this context, he is presented as a unique
champion of Stoic thought in his time. So my second concern is that there is a tendency to
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present Spinoza’s Stoic ethics as a 17th century novelty, a shocking moral view for his time.
Susan James writes, for instance, that:
Although twentieth-century scholars have largely lost sight of the Stoic elements in the
Ethics, these would unquestionably have been evident to many of Spinoza’s
contemporaries. To be sure, it is difficult to tell what proportion of his readers would
have possessed a sufficiently detailed knowledge of Stoicism to appreciate the full extent
of his intellectual debt. But it is clear that many of them would have recognized the
provenance of specific doctrines which were widely identified as Stoic. For example, the
claim that all passion is inimical to virtue, so that in so far as we become virtuous we
become free of passion, was regularly decried by seventeenth-century philosophers and
moralists as a Stoic aberration.362
Although Spinoza’s work is indeed novel, and he was harshly accused of Stoicism by some of
his contemporaries, the Stoic morality was hardly a fringe position in his time. Stoicism’s rebirth
during the Renaissance as Neostoicism had lasting influence into following centuries. As a
result, Stoic themes, especially Stoic morality philosophy, are pervasive throughout early
modernity.363
In light of the recent literature that has emerged on this topic, in this chapter I do not
intend to provide an exhaustive account of any particular Spinozistic doctrine, nor of his relation
with Stoicism. Recent literature has allowed for significant gains in scholarship pertaining to
both of these topics and I do not feel the need to repeat what has already been said well by
others. Nonetheless, for the two concerns stated above, I believe that the present-day discussions
continue to mischaracterize the role that Stoicism plays in Spinoza’s thought. In this chapter,
then, I aim to resituate Spinoza’s morality with a greater sensitivity to his anti-Stoicism and to
the philosophies of other Neostoics in his day. Doing this will allow for a better frame of
reference from which to understand his moral philosophy.
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In this chapter, I will argue that rather than offering an altogether unique morality for his
time (as the literature suggests), Spinoza is part of an established Neostoic tradition. This will be
accomplished through the following three sections: in the first section, I will give a brief survey
of Spinoza’s Stoicism as portrayed in contemporary literature, showing areas of neglect and
problems to be resolved; in the second, I will push back against these readings by showing
predominant anti-Stoic themes in Spinoza’s morality; and, finally, in the third, I will place
Spinoza into the tradition of Neostoicism by comparing his Stoicism (and anti-Stoicism) with
others in the Neostoic tradition.
I. Some Interpretations of Spinoza and the Stoic Morality
As outlined above, there are two present-day views pertaining to Spinoza’s Stoicism. The
first are those that neglect Stoic themes altogether; this is typical of less recent scholarship.
These commentators are interested in other philosophical problems in Spinoza’s work, such as
meta-ethics. For example, Edwin Curley examines Spinoza’s moral psychology against claims
that he is a psychological egoist. In Curley’s analysis he is not concerned with Stoicism, though
he does identify the end towards which Spinoza’s ethical theory is aimed as an enduring state of
mind, writing:
What is of primary importance, morally, is the quality of consciousness from which
action flows, and one of the main problems of moral philosophy is deciding whether
there are, ‘…any techniques for the purification and reorientation of an energy which is
naturally selfish, in such a way that when moments of choice arrive we shall be sure of
acting rightly’.364
The quote that Curley includes in this explanation is from Freud, which he finds to be an apt
paraphrase of themes in Ethics Part IV where Spinoza describes a gradual formation of a
364
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character less prone to harmful emotions.365 There are shadows of Stoicism lurking behind
Freud’s analysis cited here; Martha Nussbaum, for instance, frames Stoic morality as a form of
psychotherapy, drawing Freudian comparisons.366 But Curley does not draw this connection.
Likewise, there are many other authors who provide strong enough summaries of
Spinozistic philosophy in the Ethics but neglect its correlations with Stoicism. Stuart
Hampshire’s succinct introduction to Spinozism highlights several influences on Spinoza’s
thought, such as Hobbes and Descartes, and like Curley, he also draws correlation between
Spinoza and Freud, but there is no mention of the Stoics or their influences on his philosophy.367
The same is true for Genevieve Lloyd. In her detailed analysis of the Ethics, she focuses on
topics where Spinoza has clear affinities with Stoicism, such as substance, and could provide a
suitable place for introducing similarities in their thought, but she does not.368
Most of these texts are models of excellent scholarship in as far as the authors achieve
what they set out to accomplish. Fully acknowledging each of the traditions which influence an
author’s work may not be a necessary condition for interpreting his or her writings correctly.
Nonetheless, there certainly is good motivation for exploring these similarities.369 One way this
need is evident in particular is that though much recent literature has ignored Spinoza and the
Stoics, the issue of Spinoza’s Stoicism was important to his contemporaries. Jonathan Israel

365

See Ethics P.IV, Appendix 14-16, 27-28, etc. Curley similarly notes that in Ethics PV, Spinoza prescribes
techniques designed to accomplish this goal of character formation.
366
In The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. See Nussbaum (1994), 439, etc; Susan
James makes this connection between Freudian and Spinozistic psychotherapy explicit, drawing also from
Nussbaum. See James (1993).
367
Hampshire (1987), 98-132.
368
There are others, but Curley, Lloyd, and Hampshire serve as effective examples. There is a great deal of topical
literature as well that deals with themes relevant to the question of Spinoza’s Stoicism: Kashap (1987), Lin (2006),
Kisner (2013), and so forth. I am indebted to Miller (2015) for his analysis as it has helped me frame some of this
literature as I have.
369
Though context may not be a necessary condition for interpreting a philosopher correctly, it certainly helps a
great deal in drawing an interpretation and safeguarding against misinterpretation. Without context, there is the
danger of philosophy texts becoming nothing but a mirror of the reader’s own existing beliefs, an unfortunately
common occurrence among historians of philosophy who reject external evidence.

119

describes the intellectual climate well; many criticisms advanced against Spinoza were
accusations of Stoicism given their resemblance to some of the themes in his work:
While these modern [that is, present-day] scholars do not, of course, share the motives
which inspired earlier comparisons of Spinozism with Stoicism, the effect, were their
reading correct, might well be similar. For by labeling Spinoza a ‘Stoic’, Early
Enlightenment critics questioned both his originality and integrity, reminding readers that
Christianity had long since disposed of the arguments of the Stoics, back in late
antiquity.370
While I do not share Israel’s confidence that Christianity disposed of Stoicism – there is
overwhelming evidence that it was appropriated, not disposed371 – the overall force of his claim
is helpful. Understanding Spinoza’s relation with Stoicism, seeing to what extent he identifies as
a Stoic, and reconsidering where he rejects Stoic thought all help to illuminate the thought of
Spinoza himself.
Towards this end, a second set of present-day literature turns its attention towards
Spinoza’s Stoicism. One of the first to do so is Paul Oskar Kristeller. Kristeller sets Stoicism
against an alleged Aristotelianism, arguing that Spinoza is better identified as a Stoic and
Neoplatonist than an Aristotelian: in short, he claims it is false that Spinoza is influenced by
Aristotle because he is a Stoic. He appeals to Spinoza’s morality, highlighting the correlations
between their theories of the passions. In Kristeller’s account, conatus is “nothing but the
impulse of self-preservation which occupies a central place in the Stoic system of ethics.”372
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Although credit is due for being among the first modern scholars to note the similarities between
the two philosophies, even at the points where Kristeller is right in his article, he overemphasizes
the role that Stoicism plays in Spinoza’s thought. In treatment of Spinoza’s Ethics, he quickly
identifies him as Stoic while overlooking aspects that run contrary to Stoic thought.373
Another author who discusses Spinoza’s Stoicism is Susan James. While others argue
similarly, I find her account the most compelling.374 She approaches her discussion from the
place of Spinoza’s definition of virtue, which can be summarized as freedom from passion
resulting from a complex process of moral growth. She notes that Spinoza’s concept of virtue is
composed of two parts that are analogous to the Stoic opinion. The first is that virtue is living in
agreement with nature, or assenting only to actions that are in accordance with nature. However,
she notes that, according to Spinoza, the person who is merely living in accordance with nature is
likely to choose things that are morally indifferent, such as helping a sick friend because of pity;
this is a passion, instead of a rational emotion. This person, though morally conscientious, lacks
virtue. Because of this, the virtuous person requires an additional quality: living according to
right reason. James argues that following the Stoic doctrine that Diogenes describes as “knowing
your proper function,”375 Spinoza’s conception of virtue requires more than right action. Moral
worth resides not in what action is done, but whether that action is done with a virtuous
method is Neoplatonic, though he also admits that there is no tangible evidence for Spinoza’s Neoplatonism: “If we
try to find earlier examples for the application of the method of geometry, that is, of Euclid, to a philosophical
treatise, we do not find it in the Aristotelian tradition and not even in Descartes, but in the Elements of Theology and
in the Elements of Physics of the Neoplatonist Proclus who also composed a commentary on the first Book of
Euclid. The analogy strikes me as significant, although there is no clear evidence that Spinoza knew or imitated
Proclus.” (Kristeller, 3; italics are mine)
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disposition. She concludes that Spinoza’s morality is best understood as Stoic, then, and
identifies his Stoicism as an early modern aberration, appealing to criticisms raised against
Spinoza by Henry More and John Locke where he is accused of Stoicism.376 James makes
Spinoza into an unwavering champion of the Stoic philosophy; with most of the literature on the
topic following this opinion, it would be easy to believe that Spinoza’s morality is
unquestionably Stoic.
The bulk of present-day commentators, then, can be identified with these two views,
those who neglect Spinoza’s Stoicism and those who classify his morality as wholly Stoic and an
early modern novelty. There are two exceptions worth mentioning that do provide a more
balanced account. One is Steven Nadler’s introduction to the Ethics where he acknowledges that,
“Plato, Aristotle, and the ancient (and modern) Stoics all belong to the intellectual background of
the work.”377 He also notes some similarities Spinoza shares with the Stoic theory of the passions
as well as a their prescriptions to the good life, living according to nature.378 To Nadler’s credit,
though he makes connections between the two schools of thought, it is without overstating the
influence of one upon the other, realizing that, “The deeper one goes into the Ethics, and the
further one proceeds from the metaphysics and epistemology of the early propositions into the
domain of psychology, social and political philosophy, and moral philosophy, the wider range of
intellectual contexts within which Spinoza’s ideas can be situated.”379 Nadler recognizes many
other intellectual traditions besides Stoicism that also help shape Spinoza’s ideas: Hobbes,
Descartes, Jewish rationalism, and so forth. Nadler’s approach is refreshing, but it is a generalist
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introduction and as a result he does not intend to provide a detailed analysis of the Stoic themes
in particular.
The second exception is Jon Miller, whose recent, aptly titled monograph, Spinoza and
the Stoics, provides the most detailed treatment of the topic to date. He does not set out to
establish Stoic lines of influence on Spinoza, but embarks on a much safer project, to explore
their conceptual affinities. I commend Miller’s work here, and there is value in his approach—
this is an area of investigation still in its infancy, and it is a much more difficult task to prove an
author’s influence than to highlight similarities.380 Compared to the Stoics, there is much
stronger record of Spinoza’s familiarity with Cartesian and Jewish texts than the Stoic
writings.381 It is unclear whether all of his Stoic influences are direct, or if they are indirect
through someone else, such as Descartes.382 This is not a problem, then, of Miller’s work, but it
is helpful to acknowledge what he is and is not accomplishing. Another strength in this work is
that his account is also more extensive. Where the other commentators strictly focus on
Spinoza’s morality,383 Miller’s analysis parallels the five parts of the Ethics, following
correlations between the Spinozistic and Stoic philosophies in metaphysics, epistemology,
philosophical psychology, meta-ethics, and normative ethics. The result is a more robust
presentation of how Spinoza’s philosophy relates with, and often resembles, Stoic philosophy.
Miller’s work is an important a contribution to present-day Spinoza scholarship for this reason.
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Thus, Miller accomplishes what he sets out to do, but for this very reason he does not treat antiStoic themes in Spinoza’s works. And while an important first step, I would question the lasting
philosophical payoff of merely drawing comparisons between two philosophies without taking
the further steps to say that the correlations are more than mere happenstance.384 Finally, in
making a weaker argument, it also sidesteps the question in the second set of literature as to how
unique Spinoza’s Stoicism really was in his day.
Thus, what remains is literature that neglects Spinoza’s affinities with Stoicism, and
literature that discusses it but either neglects his anti-Stoicism or portrays Spinoza as Stoic moral
philosopher, unqualified and unprecedented. I am aware that my treatment of the literature in this
section is hardly exhaustive, but my task was to give a sketch of the climate of present-day
literature and nothing more, at least to this point. In the next section I will turn directly to
examining Spinoza and the Stoics, emphasizing the anti-Stoic themes are also prevalent in his
work.

II. Spinoza’s Anti-Stoicism
In the last section I gave a brief survey of present-day commentaries on Spinoza. I
showed that while the majority of authors ignore Spinoza’s Stoicism, those who acknowledge
their affinity provide accounts that are misguided in that they overemphasize the Stoic influence
on his morality, underplay his anti-Stoicism, or both. Left to the current state of literature, then,
Spinoza should be taken as a Stoic. But Spinoza’s contemporaries were not always so quick to
draw this connection, which is a good reason to at least give pause and examine the issue more
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closely before drawing that conclusion. Israel identifies Bayle’s shift in tone towards Spinoza,
noting:
In his late work, though Bayle ceased identifying Stoicism as the prime ancient parallel to
Spinozism, […] he also highlighted what he now saw as serious inconsistencies in
Stoicism […] All the affinities between Spinoza and the Stoics in the end, Bayle came to
see, are more apparent than real.385
As Bayle saw, in spite of similarities between the two, the case for Spinoza’s Stoicism becomes
less compelling when their inconsistencies are also included in the analysis. In this section I will
reject the notion that Spinoza is a Stoic in a strict sense. Since the present-day literature focuses
on Spinoza’s morality, it is there where I will also focus in emphasizing anti-Stoic themes
prominent in the Ethics.
It is true that there are many disagreements amongst the Stoics themselves, which may
complicate establishing what exactly is an inconsistency or which ideas qualify as Stoic as
opposed to anti-Stoic. Among the Stoics, variations in doctrine are unexceptional: Aristo
believed that some external objects are indifferent and can be preferred over others; Posidonius
rejected a monist psychology, replacing it with a Platonic tripartite division; and late Stoics, such
as Seneca and Epictetus, had much less to say about physics and almost entirely neglected logic;
just to give a few examples.386 There are nonetheless particular themes that are persistent
throughout the Stoic literature. Three of these themes are teleology, free will, and moral
perfectionism, all of which Spinoza rejects.387
The first, teleology, is central to the Stoic project. Stoic teleology shapes their physics
and metaphysics, which serves as a basis for their moral psychology, meta-ethics, and normative
ethics. According to the Stoics, the universe is divinely orchestrated according to providence.
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Furthermore, humans are created as rational beings, a quality held in common with the divine.
As a result, the universe is designed with specific purposes and predefined goals designed to
point humans towards the good life. The Stoics, of course, define the good life as living in
accordance to nature, which is exchanging harmful passions for rational beliefs.
Seneca, for instance, takes it as obvious that the universe has a caretaker that orchestrates
all things towards the good end of humanity:
What, then, is the part of a good man? To offer himself to Fate. It is a great consolation
that it is together with the universe we are swept along whatever it is that has ordained us
so to have, so to die, by the same necessity it binds also the gods. One unchangeable
course bears along the affairs of men and gods alike. Although the great creator and ruler
of the universe himself wrote the decrees of Fate, yet he follows them. He obeys forever,
he decreed but once. […] I suffer nothing against my will, and I am not God's slave but
his follower, and the more so, indeed, because I know that everything proceeds according
to law that is fixed and enacted for all time.388
Epictetus likewise describes humans as endowed by nature for greatness.389 After defending
divine providence through something like teleological argument, he explains,
…while for us, to whom He has made the additional gift of the faculty of understanding,
these things are no longer sufficient, but unless we act appropriately, and methodically,
and in conformity each with his own nature and constitution, we shall no longer achieve
our own ends. […] God has brought man into the world to be a spectator of Himself and
His works, and not merely a spectator, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is shameful
for a man to begin and end just where the irrational animals do; he should rather begin
where they do, but end where nature has ended in dealing with us.390
While Seneca and Epictetus represent the opinions of later Stoics, the early and middle Stoics
share this doctrine as well.391 Diogenes Laertius reports that, “Zeno first, in his book On Human
Nature, said that the goal was to live in agreement with nature, which is to live according to
virtue. And similarly Cleanthes in On Pleasure and Posidonius and Hecaton in their books On
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the Goal.”392 For each of the Stoics, teleology permeates their vision of what it means to exist in
the world. Furthermore, it plays an important role in solving potential Stoic difficulties, such as
the problem of evil. That is, they believed everything is both determined and good, two concepts
that are difficult to reconcile together with human suffering. Teleology serves as an important
explanatory function, in that it can say that suffering exists because it is divinely orchestrated to
cultivate virtue, which is our end.393
There is some disagreement concerning how to interpret Spinoza on teleology. Bennett
suggests that he rejects all three forms of teleology available for consideration: divine
providence, goal-directed human action, and what Martin Lin describes as “unthoughtful
teleology.”394 Several others reject Bennett’s thesis, directly and indirectly, by arguing that
Spinoza allows for at least one kind, teleological explanation of human actions.395 In either case,
what is nearly uncontroversial is Spinoza’s rejection of divine teleology. In the Appendix to Part
I of the Ethics, Spinoza observes the qualities of nature that are often attributed to teleology and
divine providence, noting that,
Now all the prejudices which I intend to mention here turn on this one point, the
widespread belief among men that all things in Nature are like themselves in acting with
an end in view. Indeed, they hold it as certain that God himself directs everything to a
fixed end; for they say that God has made everything for man’s sake and has made man
so that he should worship God. […] men always act with an end in view, to wit, the
advantage that they seek. Hence it happens that they are always looking only for the final
causes of things done, and are satisfied when they find them, having, of course, no reason
for further doubt. But if they fail to discover them from some external source, they have
no recourse but to turn to themselves, and to reflect on what ends would normally
determine them to similar actions, and so they necessarily judge other minds by their
own. Further, since they find within themselves and outside themselves a considerable
392
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number of means very convenient for the pursuit of their own advantage—as, for
instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, cereals and living creatures for food, the sun
for giving light, the sea for breeding fish—the result is that they look on all the things of
Nature as means to their own advantage. And realizing that these were found, not
produced by them, they come to believe that there is someone else who produced these
means for their use. For looking on things as means, they could not believe them to be
self-created, but on the analogy of the means which they are accustomed to produce for
themselves, they were bound to conclude that there was some governor or governors of
Nature, endowed with human freedom, who have attended to all their needs and made
everything for their use.396
Spinoza seems aware of the arguments, the same types advanced by the Stoics, that the world is
made in such a way as to serve human needs. He rejects the notion that just because humans find
ways that make the world fit their ends that there is any divine principle orchestrating these
things towards any particular end.
Though Spinoza’s rejection of divine providence is uncontested, Miller denies that
Spinoza is advancing his criticism against Stoic teleology, arguing instead that he targets JudeoChristian instantiations. Miller appeals to Ethics I, P33Sch2 as an example of this; here, Spinoza
discusses how everything necessarily follows from God based on his nature, and criticizes those
saying God created freely.397 Stoics agree, says Miller, there is nothing outside of nature that it
could take as a goal for its actions. However important immanence is here, Spinoza’s criticism
does not quite so carefully avoid the Stoic account as Miller suggests. The argument he rejects
strongly correlates with Stoic accounts of divine providence in other ways. Seneca writes, for
instance, that,
it is unnecessary to show that this mighty structure of the world does not endure without
some one to guard it, and that the assembling and the separate flight of the starts above
are not due to the workings of chance; that while bodies which owe their motion to
accident often fall into disorder and quickly collide, this swift revolution of the heavens,
being ruled by eternal law, goes on unhindered, producing so many things on land and
sea, so many brilliant lights in the sky all shining in fixed array; […] But let such matters
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be ketpt for their fitting time,—all the more so, indeed, because you do not lack faith in
Providence, but complain of it.
Likewise, Epictetus says while for the irrational animals,
it is sufficient to eat and drink and rest and procreate, and whatever else of the things
within their own providence the animals severally do; while for us, to whom He has made
the additional gift of the faculty of understanding, these things are no longer sufficient,
but unless we act appropriately, and methodically, and in conformity each with his own
nature and constitution, we shall no longer achieve our ends. […] But God has brought
man into the world to be a spectator of Himself and of His works, and not merely a
spectator, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is shameful for man to begin and end just
where the irrational animals do; he should rather begin where they do, but end where
nature has ended in dealing with us.398
The distinctions that Miller intends to draw between Judeo-Christian and Stoic teleology are not
at all clear. Although the Stoics believe the universe is created from necessity and deny God’s
transcendence, they also believe nature favors certain kinds of individuals—the universe is
structured for the benefit of rational beings. Spinoza rejects this aspect of teleology as well: for
him, nature is indifferent to humans, equally beneficial and harmful to all beings. There is no
unique bond between nature and humans due to a shared essence of reason. All differences
according to Spinoza are differences of degree, and without a special connection with humans,
there is no reason to prefer them to other beings.399
After denying that Spinoza intends the Stoics as his target of teleology, Miller then tries
to reconcile the Spinozistic and Stoic accounts of divine providence to show that the targets of
Spinoza’s criticism were directed elsewhere, but that the two are not irreconcilable. He claims it
is possible that the Stoics only held their teleological position because of inferior science and
because of this, it is not a necessary condition for Stoicism.400 Miller believes that the Stoics,
though well intended, did the best they could with their obsolete natural philosophy, and if they
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only lived today they would have rid their project of immature teleological notions and formed a
Stoicism sans teleology. I do not find Miller’s attempt to reconcile these two satisfying. Stoic
philosophy is systematic, and to remove its metaphysics and physics is to dismantle the entire
project. Removing teleology from Stoicism would be similar to removing the logic from
Stoicism, which may seem inconsequential to us, but which Epictetus warns that, “without
receiving exercise in these matters [that is, logic], or even being, by me at least diverted from the
study of morality, we nevertheless make no progress toward the beautiful and the good.”401
Furthermore, in order to maintain Stoicism without teleology, Miller is forced to reduce
‘Stoicism’ down to something so vague that it could include anyone who meets the broadest
affinities with this Hellenistic school. Under these conditions, Kant could also be understood as a
Stoic; he explains moral psychology in terms of conflicting natural inclinations that are shared
with irrational creatures, and rational inclinations that resemble the divine will.402 Kant also
argues that an action is praiseworthy if and only if it is done freely out of duty alone, following a
priori motivations, and not natural inclinations. This is similar to Epictetus, who writes that,
As it is, however, we are not inasmuch as these two elements were comingled in our
begetting, on the one hand the body, which we have in common with the brutes, and the
other, reason and intelligence, which we have in common with the gods, some of us
incline toward the former relationship, which is unblessed by fortune and is mortal, and
only a few toward that which is divine and blessed.403
For both Kant and Epictetus, morality is grounded in acting rationally, which is also to act well.
Although there may be these Stoic similarities with Kant’s metaphysics of morals, I would be
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remiss to identify him as a Stoic.404 Stoicism cannot be reduced to such a vague set of principles
without resulting in these problems.
So when Miller offers a construction of Spinoza’s conception of nature sans teleology, it
seems to compromise the entire Stoic framework. Whatever the Stoics were in the ancient and
early modern world, teleology was essential to their philosophy as a whole, and it is a feature
that Spinoza rejects. Although Miller is correct that Spinoza’s rejection of divine freedom aligns
with the Stoic account of a necessary creation, it seems that given the differences between the
two views outlined above that it is unfair to exclude Stoic teleology from the scope of Spinoza’s
attack.405 Regardless of whether Stoicism was Spinoza’s only target in the Appendix to Part I,
arguments that it was not at least one of the objects of his criticism are unconvincing. Spinoza
rejects divine providence, which is central to the Stoic philosophy.
Moving on, Spinoza’s second important deviation from Stoicism concerns free will. Free
choice of the will is a fundamental part of human existence, and a precondition for virtuous
living, according to Stoic teachings. Although external matters, such as good fortune, are
determined, free will is implicit throughout the Stoic writings as it is required in order to respond
to these determined events in a virtuous way. Seneca, for example, believes that it is not what the
virtuous person bears but how s/he bears it that is important.406 He writes,
There await us, if ever we escape from these low dregs to that sublime and lofty height,
peace of mind and, when all error has been driven out, perfect liberty. You ask what this
404
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freedom is? It means not fearing either men or gods; it means not craving wickedness or
excess; it means possessing supreme power over oneself. And it is a priceless good to be
master of oneself.407
Freedom is essential to transcending the passions, applying the intellect to overcome them.
Epictetus also refers to this in Discourses, where he writes,
But I have never been hindered in the exercise of my will, nor have I ever been subjected
to compulsion against my will. And how is this possible? I have submitted my freedom of
choice unto God. He wills that I shall have fever; it is my will too. He wills that I should
choose something; it is my will too. He wills that I should desire something; it is my will
too. He wills that I should get something; it is my wish too. He does not will it; I do not
wish it. Therefore, it is my will to die; therefore, it is my will to be tortured on the rack.
Who can hinder me any longer against my own views, or put compulsion upon me? That
is no more possible in my case than it would be with Zeus.408
For Epictetus, it is his will that allows him to live in accordance with nature, to replace irrational,
destructive passions with rational emotions.
Contrarily, Spinoza denies free will. There is only one place where Spinoza explicitly
addresses the Stoics in the Ethics and it is to criticize them on this point. In the Preface to Part V,
he writes,
Now the Stoics thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that we can
have absolute command over them. However, with experience crying out against them
they were obliged against their principles to admit that no little practice and zeal are
required in order to check and control emotions.
After comparing this view to Descartes, showing where the Passions of the Soul makes
analogous claims, Spinoza levels a tirade against Cartesian freedom, which also applies to
Stoicism by extension.
The third notable deviation that Spinoza takes from Stoicism is on moral
perfectionism.409 In short, this is the belief that complete virtue is attainable in this life. More
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particularly, this teaching in Stoic doctrine consists of three parts: (1) the unity of the virtues; (2)
that either a person is entirely virtuous or does not express virtue at all; and, (3) completeness of
virtue, or moral perfection, and as a result, also tranquility, are attainable in this life.
To the first, the Stoics believe that if someone has a single virtue, then s/he has them all.
Reporting on Stoic perfectionism, Plutarch describes that,
They say that the virtues are inter-entailing, not only because he who has one has them all
but also because he who does any action in accordance with one does so in accordance
with them all. For they say that a man is not perfect unless he possesses all the virtues nor
an action either, unless it is performed in accordance with all the virtues.410
They believe that the virtues as a whole cannot be separated from one another, and it is
impossible for someone to have a single virtue detached from the others. Plutarch’s report also
leads into the second part, that virtue is not acquired in degrees. Since there is a unity of the
virtues, if someone embraces one virtue, s/he has them all; it is the same with those who lack of
virtue, that they have none. It is Stoic doctrine, Diogenes Laertius writes, “that nothing is in
between virtue and vice, though the Peripatetics say that progress is in between these. For as,
they say, a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, but not
either more just or more unjust, and likewise with the other virtues.”411 This second part also
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applies to the degrees in which one may express the virtues as a whole. Stobaeus reports that the
Stoics think the wise man does all things well concluding,
In their opinion, the doctrine that the wise man does everything well is a consequence of
his accomplishing everything in accordance with right reason and in accordance with
virtue, which is expertise concerned with the whole of life. By analogy, the inferior man
does everything that he does badly and in accordance with all the vices.412
The virtuous person is morally perfect. Plutarch states this more strongly, also appealing to the
third part of this doctrine, where moral perfection and its resulting tranquility can be established
in this life. Subsequently, those who are not complete in their virtue do not obtain any virtue or
tranquility:
… just as in the sea the man an arm’s length from the surface is downing no less than the
one who has sunk five hundred fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are
no less in a state of vice than those who are far from it. And just as the blind are blind
even if they are going to recover their sight a little later, so those progressing remain
foolish and vicious right up to their attainment of virtue.413
Moral perfectionism is prominent in how the Stoics see virtue and the good life, which is the end
for their teaching.
In Spinoza’s case, it seems that he is willing to admit the unity of the virtues.414 However,
his account of human nature is bleaker than the Stoic view. Although moral perfectionism cannot
be easily divorced from how the Stoics see the ethical life, Spinoza still must reject one of the
last two parts of this doctrine. He believes that human power is limited and is subject to an
insurmountable amount of external forces. These forces influence a person’s ability to
successfully have all of his or her irrational passions changed into rationally grounded adequate
beliefs. In the Appendix to Part IV of the Ethics, Spinoza claims that: “human power is very
limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and so we do not have
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absolute power to adapt to our purposes things external to us.”415 And he confirms this in the
Preface to Part V:
Above all I shall be showing the degree and nature of its command over the emotions in
checking and controlling them [that is, the power of the mind or reason]. For I have
already demonstrated [in Part IV] that we do not have absolute command over them.416
For Spinoza, moral perfection is impossible. As such, if virtue and its resulting tranquility are to
be achieved at all, then virtue must be present but imperfect. This forces Spinoza to deny (2) or
(3): either it is possible to be virtuous in varying degrees that are less than complete and still
have virtue, or the good life is not possible in this life.
Firman DeBrabander takes this criticism further, noting that it is not just because of
external causes that people always fail to be fully virtuous, but that there are internal reasons as
well. For Spinoza, he argues, it is impossible for a person to have completeness of virtue because
there is always a laden desire motivating all rational judgments. He notes that Spinoza’s conatus,
the internal striving common to all rational agents, motivates all of a person’s judgments. As a
result, desire is implicit in any cognition, for the motivation to be virtuous is itself a non-rational
desire. Virtue is acquired for Spinoza when a person transforms beliefs from mostly passive to
mostly active—turning inadequate ideas into adequate ideas. So a belief stops being a passive
emotion when it is clear and distinct. The principle of Spinozistic ‘psychotherapy’, then, is the
ability for reason to produce new, more powerful emotions to combat and offset the passions.417
The goal is not to altogether transform or eradicate the passions, but to control and overcome
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them by producing stronger rational emotions.418 It is impossible, then, to rid oneself of desires
and emotions because they are a necessary and irremovable part of one’s own cognition.
Spinoza clearly rejects (2), then. Complete virtue cannot be attained in this life due to the
strength of external causes combined with the inability for someone to fully separate his or her
desires from the process of forming rational beliefs. If Spinoza were a Stoic, this would be the
end of his story, where the failure of reason at the hands of passions is inevitable, and the
morally hopeful person is left unable to reach the good life.
However, in the Appendix to Part IV Spinoza allows for (3), that virtue is possible in this
life. Different than the Stoic view, rather than worrying if one will reach perfection, which
Spinoza has already rejected, the prescription is resignation—to accept that moral perfectionism
is unattainable, but persevere in pursuing the Good Life nonetheless.419 There is still a sense of
futility involved, but it is not nihilistic. Consistently replacing passions with adequate ideas is
enough to lead to tranquility, even if this practice is not complete. Perpetual combat against the
passions will always be necessary; life is an ongoing pursuit of tranquility, of making all ideas
adequate. True moral perfection can only be achieved when fully reunited with the infinite
substance.420 Until then, the impossibility of moral perfection only becomes clearer as one
pursues and gets closer to it. DeBrabander describes Spinoza’s ethics as one that transcends the
Stoic ethical ideal: where the Stoics are “fatally optimistic” concerning the wise man’s victory
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DeBrabander (2004), 207. This difference is analogous to the difference between setting an object on fire (which
entirely transforms, if not eradicates, the object) versus controlling a wild animal on a chain. In the case of the
animal, it is very much the same as it was before the chain was attached, but it is kept from destructive behavior
since the person holding the chain is stronger. The Stoics believed the passions could be eradicated and replaced
with or transformed into rational emotions, but Spinoza believes the passions will always be present, but can be
controlled by producing a stronger emotion. This is reminiscent to Descartes in the Passions of the Soul where he
says that it is not possible to choose not to fix one’s gaze at something, but must direct the gaze at a different object
and thus indirectly remove the first object from sight. (Article 44)
419
“…that part of us which is defined by the understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be fully resigned and
will endeavor to persevere in that resignation.” (Ethics IV, Appendix 32)
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DeBrabander (2004), 210.
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over fortune, Spinoza instead prescribes resignation over the existential condition. The wise man
in Spinoza’s mind is only “saved” in recognizing “his normalcy.” The only difference, then,
between the wise and ordinary man is “a few degrees of intellectual clarity.”421 The whole life is
an ongoing endeavor to reach the mind of God; it is only fully reached upon death when it
reunites with the one substance.422
On moral perfectionism, then, though Spinoza accepts (1), he emphatically rejects (2),
believing that it is possible to obtain virtues incompletely. As for (3), though like the Stoics he
believes virtue, and tranquility as a result, is attainable in this life, what this actually means is
very different given Spinoza’s rejection of (2). The virtuous person is one who is not morally
perfect, but one who acknowledges this perfection is impossible, but perseveres in the becoming
more virtuous anyhow.
To step back, then, and consider this section as a whole, moral perfectionism now joins
teleology and free will as central Stoic themes that Spinoza rejects. It is more challenging to see
him as a Stoic with this in mind, even if in broad strokes his account resembles their story that
the passions are a sickness of the intellect whose cure is found in reason. Furthermore, all three
of these anti-Stoic doctrines are important parts of the ethical theories of both schools of thought;
to imagine a Spinozism with free will and teleology is just as unimaginable as a Stoicism without
them. Since present-day literature draws special attention to Spinoza’s Stoic ethics, it is
disconcerting that he repeatedly rejects these doctrines in his moral philosophy.
The question remains what to make of Spinoza and the Stoics, then. One option is the
approach taken by present-day commentators, to maintain that Spinoza is a Stoic. But I have
spent this second section discrediting that opinion: there may be resemblance, but Spinoza
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DeBrabander (2004), 210.
DeBrabander (2004), 210.
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cannot be a Stoic moralist in a robust sense if he rejects central ideas of Stoic virtue, free human
action, and teleology. Another option would be to outright reject his Stoicism while admitting
that there is some correlation between them. Under this option, we could agree that there are too
many reasons to reject Spinoza’s Stoicism to give it any credence. However, I do believe the
commentators are right in drawing out the similarities between the two philosophies. Spinoza is
recognized as a Stoic not only recently, but even Spinoza’s contemporaries accused him of
Stoicism.423 Because of this, I believe it is unfair to entirely dismiss Spinoza’s Stoic tendencies.
This leads me to a third option, which I believe is the best solution. Under this option, the way to
make sense of the problem at hand is to identify Spinoza not as a Stoic, but as a Neostoic.
Neostoicism is the tradition of commentators, interpreters, and philosophers during the 16th and
17th centuries that held Stoicism as foundational to their intellectual framework while
appropriating it to fit their other intellectual commitments. As a Neostoic, Spinoza is part of an
established tradition of moral philosophy. Rather than being a 17th century novelty as James and
others suggest, he is an important part of a vibrant school first established in the Renaissance. It
is helpful to understand Spinoza from this context, which is where I will now turn in the third
section.

III. Spinoza Among the Neostoics
At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Susan James, who advances two claims
concerning Spinoza’s Stoicism: first, that Spinoza is best identified as a Stoic, and from that,
second, Spinoza was advancing a controversial tenet of Stoicism through his morality. As for the
first, that Spinoza is a Stoic, at the end of the last section I arrived at the conclusion that he is not
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I showed Leibniz’s criticism at the beginning of this chapter (AG, 240-244) and as I will soon discuss, James also
mentions Senault, Coeffeteau, and Caussins.
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best identified as a Stoic, but as a Neostoic. Concerning her second claim, that Spinoza’s
Stoicism is moral in nature and controversial in its reception, it is entirely false.
Controversy undoubtedly follows Spinoza. He is excommunicated by the Dutch Jews.
His philosophy is condemned by philosophers and theologians alike. The Ethics was only
published posthumously for fear of its reception, an even bolder treatise following the
publication of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, which was itself a “scandalous treatise” that
Steven Nadler aptly refers to as “a book forged in hell.”424 What we do not see, however, is a
widespread condemnation of his morality. This does not mean there are not exceptions: Henry
More found problem with it, as well as some theologians such as Jean-François Senault, Nicolas
Coeffeteau, and Nicolas Caussins.425 James appeals to these critics at the beginning of her
argument. Her sample set is weak, however. All four of them had very specific theological
motivations that were threatened by both Spinoza and Stoicism. Henry More was among the
Cambridge Platonists, religious apologists whose efforts focused on defending doctrines such as
dualism against Hobbes and Spinoza. Their criticisms have a common flair for rhetoric, if not for
arguing ad hominem, which included levying accusations such as atheism, aimed to discredit
opponents.426 The Cambridge Platonists’ accounts of others should be treated cautiously when
not supported by other evidence. As for Senault, Coeffeteau, and Caussins, they were theological
moralists and preachers—while what they have to say should be taken into consideration,
conclusions should not be drawn based on these minor theologians alone while ignoring what
influential contemporaries such as Leibniz and Bayle also have to say.
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See Nadler (2011), 7-8 for more on these issues including the excommunication. In this chapter I also show
Leibniz’s criticisms as well as note ones that Jonathan Israel and Susan James cite including the Cambridge
Platonists.
425
James (1993), 291n10
426
See Kraye (1998), 1292 and Armogathe (1998b), 305-313, etc.
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If this sample set is expanded, it becomes evident that Stoic morality is not as exceptional
as James makes it out to be, but a fairly common 17th century manifestation that emerges from
the Renaissance. Neostoic morality begins with the Renaissance Humanists such as Justus
Lipsius and Guillaume du Vair. They published popular translations of Seneca and Epictetus, as
well as each publishing his own Neostoic philosophy. These Neostoic treatises “baptized”
Stoicism, giving a palatable Stoic morality to the Christian west.427 They replaced a pantheistic
monism with the monotheistic Judeo-Christian God. They also minimized what would have been
more embarrassing Stoic themes for their day, such as panpsychism. In addition to Lipsius and
du Vair, others during the 16th century, such as Michel de Montaigne and Pierre Charron, began
producing more complex philosophical accounts that were clearly Stoic but also took liberties in
their adaptions. Even more than those preceding them, these Neostoics were eclectics,
synthesizing multiple traditions together, rejecting aspects of each school when needed to fulfill
their philosophical vision. In their case, they synthesized Christianized Stoicism with
Pyrrhonianism.
These Renaissance Neostoics have a tremendous impact on the 17th century. In the first
three chapters, I showed that Descartes and Pascal both draw significantly from the Stoic
tradition in forming their morality.428 This is not to mention other philosophers who, though
lesser known, shared similar moral accounts. Among them was Princess Elisabeth, whose
correspondence helped Descartes in forming his morality, and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, an early
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This was not too far a deviation from the later Roman Stoics anyhow; Epictetus placed much greater emphasis on
the moral elements of Stoic thought than its physics and metaphysics.
428
Less strongly, Hobbes is clearly working through Cicero and Seneca in his work, and though he is influenced by
Stoicism to a lesser degree, it is treated much more fairly than nearly all other sources he writes on, ancient and
modern. His politics could be influenced by Stoicism at points. For example, though his appeal to the
Commonwealth being a body with the Sovereign as a head may be a biblical reference (Lev. Part II, Ch. 22-23),
Hobbes also may be referring to a text like Seneca’s On Clemency where the same analogy is used. See also
Oestreich (1982).

140

Cartesian who interpreted the Passions of the Soul as a physiological text and prescribed
Neostoic morality as the way to the Supreme Good.
Among the Cartesians there was also Antoine Le Grand, whose importance as a
systematizer of Cartesian ethics I discussed in my last chapter. Though he became yet another
prominent Cartesian to promote a Neostoic morality, his Neostoicism predated his Cartesianism,
publishing a pamphlet promoting Stoicism, Le Sage des Stoiques, ou l'Homme sans Passions
(1662), several years before his Cartesian textbook.
So by the time Spinoza writes his morality, there has already been a thriving tradition of
Neostoics for almost a century. Typically, they maintained free will and divine providence, but
reject an imminent theology along with monism and pantheism. However, what they all have in
common is that they interpret and appropriate a Stoic morality into their own philosophical
systems, selectively picking which parts cohere with their system and leaving behind those parts
they find cannot be reconciled. This is, of course, exactly what Spinoza is doing with Stoicism.
Spinoza enters into a tradition of Neostoicism, which is not to question the originality of his
work—Spinoza’s addition to the Neostoic tradition is important. Also, the goal of identifying
Spinoza as a Neostoic is not to downplay the other important influences on his thought, such as
Hobbes or Descartes; Spinoza’s philosophy is undoubtedly complex, and I gladly admit that his
Neostoicism allows for a diversity of influences, like Montaigne and Charron exhibited in the
previous century. I do believe it is helpful to understand him in this tradition, however, because it
is corrective against the first two options I laid out above, that Spinoza is either not a Stoic at all,
or that his morality is a robust Stoicism unparalleled in the 17th century. The Stoic influence on
Spinoza is symptomatic of a more widespread Stoic impact in the 17th century that affects many
others. Rather than his morality being considered a fringe “Stoic aberration” as James claims and
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many others infer, Spinoza’s morality is strikingly ordinary in the face of the 17th century
conversation filled with eclectics, Neostoics, Epicureans, Scholastics, and many others who
embraced a variety of ancient traditions that were stirred up in the Renaissance.
Still, it would be disingenuous to say that Spinoza’s Stoicism is not unique among the
early moderns, even among the Neostoics. What makes Spinoza particular, then, and especially
controversial, is that he is the only major figure in modernity that dares to leave intact the more
‘embarrassing’ aspects of Stoic physics (and metaphysics in a more qualified sense) which the
other Neostoics avoided. That is, like those of the Stoics, Spinoza is a pantheist, panpsychic, and
monist; he advances a theology of immanence and denies divine transcendence. Although this
itself deserves a more detailed study, I do not believe it changes the status of Spinoza in relation
to this Hellenistic tradition; his morality is less Stoic than other Neostoics, while his physics is
clearly more-so. This simply fits the Neostoic tendency to selectively embrace certain themes in
classical Stoicism while rejecting others; Spinoza is unique in how he practices his Neostoicism,
not in that he is one.429
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For both Spinoza and the Stoics, the line between physics and metaphysics is often blurry. To explore some of
these topics apart from discussions of Stoicism properly, I recommend Curley (1969) as well as Melamed (2013).
There is no major investigation of Spinoza and the Stoic physics. I hope to pursue this question someday.
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CONCLUSION
Over the course of this dissertation I examined the moral philosophies of René Descartes,
Blaise Pascal, and Benedict Spinoza. My first point of investigation was the morale par
provision of Descartes from the third part of the Discourse on Method. In this first chapter, I
defended the traditional reading that the provisional morality is a temporary morality, a ‘shelter’
from where to provide moral guidance until a more permanent ‘structure’ is established. Many
who reject this traditional reading believe Descartes should be understood as a Stoic. I showed
that though it is true that he should be understood as a Neostoic in the morale par provision, it is
an extension of his writing under a veil of doubt. He enters this mode in the first part of the
Discourse and does not emerge until the fourth part, after the morale. In taking on a skeptical
mode, he is mimicking the doubt of Montaigne and Charron who both complete their skeptical
accounts by providing a guide to living the good life when ignorant of the good, a life presented
as a Stoic Sage. For Descartes, the morale is provisional because the doubt is also.
In the second chapter I continued my investigation into Descartes’ ethics, turning to the
moral philosophy outlined later in his life through correspondence, most notably with Princess
Elisabeth, Pierre Chanut, and Queen Christina. In these letters, Descartes claims that his ethics
satisfies the competing traditions of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus. Creating a moral
philosophy that comfortably draws from all three of these traditions, Descartes believes that the
Supreme Good is virtue, which is primarily an internal state that is pleasurable in itself, and it
can also include external goods. He also claims virtue is obtained through cultivating habit and
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practice. In the first half of this chapter, I showed that Descartes creates the intellectual
groundwork for doing this through his physics of man, the Passions of the Soul. This synthesis is
made possible by relocating the cause of the passions: the passions for Descartes are not an
intellectual illness that grows from ignorance, but an amoral physiological event. Descartes
embraces Stoicism, but not exclusively; he is not forwarding any morality but his own, but his
doctrines are often, as he makes clear himself, similar to those of the Stoics, but not exclusively.
I turned to Pascal in my third chapter, arguing that he accepted Stoicism as an alternative
morality for those who lack moral good and happiness. An Augustinian in his theology, Pascal
provides a binary ethics that divides humanity into two groups based on the objects of their
affections, God and created things. Happiness and the Supreme Good, he believes, are only
obtained through knowing and loving God. As a Jansenist, Pascal believes that in the
postlapsarian state, loving God requires a movement of the will that a person is incapable of
making on his or her own, requiring effective grace. However, this means many people will
never know true happiness and will remain ignorant to the nature of the good. Since he hopes all
people will nonetheless pursue the good life, Pascal does not want to abandon those who do not
know God to concupiscence. His answer for the person who does not know the good is to
continue to seek God and embrace a Neostoic morality. By reducing one’s passions and
resigning oneself to the omnibenevolent divine will, though the morally hopeful person lacks
tranquility, s/he can still live a moderately content life, markedly better than a wretched life
enflamed in the passions. And from this place, s/he can continue to seek God, who is both the
source and essence of the summum bonum. When Pascal embraces Stoicism, it is not the good
life, but an acceptable alternative morality for those who cannot achieve their highest end.
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The fourth chapter, on Spinoza, took on a different approach than the previous three.
While the previous chapters argued that Descartes and Pascal exhibit Neostoic tendencies in
previously misunderstood articulations of their morality, this chapter encountered a Spinoza who
is already portrayed as a Stoic moralist by recent commentators. My aim here, then, was to
resituate his morality, agreeing that there are many affinities with Stoicism but refusing to accept
these similarities at the cost of reducing him to an unqualified Stoic. I showed that in addition to
their likeness, Spinoza also has a strong sense of anti-Stoic themes in the Ethics that should
disqualify him from being an unadulterated Stoic. Given Spinoza’s mixture of Stoicism and antiStoicism, I more carefully situated him within the Neostoics; this allows for Stoic themes to still
be acknowledged in his work, but with the necessary correction that Stoic themes should not be
attributed where they are absent.
It is fitting that my final chapter is on Spinoza. The chapters do follow the chronological
and philosophical development of these philosophers, beginning with Descartes, then moving to
Pascal who enters the discussion of Cartesian thought, and is then followed by Spinoza who
enters modernity as it advances from its earliest stages. All else aside, this is already an effective
arrangement. But by concluding with Spinoza, I am able to bring attention to the Neostoic
tradition in which he falls. That is, there is a broader implication that I intend to draw from this
dissertation study beyond better understanding the ethical theory of these authors individually.
There is an inclination towards Stoicism in early modernity that begins to emerge when seeing
themes common to them all. Stoicism is the ‘gravity’ of the 17th century, a background force that
is easily overlooked if a reader is not attentive; but it is always there, lurking just below the
surface, shaping and bending the intellectual landscape of authors who otherwise may have little
in common. And, like gravity, if attention is paid to the effects of Stoicism during this time, the
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impact is not just present but significant. This is the overarching theme that I have worked to
demonstrate beyond the examination of each individual philosopher. I end with Spinoza, seeing
him as a member of a tradition, Neostoicism, that was shared with Pascal, and before him,
Descartes.
There is much more research that deserves to be done on these topics, but this dissertation
provides a foundation for these new studies by uncovering the breadth of Stoic influence and the
diversity of forms in its adaptation. By design, I hardly think that this research program is over.
Many other early modern authors discuss Stoicism, both positively and critically, and my
research program provides a framework from which to consider these additional texts. Although
the diversity in the thought in Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza make an effective sample group, by
expanding the scope of authors considered in this investigation, the claims that I forwarded will
be strengthened or, if necessary, qualified. I am open to the hypothesis, for example, that 17th
century Neostoicism is a broadly Cartesian phenomenon. This is certainly true of early
Cartesians, such as Le Grand and Régis, and though identifying Pascal and Spinoza as Cartesian
is contentious, it would not be a radical claim to call some of the Stoic themes in their morality
‘Cartesian.’430 It could be beneficial to begin one of these future studies with Leibniz, whose turn
from Cartesianism is absolute and emphatic, and whose Stoic epithets of Spinoza are intended to
be anything but positive. Leibniz’s relation to Stoicism would be a productive first step in testing
the thesis of whether Neostoicism is a strictly Cartesian tendency in the 17th century. His work
would also be an interesting object of study since in his philosophy he embraces themes opposite
to Spinoza, such as teleology. Whether this teleology is in some way Stoic, though, I leave for
this future project.
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This warrants further investigation for several reasons, including that there is already an exception: Le Grand’s
Stoicism predates his Cartesianism.
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There is also further work that should be done towards the moral philosophies of the
authors I have discussed individually. Concerning Descartes’ early morality, a more detailed
analysis in the thought of Pierre Charron vis-à-vis Descartes is warranted. Richard Popkin and
José R. Maia Neto have already contributed important research towards this end,431 but I believe
a slower (and lengthier) study limited to Charron’s On Wisdom and Descartes’ morality in the
third part of the Discourse would be fruitful. Concerning Descartes’ later morality, a broader
analysis of the Passions of the Soul qua physics of man will help further highlight the relation
between Descartes’ physics and the applied philosophies (medicine, mechanics, and morals). In
Spinoza, a lengthier treatment on teleology, free will, and moral perfectionism as they pertain to
Stoicism would be helpful in filling an area of commentary that is still lacking; the same is true
for unpacking the correlations between Spinoza and the Stoic physics. At the moment there is a
great deal of literature on these topics in isolation432 and they would provide a fertile ground for
developing these ideas further in a Stoic context. A robust account of Spinoza and the Stoic
physics still remains to be written, and unlike his morality, I believe it would better bring out the
unique aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy that are more clearly Stoic.
Pascal leaves the most work still to be done. If I have accomplished nothing else in this
dissertation as it pertains to Pascal, my hope is that a reader may become more sympathetic to
him as a philosopher, someone who has more to contribute to philosophy than ‘the Wager’ (for
analytic philosophers) or marginal proto-existentialism (for the continentals). Needless to say,
there is a great deal to still uncover, including and beyond his Stoicism. A good place to start
here may be looking at his Discours sur les passions de l’amour. I also would like to see an
English translation of the latest manuscript of Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Épictète et
431

Popkin (1954) and Maia Neto (2003; 2014).
Curley (1969), Kashap (1987), Della Rocca (1993), Lloyd (1994), Garrett (1999), Manning (2002), Smith (2003),
Lin (2006), Youpa (2009), Kisner (2013), Melamed (2013), Kisner and Youpa (2014), and so forth.
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Montaigne with Pascale Mengotti and Jean Mesnard’s introduction. All of the existing
translations are of an older and less complete manuscript, and the introduction helps counteract
some of the popular misconceptions that currently exist concerning the document’s reliability.
Nonetheless, by understanding the Stoic themes present in the moralities of Descartes,
Pascal, and Spinoza, it allows for a clearer reading of their texts, reconciling what are apparent
inconsistences in their work and correcting misinterpretations that prevail in present-day
commentaries. There are certainly drawbacks with focusing my study on these three authors
instead of just choosing one of them; that is, I have had to strike a balance between depth and
breadth. However, if I had focused on only one as some others have, it would have lost the
greater benefit of uncovering the Stoic inclinations present throughout the period, and that is the
ultimate goal of this project.
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APPENDIX
MEDIEVAL REFERENCES TO STOICISM
I am sure I have overlooked a great number of references from both major and lesser-known
medieval texts, but the list of some references from two of the major figures, Augustine and
Aquinas, is helpful to illustrate how the Stoic philosophy was received in the period. That is,
they were not forgotten and not always viewed so badly. These are based on occasions of the
terms ‘Stoic’ and its variations, plus individual Stoic philosophers (‘Seneca’, ‘Cicero’,
‘Epictetus’, et al) as they appeared in Civitate Dei and Summa Theologica.
Augustine
Major References
CD IX.4
CD XIV.8

Stoics agree with Platonists and Peripatetics in different words
Stoics believe perturbations in the soul are allowed in the
place of grief or sadness.
Quotes, Glosses, Minor References

CD I.11
CD IV.30
CD V.2
CD V.9-10
CD VIII.5
CD XIV.2
CD XVIII.41
CD XIX.1
CD XIX.4

433
434

Quotes Antonius on human ends and that godliness is better
than wealth
Stoics still teach a shadow of truth regarding religion
Posidonius the Stoic says twins born and conceived under the
same constellation (he read too much astrology)
Cicero is wrong to dismiss all foreknowledge in his criticism
of the Stoics. Stoics do not say things happen out of necessity
but out of destiny. Necessity in the will.
The first Principle of Stoicism is Fire; Plato is Better
Stoics were wrong to only value the spirit over the body; both
will live on in afterlife.
Against Epicureans, Stoics hold that the world was ruled and
defended by the gods
Discussion on Varro’s accounts of the supreme good. Stoics:
supreme good is only in virtue.433
Perplexion that the Stoics presume to say that there are no
ills, though at the same time they permit that the wise man to
commit suicide if he cannot, or ought not, to endure his
ills.434

This is the account that Pascal (mis)quotes from Montaigne’s Essays as I discussed in my third chapter.
Pascal says the same thing in Pensées S180/L147, but he does not attribute it to Augustine.
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Aquinas
Major References
ST I-II,
Q.24, Art. 2
ST I-II
Q.52, Art. 1

Stoics do not distinguish between the sensitive and appetitive
soul; thus, all the passions are evil. Still, not a big difference
between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. Every passion
lessons the good of an act.
Stoics say some things, like art, come in degrees while other
things (like virtue) do not.
Quotes, Glosses, Minor References

ST I-II
Q. 59, Art. 2
ST I-II
Q. 59, Art. 3
ST I-II
Q. 66, Art. 1
ST I-II
Q. 73, Art. 2
ST II-II
Q.123, Art. 10
ST III
Q. 15, Art. 4,
Reply to Obj 2
ST III,
Q. 15, Art. 6,
Obj. 2
Reply to Obj 2

Cites Augustine’s CD IX.4: Stoics and Peripatetics hold same
opinion as them.
Cites Augustine’s CD XIV.8: There are three good passions
according to the Stoics, which they identify as disturbances;
the wise man has no sorrow.
The Stoics believe that virtue does not come in degrees; that
no one can be virtuous unless s/he reaches highest degree
(and that is wrong). Like Aristotle, it’s enough that s/he
approaches the mean.
Stoics say all sins are equal, which is the source of heresies.
Privation, the only aspect of sin considered.
Stoics say, against Aristotle, that a brave man never uses his
anger.
Notes Tully who references the Stoics, criticizing that they
only named the passions that lead to disorderly conduct.
Stoics assert there is no one saddened except at the loss of
goods; the just man esteems justice and virtue as goods and
he cannot lose those.
Cites Augustine’s CD XIV.8, that there are three good
passions and the wise man has no sorrow.
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